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ABSTRACT 
 
Pluralism is an inescapable feature of contemporary liberal societies and it raises the 
demand for a normative strategy to face the disagreement it generates. Contemporary 
debates in normative political theory deal with pluralism by proposing a variety of 
solutions to prevent it from degenerating into unmanageable conflicts. The most 
prominent and dominant theoretical paradigm is John Rawls’s theory of political 
liberalism, that dissolves the dangerous potential of political disagreement by imposing 
a discipline of pluralism. This work is guided by the question: is there a way to govern the 
undesirable consequences of pluralism that does not imply a disciplining of pluralism 
itself? The goal is to find a solution to the problem of pluralism, a strategy for its 
management able to preserve its features without putting order, peace and stability at 
risk. Along with modus vivendi scholars and contrary to the Rawls outlook on modus 
vivendi, this work is committed to show that modus vivendi contains the potential to 
give an answer to the pluralism of beliefs and not just to the plurality of goals. Modus 
vivendi is here regarded as an independent political project, capable of providing an 
answer to pluralism whilst representing a valuable alternative to political liberalism. I 
commence my analysis challenging the Rawlsian paradigm of political liberalism, starting 
with an assessment of his version of pluralism, reasonable pluralism, and of what I call 
the “tools” that political liberalism puts in place to contain the effects of reasonable 
pluralism and to attain a form of strong and enduring consensus. I then turn to the 
appraisal of modus vivendi solutions. I define the Rawlsian understanding of modus 
vivendi (which I called “Rawlsian modus vivendi”, RMV) as the black mirror of political 
liberalism since it is entirely thought out to perform an ancillary role with respect to the 
purposes of it. The pars construens on this work is dedicated to the project of rethinking 
modus vivendi along the dynamics of compromise, a model that I call “compromise 
modus vivendi” (CMV). I argue that CMV should fall within the scope of non-ideal 
realist political theory and that it is normative as it demands that citizens have an attitude 
to compromise, specified by a list of requirements. I observe how the dynamics of CMV 
result in a specific form of consensus that does not require any selection of reasons and 
a specific form of stability (light stability) that mirrors such openness to plural reasons. I 
conclude that CMV has the virtue of being a desirable and practicable solution while 
respecting pluralism in its actual form. 
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Introduction 
A description of contemporary liberal democracies would not be correct or complete if 
it did not account for pluralism. Pluralism is defined by the set of moral, religious, 
philosophical points of view hosted in liberal societies. In other terms, it is the empirical 
observation of the fact that people hold different beliefs. Contemporary liberal societies 
are pluralistic and citizens of such societies constantly encounter the effects of pluralism 
in the public debate, in newspapers, on social media, and especially in political discourses. 
However defined, pluralism fosters disagreements that may, time after time, find 
uncontroversial solutions, but may also trigger broad debates and harsh quarrels. One 
task of politics is to confront with such disagreement and to design a practicable way to 
deal politically with the plural and competing claims advanced by citizens. Normative 
political theory has aimed attention at the problem of pluralism over the past three 
decades, but it is far from being a resolved issue. Recent events in Western democracies 
constitute evidence of how the question of understanding how to deal with the fact of 
pluralism is an urgent one. 
Contemporary debates in normative political theory dealt with pluralism by 
proposing a variety of solutions to prevent it from degenerating into unmanageable 
conflicts. The most prominent and dominant theoretical paradigm is John Rawls’s theory 
of political liberalism. The strategy advanced by political liberalism alleges for the 
possibility of overcoming, and not just coping with, the problem of pluralism. Political 
liberalism dissolves the dangerous potential of political disagreement by imposing a 
discipline of pluralism. In political liberalism, the urgent question raised by pluralism 
becomes the question raised by reasonable pluralism, i.e. a regimented version of pluralism 
that is more accommodating to the desiderata of the theory and so easier to be politically 
managed.  
The study of political liberalism, and of the large debate that it raised, brought 
about the research question that guided this work: is there a way to govern the 
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undesirable consequences of pluralism that does not imply a disciplining of pluralism 
itself? My question concerns in the first instance a method to look at pluralism and to 
give a normative answer that left it untouched, unreduced, unrefined. My goal was to 
look for a theory that worked for the purposes of pluralism and not a form of pluralism 
that worked for the purposes of the theory. The guiding idea of this work was to find a 
solution to the problem of pluralism, that is to think out a strategy for the management 
of pluralism able to preserve its features without putting order, peace and stability at risk. 
I looked for this strategy within the method of modus vivendi. 
The theory of modus vivendi is discarded by Rawls as a mere battle for power 
within a society and identified with a contingent and fortunate conjunction of events 
leading to a simple balance of interests (a solution of no normative relevance). Along 
with other scholars studying the dynamics of modus vivendi and contrary to Rawls, I 
believe that modus vivendi contains the potential to give an answer to the pluralism of 
beliefs and not just to the plurality of goals. For this reason, I embarked on a reflection 
on modus vivendi as an independent political project, capable of providing an answer to 
my research question whilst representing a valuable alternative to political liberalism. 
Between the overcoming of pluralism in the form of strong consensus envisaged by 
political liberalism and the Rawlsian demeaning understanding of modus vivendi, there 
is an option to be explored, that is a normative conceptualisation of modus vivendi. 
A complete scrutiny of this third option is the object of a current lively debate in 
political theory and my contribution nestles within this new emerging field. In order to 
seriously conduct my examination of modus vivendi as a substantial response to the fact 
of pluralism, I devoted large part of this work to the assessment of the available 
solutions, i.e. political liberalism and the Rawlsian account of modus vivendi. I then 
considered the state of the art of the contemporary debate on normative modus vivendi. 
The objective of my analysis was to measure which aspects of the available perspectives 
could assist in answering my research question, and which aspects determined obstacles 
in preserving pluralism without endangering order. I searched for a solution that could 
be respectful of the fact of pluralism as it is (its factual shape) by being at the same time 
practicable as well as desirable, and thus politically relevant. 
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This solution is an example of modus vivendi theory tailored onto the notion of 
compromise, which I called “compromise modus vivendi” (CMV). Having observed 
that the narrative of negotiation and compromise is a significant facet of the debate 
around modus vivendi, I examined the dynamics of compromise and found that they 
are consistent with the essential features of modus vivendi. CMV, the outcome of such 
analysis, is a normative theory of modus vivendi that does not call for any restriction on 
pluralism and can guarantee a sufficient level of stability. For this reason, I believe that 
CMV is a desirable solution. Because it is a normative solution and because it refers to 
the notion of compromise, CMV implies some demands for individuals, that are 
modeled according to the attitude required of compromising parties. Such demands take 
into account the imperfection and complexity of human political interaction and, unlike 
the demands of Rawlsian public reason, do not embody any indication about what values 
or kind of values should be prioritised. As a result, they do not constitute an infringement 
on pluralism nor they represent an interference with contingent political dynamics. I 
believe this aspect of CMV make it a desirable but also practicable answer to the question 
of pluralism. 
I commenced my analysis challenging the Rawlsian paradigm of political 
liberalism. I started with an assessment of his version of pluralism, reasonable pluralism, 
and of what I called the “tools” that political liberalism puts in place to contain the 
effects of reasonable pluralism and to attain a form of strong and enduring consensus. I 
identified two main features of political liberalism that I argued should be considered 
shortcomings in facing the fact of pluralism: political liberalism is an example of ideal 
theory and of moralist theory. The descriptive distance political liberalism has from the 
reality of political cooperation, I argued, results in the definition of a demanding 
standard, that real people will hardly ever match. The reconstruction and critique of 
political liberalism constitute the substance of Chapter 1.  
I then turned to the appraisal of modus vivendi solutions. I defined the Rawlsian 
understanding of modus vivendi (which I called “Rawlsian modus vivendi”, RMV) as 
the black mirror of modus vivendi since it is entirely thought out to perform an ancillary 
role with respect to the purposes of political liberalism. RMV has the explanatory 
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function of describing a political scenario in which all the desiderata of political liberalism 
are absent and that, for this reason, is highly undesirable because deeply unstable. I 
observed how RMV is no more descriptively adequate than political liberalism is, as it 
oversimplifies political interaction by depicting it as mere coordination of goals.  
A final step required before addressing CMV consisted of laying the foundation 
of my proposal in the field of normative modus vivendi theory. Could CMV be a non-
ideal, non moralist theory and a practicable, desirable, stable political solution respectful 
of pluralism that still be true to what constitutes a modus vivendi? In examining the 
stances of modus vivendi theorists, I concluded that the form of consensus featured in 
CMV should be built on prudential and plural reasons and that CMV should embody a 
thin notion of toleration, consistent with pluralism and minimally demanding. The 
critique of RMV and the critical analysis of modus vivendi literature are comprise, 
respectively, in the first and second part of Chapter 2. 
On this premises, I devoted Chapter 3 to construct the proposal of CMV. My 
aim has been to figure out what constitutes the idea of compromise and how it can be 
used to define modus vivendi, rather than tackling modus vivendi in the first place and 
then incorporating the language of compromise. I believe CMV unfolds the existing 
dynamics between modus vivendi and the concept of compromise and I argued that the 
normativity of compromise not only is consistent with the purposes of modus vivendi, 
but it also reveals, at least to a partial extent, what type of normativity modus vivendi 
theory should look for. 
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Chapter 1  
The limits of political liberalism 
1.Political liberalism: questions, goals, premises 
1.1. Genesis and aims 
Amongst the most prominent strategies to manage the ineradicable presence of 
pluralism in contemporary societies is certainly the Rawlsian one, that established an 
approach to the issues of political theory widely recognised as mainstream and identified 
as political liberalism. The full systematisation of the theory is indeed represented by 
Rawls’s 1993 Political Liberalism (hereinafter PL1), a book which genesis unveils the depth 
and relevance of some of its core concepts. PL, in fact, represents a step back with 
respect to his 1971 work A Theory of Justice which goal was to identify a set of principles 
of justice that might be widely accepted and that might work as the foundation for a 
well-ordered and stable society, by defining a method, the original position, intrinsically 
able to guarantee that the outcome would be the fairest. The result was the theory of 
justice as fairness, defined by two fundamental principles: the first listing a set of basic 
prior liberties, the second covering the issues of distributive justice2. The way justice as 
fairness was presented in TJ was considered dissatisfactory by Rawls, also because it does 
not sufficiently account for the ongoing disagreement on political matters that 
characterises contemporary democracies. In particular, in TJ, the conception of justice 
as fairness embodied a conception of the individual as having capacity for moral agency. 
Individuals are able to perform moral rights and duties connected with their capacity of 
having moral motivations to act according to a certain notion of virtue3. Justice as 
fairness represented thus what Rawls defined a comprehensive account of justice, because 
                                            
1 I will refer hereinafter to Political Liberalism the book as “PL”, while with the expression “political liberalism” I 
refer to the theory. 
2 For a recent analysis see Freeman and Freeman 2007. 
3 Rawls 2005, xliii. All through this work I will refer to the 2005 edition of PL, without specifying if I am referring 
to PL (originally published in 1993), Reply to Habermas (originally published in 1995), or The Idea of Public Reason 
Revisisted (originally published in 1997), unless it is relevant for the argument. 
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it embodied potentially controversial claims that go beyond the scope of the political 
and may hardly be the object of a wide agreement. 
In the years that separate the publication of TJ from the one of PL, Rawls 
developed a defence of justice as fairness consisting in harbouring the account of justice 
connoted by the two principles in a new project, advocating for a political structure that 
may satisfy the requirements of justice even while taking into account a basic feature of 
contemporary liberal societies, i.e. the fact of pluralism typical of modern liberal 
democracies. In this sense, the question of political liberalism is not anymore one of an 
account of justice preferable to alternative options (utilitarian, perfectionist or 
intuitionist). Rather it is the one of showing how an account of justice can possibly work 
in the specific historical and institutional context of contemporary constitutional 
democracies4. The first concern of political liberalism is to show how justice as fairness, 
that is a “particular account of justice…always to be so understood”5, should work when 
it is adjusted to the presence of pluralism. So, in this sense, the underlying purpose of 
political liberalism consist of the achievement of two goals. A first one is still that of 
presenting the design of a well-ordered liberal society (i.e. a society where citizens share 
a conception of justice and in which such conception of justice informs the fundamental 
institutional structure6) that respect the demands of justice. But this time a second aim 
is added: political liberalism should also be able to manage the undesirable consequences 
of the existent variety of incompatible moral standpoints7. Part of the management of 
pluralism consists in political liberalism having the adequate theoretical tools to enable a 
sufficient degree of stability, given the requirements of liberty and legitimacy typical of 
a well-ordered society. In fact, the problem that political liberalism intends to investigate 
                                            
4 Audard 2006, 7. 
5 Rawls 2005, xxxv, n. 2. 
6 Rawls 1999, 4. 
7 “A main aim of Political Liberalism … is to say how the well-ordered society of justice as fairness set out in A Theory 
of Justice … is to be understood once it is adjusted to the fact of reasonable pluralism … and regulated by a political 
conception of justice. … Another main aim of PL is to say how a well-ordered liberal society containing a number 
of reasonable political conceptions is to be understood” (Rawls 2005, xxxv-xxxvi). This is how Rawls sets out the 
goals of political liberalism in the 1999 introduction. This brief quotation shows how the adjustment of justice as 
fairness to pluralism comes together with an arrangement of the question that political liberalism is asking, that is 
the possibility of a just and stable society given pluralism. As I will explain later, the notion of reasonableness is 
the cornerstone of the answer to such question. 
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is presented as the possibility of a plural yet liberal, democratic, just and stable society8 
and the design of an efficient strategy to fulfil these goals. 
 
1.2. Pluralism as it is, pluralism as it should be 
Pluralism is presented as the “fact of pluralism”, defined by the array of 
comprehensive doctrines, that is those philosophical, religious, moral views that include 
“conception of what is of value in human life, and ideals of personal character, as well 
as ideals of friendship and of familial and associational relationships”9. Comprehensive 
doctrines embody and/or imply specific sets of values and give indications about how 
to rank such values, that can (and often do) cover manifold aspects of human life, thus 
giving indications about the motives and reasons to act one way or another in the private, 
as well as in the public sphere. Their role is all-encompassing10, they contain normative 
indication about how life should be conducted inside and outside the political realm, that 
is to say they provide individuals with full moral guidance11. Comprehensive doctrines 
put forward incompatible ideas of what is to be considered good and virtuous in human 
life, in fact the value claims embodied in comprehensive doctrines can be and in fact are 
in conflict. Because they advocate for specific political decisions the disagreement they 
might bring about has political relevance. The set of comprehensive doctrines is defined 
as the fact of pluralism, and it consists of the acknowledgement that the positions 
concerning the good of life are manifold and that their difference is potentially 
impossible to overcome.  
This account of pluralism is not specified by a metaphysical claim about the 
nature of values and their being related to incommensurable ends of human life as for 
instance in Isaiah Berlin’s work12, which could represent one amongst others 
philosophical comprehensive doctrines. The fact of pluralism does not embody any 
                                            
8 Freeman 1994, 619-633. 
9 Rawls 2005, 13. 
10 Dreben 2002, 331. 
11 Comprehensive doctrines “inform much of our non-political conduct (in the limit our life as a whole). … A 
doctrine is fully comprehensive when it covers all recognized values and virtues within one rather precisely 
articulated scheme of though; whereas a doctrine is only partially comprehensive when it comprises certain (but 
not all) non-political values and virtues and is rather loosely articulated” (Rawls 2005, 175). 
12 Berlin 1969, Berlin 1998. 
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claim about the ontological and metaphysical status of values. Its philosophical 
definition is agnostic with regard to any value-related dynamics that apply to the broadly 
conceived interpersonal sphere (so to a set of situations larger than the political) and falls 
within the competence of moral philosophy, rather than of political theory. The fact of 
pluralism corresponds to the acknowledgement that de facto, values expressed in the 
public discourses of modern and contemporary societies do (and potentially will still do 
in the long run) ask for incompatible political solutions. They refer indeed to different 
conceptualisations of what is good and therefore give different indications about what 
has to be done also in the political realm. The problem of political liberalism is exactly 
the one of finding a way for the political to offer a framework that can be presented as 
coherent and acceptable from all these points of view, i.e., in other terms, to reconcile the 
irreconcilable claims represented in the fact of pluralism13. In this sense, its goal goes 
beyond the management of the undesirable consequences of pluralism. In fact, it rather 
primarily aims at shaping the political according to the needs of the pacification of 
disagreement generated by pluralism.  
In order to do this, political liberalism has to put in place a series of theoretical 
tools that make such appeasement possible (as well as successful from the point of view 
of stability). Such theoretical tools are the notions of reasonableness and of public reason, 
and on their turn they produce two effects. They enable a form of strong agreement, 
overlapping consensus, and allow for a specific kind of public justification. Reasonableness is 
the form of reasoning that specifies an interpersonal (moral) attitude referring to the 
notion of reciprocity, and it embodies a list of requirements that apply to the content of 
                                            
13 Here it is worth to look more in detail in the Rawlsian terminology, crucial to the formulation of the most 
fundamental ideas of political liberalism, as it will be clearer later. Comprehensive doctrines accomplish, as I said, 
an all-encompassing task: they (can) host all kinds of beliefs, including of course those concerning moral and 
political values. In so doing they provide full or at least partial guidance in defining one’s own plan of life, that is 
laying out what are good ends to be pursued or more broadly what should be considered morally valuable (virtuous 
or, indeed, good). The way the many comprehensive doctrines rank, organise and account for values is not 
homogeneous and is not fully necessitated by context. This plurality is what constitutes the fact of pluralism and it 
results in an ongoing ineradicable disagreement about what is to be considered good. In contrast, those political values 
embodied in the conception of justice are the object of agreement and define what is right. According to Rawls, the 
values and beliefs falling under the respect of the right are not subject to the same disagreement that concerns the 
idea of the good. Through this usage of the conceptual pairs moral/political and right/good, Rawls redefined the 
sense in which the idea of “political” should be employed. The reduction of the sphere of the political to the 
conception of justice and rightness, resulted in an exclusion from the theoretical discourse about the political of all 
considerations that concern the facts of politics and that fall outside the scope of the definition of justice 
(relationships of power, changing circumstances, interests and non well-ordered form of political participation).  
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comprehensive doctrines. Moreover, reasonableness informs public reason, that in its 
turn defines the set of reasons citizens can bring in the public sphere and how they 
should refer to the conception of justice. These are what Rawls calls the right reasons, that 
is those specified by the most reasonable conception of justice and formulated according 
to its political values (embodied in all reasonable comprehensive doctrines14), and in fact 
they represent an appeal to those values “that all citizens as reasonable and rational might 
reasonably be expected to endorse”15. This collection of concepts, just mentioned 
highlighted in italics, are the theoretical devices that constitute the architecture of 
political liberalism and that perform the function of reconciling the irreducible claims of 
the many comprehensive doctrines. This function is achieved by setting the profile of 
political circumstances in order for the different moral points of view to be able to 
endorse the conception of justice: “the problem of political liberalism is to work out a 
political conception of political justice for a (liberal) constitutional democratic regime 
that a plurality of reasonable doctrines, both religious and nonreligious, liberal and 
nonliberal, may endorse for the right reasons. … In sum, PL considers whether in the 
circumstances of a plurality of reasonable doctrines, both religious and nonreligious, 
liberal and nonliberal, a well-ordered and stable democratic government is possible, and 
indeed even how it is to be conceived as coherent”16. The specification of the set of 
reasons together with the qualification of the set of comprehensive doctrines taken into 
account as just the reasonable ones make the system of political capable of matching the 
standard set by the conception of justice while being at the same time stable17, thus 
fulfilling its present goals. 
                                            
14 “Public political discussions, when constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice are at stake, are always 
(or nearly always) reasonably decidable on the basis of the reasons specified by the most reasonable political 
conception of justice, or by a reasonable family of such conceptions” (Rawls 2005, 391).  
15 Rawls 2005, 236. 
16 Rawls 2005, xxxix. 
17 In fact, “[i]t bears emphasizing that Rawls is not concerned with Hobbesian stability or peace and tranquillity for 
their own sake. The stability of a grossly unjust society is worth little or nothing by itself, particularly if its 
destabilization will result in a more just situation without great loss of life. Rawls’s concern is with the stability of 
a presumptively just (or “well-ordered”) society, which depends on its member having certain moral motives” 
(Freeman 2002, 21). Such set motivations to support the institutional set of the well-ordered society is the result 
of a selection put into place by reasonableness and leading to overlapping consensus. Because such reasons are 
grounded in the political values of the conception of justice, they are referred to as the right reasons. Stability in 
political liberalism is worth being achieved only if it is for those right reasons, that guarantee moral allegiance to 
the institutional (political) set, rather than merely disclose an interest in peaceful coexistence.  
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Nevertheless, such accomplishment of both tasks, answering the question raised 
by justice and by pluralism at one time, comes at a cost. Ultimately, what reasonableness 
and public reason do is to impose limits on the scope and depth of pluralism, by 
governing the kind of claims that can be brought into the public sphere, that is in the 
institutional space where issues concerning the basic structure of society are discussed. 
So, it is the fact of pluralism, i.e. the set of comprehensive doctrines, that is the very 
object of this restraint operated by reasonableness and public reason. Reasonableness is 
the standard making it possible for political liberalism to select those comprehensive 
doctrines that are worth to be taken into account for the purpose of full public 
justification and of the stability of the agreement on the conception of justice. 
Overlapping consensus thus corresponds to an area of intersection among reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines, that is indeed specified by boundaries of reasonableness18. 
This way, it is also a satisfactory solution from the point of view of stability over time 
because it refers and in fact depends on an ex ante specified set of viewpoints, i.e. 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines19. These are those religious, philosophical and moral 
doctrines that can be formulated in a way that makes them imply or at least makes them 
compatible with the conception of justice, the values of which are assigned priority or at 
least great importance within the conception of the good that the doctrines put forward. 
This “new” and narrower set of comprehensive doctrines, governed by the discipline of 
reasonableness constitutes the fact of reasonable pluralism. 
Political liberalism further defines reasonable pluralism as the result of what 
Rawls calls the burdens of judgement, i.e. the sources and causes of the difference of 
standpoints amongst reasonable people and therefore of reasonable disagreement. 
Citizens are conceived as possessing “a common human reason, similar powers of 
thought and judgement: they can draw inferences, weight evidence and balance 
competing considerations. … [the burdens of judgement] are the many hazards involved 
                                            
18 “Such a consensus consists of all the reasonable opposing religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines likely to 
persist over generations and to gain a sizable body of adherents in a more or less just constitutional regime, a 
regime in which the criterion of justice is that political conception itself” (Rawls 2005, 15). The notion of 
overlapping consensus is defined and explored in several places in PL, its full analysis is in Lecture IV. 
19 “the problem of stability for a democratic society requires that its political conception can be the focus of an 
overlapping consensus of reasonable doctrines that can support a constitutional regime” (Rawls 2005, 65). 
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in the correct (and conscientious) exercise of our powers of reason and judgement in the 
ordinary course of political life”20. The burdens of judgement cover the many epistemic 
and moral-theoretical difficulties individuals face when finding adequate evidence and 
the correct relative weighting of competing values before making a decision. Simply, the 
idea of the burdens of judgement is the recognition that people, even reasonable ones, 
can end up holding different and possibly mutually exclusive positions with regard to 
the course of action to be taken21. Being aware that their difference comes from the 
complication of the burdens of judgement, that is common to everybody, the attitude 
citizens’ should hold in a situation of reasonable pluralism is not one of scepticism about 
their or others’ background. Rather they should be able to recognise that different 
viewpoints, provided that they are reasonable ones, might and do trigger different 
endorsements that, from a subjective point of view, are not equally evaluated but must 
be seen as equally reasonable22. This can only be possible if the raw material to which 
the political liberal strategy applies is not pluralism in its actual (factual) shape, i.e. 
pluralism as it is23. If it wants to manage the disagreement generated by pluralism, 
political liberalism has to consider a refined version of it, adjusted, modelled and sculpted 
according to the needs of justice and stability. By reducing the fact of pluralism to 
reasonable pluralism, intractable disagreement is also reduced to reasonable 
disagreement and the moral purport of reasonableness with its requirements puts 
citizens in the condition of managing it, through the tools that political liberalism puts 
in place. 
 
 
                                            
20 Rawls 2005, 55-56, passim. 
21 “being reasonable – that is, thinking and conversing in good faith and applying, as best as one can, the general 
capacities of reason that pertain to every domain of inquiry – tends not to produce agreement but to spark 
controversy” (Larmore 1999, 600). Another version of this same definition and claim, is already found in Larmore 
1990, 340 and Larmore 1994, 74. 
22 The individual attitude required by the recognition of the burdens of judgement can be so expressed: “[g]iven 
your upbringing, your epistemic position, and the difficulty of the issue in question, I may come to see that it is 
perfectly reasonable for you to believe some proposition that I reject, but this need not commit me to the further 
belief that you might be right and I might be wrong. … It might be unreasonable to expect you to believe anything 
else. Given you vantage point, your views are reasonable” (Quong 2007, 327). 
23 “The fact of reasonable pluralism is not an unfortunate condition of human life, as we might say of pluralism as 
such, allowing for doctrines that are not only irrational but mad and aggressive” (Rawls 2005, 144). 
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1.3. Moralism and ideal theory: the profile of political liberalism 
The observations hosted in this paragraph is meant to situate political liberalism 
in the constellation of positions and labels characterising the debate about how to do 
political theory. In particular, I follow recent literature in classifying the status of political 
liberalism as an example of ideal theory and of moralism. If the former predicate was forged 
for the purpose of drawing a criticism to an approach to political theory of which 
political liberalism is the most studies paradigm, the latter has been even endorsed by 
Rawls himself. I will limit myself to define what is meant by the terms “ideal theory” and 
“moralism” and to present the reasons why political liberalism can be labelled as such24. 
First, as said, Rawls identifies political liberalism as an ideal theory, advocating for 
the ideal of the basic institutional structure (expressed in the two principles of justice) to 
be at one time a standard that institutions and their changes in time are meant to respect 
in order to preserve the justice in society. These considerations pinpoint the role of such 
an ideal as the guide to channel the so called adjustments into the right direction but also 
as the representation of a final goal to strive for25. Rawls treats political liberalism as an 
example of ideal theory because of its purpose: by setting a highly idealised aim for society 
(the reason why his theory has been defined “high-liberalism”) it emphasises the goals 
for a long-term change, rather than focussing on more directly practicable solutions26. 
As Matt Sleat summarises: “[i]deal theory provides the blueprint for a perfectly just 
society, our desired endpoint towards which political action, reform and design should 
be directed. And by providing such a blueprint it also enables us to make evaluative 
comparisons between the ideal and the non-ideal circumstances we live in today, 
allowing us to determine where injustices prevail and when at least partial justice has 
been achieved. But ideal theory tells us nothing about how we got from our 
                                            
24 I do not enter in the debate about how to define what are considered in literature the opposites of ideal theory 
and moralism, namely non-ideal theory and political realism. There is still no established agreement amongst scholars 
about what it means to do realist political theory or how it is related to non-ideal theory, Nevertheless, many agree 
in taking political liberalism as a paradigm of moralism and of ideal theory. 
25 “a structural ideal [is meant] to specify constraints and to guide adjustments … The fact that actual political and 
social life is often pervaded by much injustice merely underlines this necessity. ... Thus ideal theory, which defines 
a perfectly just basic structure, is a necessary complement to nonideal theory without which the desire for changes 
lacks an aim” (Rawls 2005, 284-285). 
26 Valentini 2012, 660-662. 
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circumstances of partial justice to those of full justice”27. Political liberalism is ideal 
theory at least two other senses. A first one is its lack of fact-sensitivity and its disregard 
of aspects of the political such as peace and security (despite being coupled with the 
search for stability, the primary aim remains justice) and the assumption that 
circumstances will after all be favourable (thanks to a selection of the most relevant 
ones). A second sense concerns the expected compliance citizens have to the demands 
of justice, in particular the idea that “all relevant agents comply with the demands of justice 
applying to them”28, that is to say the capacity of reasonable persons to fulfil all 
requirements of justice, regardless of how demanding they are. 
Second, the idea that a philosophically designed moral notion such as 
reasonableness is employed to impose a discipline on a political problem (in this case the 
fact of pluralism) led to the identification of political liberalism as an example of the 
theoretical model labelled by Bernard Williams as moralism. Williams introduced the term 
moralism to connote those theories in which the moral point takes priority over the 
political one, meaning that either the political is conceived as instrumental to the 
realisation of morality or that at least morality sets limits on the political action and on 
the way it is governed by inherently political rules or principles29. This is considered a 
shortcoming because political circumstances end up being regulated by morally 
connoted principles that are decided outside those same circumstances. As a result, 
politics end up being subjected to an externally imposed discipline. Consequently, 
political actors are not expected to think and reason in the way that real politics requires, 
rather they will be focused on the implementation of a specific morality (hence the term 
moralism): “I shall call views that make the moral prior to the political, versions of 
‘political moralism’ (PM). PM does not immediately imply much about the style in which 
political actors should think, but in fact does tend to have the consequence that they 
should think, not only in moral terms, but in the moral terms that belong to the political 
theory itself”30. Rawls does not conceive political theory as a subset of moral philosophy, 
                                            
27 Sleat 2014, 2. 
28 Valentini 2012, 655, my emphasis. 
29 Williams 2005, 2. 
30 Williams 2005, 2-3, my emphasis. 
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but it still relates to the political sphere in a way that undermines its distinctiveness31. 
The political liberal outlook is selective with respect to political facts and political actors: 
this is the focus of the accusation of moralism. The problem with the idea that morals 
could be just applied to politics is that it “assumes that there is, or could be, such a thing 
as a separate discipline … which prescribes how humans should act toward one another 
… without unceasingly reflecting on the relations one’s claims have with history, 
sociology, ethnology, psychology, and economics”32.  
Political liberalism represents an example of moralism because the conception of 
justice, that is the expression of a specific morality, is the object of the consensus and 
the foundation of the type of reasoning that should be used in the public sphere, 
regardless of the contextual features of the public sphere itself. In this sense, the morality 
embodied in the principles of justice trumps the political circumstances. Following 
Williams’s definition, political liberalism does not immediately inform the type of 
reasoning that the citizens should apply to political issues. Reasonableness and public 
reason are this mediation. The application of reasonableness in public reason is related 
to the content of the principles of justice but, at the same time, it represents the normative 
core of the conception of justice. At one time, reasonableness embodies a particular 
morality, the one of the conception of justice (one amongst a family of other 
conceptions, as Rawls acknowledges), and marks the dividing line between those 
comprehensive doctrines that are eligible to become relevant to the public discourse and 
those that are not. In doing this, and in informing public reason, it says something about 
the type of reasoning that political actors should carry out.  
A clarification is needed here. Rawls does not think of the conception of justice 
as fairness as a comprehensive doctrine and so there is no conception of the good 
defining, limiting or guiding the political dynamics. In this sense, political liberalism is 
not a form of perfectionism33. “[J]ustice as fairness is not a comprehensive religious, 
philosophical or moral doctrine – one that applies to all subjects and covers all values. 
Nor it is to be regarded as the application of such a doctrine to the basic structure of 
                                            
31 Galston 2009. 
32 Geuss 2008, 6-7. 
33 For a debate about the relationship between political liberalism and perfectionism see Rawls 2005, 144. 
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society, as if this structure were merely another subject to which the comprehensive view 
is to be applied. Neither political philosophy nor justice as fairness is, in that way, applied 
moral philosophy”34. The fact that Rawls distinguishes political liberalism from an 
application of moral philosophy does not affect the observation that reasonableness 
represents a moral interference for the political. Even if the notion of reasonableness 
belongs to the language and complex of meanings of the political, the way it relates to 
politics is a moralist one35: political liberalism is efficient in defining pluralism how it should 
be thanks to a philosophically and not politically designed ideal of reasonableness and of 
reciprocity. Based on these preliminary observation, I turn now to the detailed discussion 
of what I called the tools to carry out the political liberal strategy. 
 
2. The tools of the political liberal strategy: achieving justice and stability 
2.1. The notion of reasonableness 
Reasonableness is a form of reasoning that is meant to be qualitatively different 
from mere rationality. As Rawls points out at the very beginning of PL: “knowing that 
people are rational we do not know the ends they will pursue, only that they will pursue 
them intelligently. Knowing that people are reasonable when others are concerned, we 
know that they are willing to govern their conduct by a principle from which they and 
others can reason in common; and reasonable people take into account the 
consequences of their actions on others’ well-being. The disposition to be reasonable is 
neither derived from nor opposed to the rational but it is incompatible with egoism, as 
it is related to the disposition to act morally”36. In fact, rationality must be completed 
and equipped with reasonableness in order to have an unabridged account of public 
reason and of the political liberal individual as a citizen. Rationality is the intelligent but 
possibly solipsistic and certainly self-interested calculus and assessment of the bare 
interests implied by one’s actions, based on an accurate evaluation of the relationship 
between means and ends and on a correct (or at least correctly elaborated) prediction of 
                                            
34 Rawls 2001, 14. 
35 Galston 2009, 113 
36 Rawls 2005, 49, n. 1. 
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the possible outcomes of choices. It applies in the private as well as in the public sphere, 
in the short and long run, and its requirements do not go beyond the ability to navigate 
in the circumstances of the world. It governs the kind of cooperation made necessary by 
the availability of a limited amount of space and resources and by the motivation to fulfil 
particular (individual) interests. Thus, rational agents regard other actors only as 
functions of their own interests and goals because other actors’ interests and goals may 
in manifold ways curb or expand one’s probability of success. Rationality is certainly a 
fundamental pattern of behaviour for interpersonal and, more broadly, political 
interactions. Political liberalism does not deny that, but it needs more. Rationality alone 
is consistent with egoism37, in fact it specifies a form of cooperation that does not go 
beyond “merely socially coordinated activity”38. 
On the contrary, reasonableness is a form of attitude that takes the presence of 
an interpersonal space into consideration in a moral way. This means that the reasonable 
agent is able to account for the interests of others, even particular ones, as something 
valuable39 and that she is able to acknowledge and consider a common point of view as 
well as her individual one. Being the common perspective a variable in the decision-
making process, behaviour is guided by a combination of rational and reasonable 
motives. So, “[s]uppose, for example, that my apartment complex requires dog-owners 
to dispose of their dogs’ waste. If one of my interests is to avoid personal inconvenience, 
there is nothing inherently irrational … about my regular failure to pick up after my dog. 
… Reasonableness, however, is not simply the exercise of rational and intelligent 
judgment. … From a common perspective, then, my deliberate failure to pick up after 
my dog is plainly unreasonable. My decision is not justifiable from a common point of 
view”40. The reasonable thus accounts for a justification that assumes the common point 
of view and therefore embodies an expectation from others to do as much, in terms of 
cooperation within the limits of what is a shared space. The reasons that reasonableness 
provides the individual with (at the intrapersonal level, i.e. these are the reasons I have 
                                            
37 Boettcher 2004, 603. 
38 Rawls 2005, 16. 
39 Boettcher 2004, 603. 
40 Boettcher 2004, 603. 
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to behave in a certain way) depend on a moral characterisation of the interpersonal 
circumstances the individual finds herself in (I judge my decision to behave in a certain 
way according to its justifiability from the point of view of others).  
Here it is important to notice that the foundation of such justifiability does not 
lie in the idea of a common good. If there is something like one unique account of what 
such common good is, reasonableness remains agnostic about it41. This does not mean 
that the kind of cooperation produced by reasonableness does not represent a form of 
improvement from the point of view of the agent or that it only comes with costs. In 
fact, there is a form of advantage or gain for the reasonable individual42 that should not be 
identified by a specific idea of the good, i.e. by a specific comprehensive doctrine. 
Justifiability thus relies in the mutuality of reasonable reasons, this meaning that the 
reasons the agents puts forward for an action must be available to the comprehension 
and acceptance of others43. In fact, “[r]easonable persons, we say, are not moved by the 
general good as such but desire for its own sake a social world in which they, as free and 
equal, can cooperate with others on terms all can accept. They insist that reciprocity 
should hold within that world so that each benefits along with others”44. This idea of 
reciprocity is embodied and refers to the conception of justice informing the 
relationships between citizens in the well-ordered society, namely, in the case of political 
liberalism, justice as fairness.  
More than that, this criterion of reciprocity sets the normative standard of 
reasonableness thought out as an irrevocable ingredient of the conception of justice 
itself. The political conception of justice, in fact, “must contain its own intrinsic normative 
and moral ideal. One such ideal can be set out this way. Citizens are reasonable when, 
viewing one another as free and equal in a system of social cooperation over generations, 
they are prepared to offer one another fair terms of social cooperation (defined by 
principles and ideals) and they agree to act on those terms, even at the cost of their own 
interests in particular situations, provided that others also accept those terms. … Note 
                                            
41 Kraus 1999, 50. 
42 Rawls 1999a, 408. 
43 On the complementarity and gap between the understanding of a reason and the acceptance of it I will reflect 
later. 
44 Rawls 2005, 50. 
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that ‘reasonably’ occurs at both ends of this formulation: in offering fair terms we must 
reasonably think that citizens offered them might also reasonably accept them. And they 
must be able to do this as free and equal, and not as dominated or manipulated, or under 
the pressure of an inferior political or social position. I refer to this as the criterion of 
reciprocity”45. So, the criterion of reciprocity, even if it goes beyond the prudential nature 
of rationality, does not fully overlap with the altruistic idea that people can do without a 
form of reward for their cooperative behaviour46. This shows how some advantage 
comes from the application of the criterion of reciprocity, because individuals are indeed 
securing their benefit even if they need to provide acceptability of their choices form the 
points of view of others. But it also shows how such advantage is embedded in a broader 
understanding of the criterion of reciprocity, one that refers to the requirement of 
mutual justification of the principles individuals are acting upon47. 
This last requirement of mutual justification is crucial for the Rawlsian notion of 
reasonableness, making it morally tainted. In fact, the moral character of reasonableness 
embodies a more extensive requirement than the one of simply acting in accordance 
with the mutuality of reasons. The morality of reasonableness demands that the possible 
point of view of others (fellow citizens) should be considered when formulating 
arguments in the public debate. The point of behaving as a good (reasonable) citizen is 
to be able to see the public space from the perspective of others, and so it implies the 
use of methods of reasoning and inquiring that are acceptable to others48. Now, it seems 
to me that the criterion of reciprocity requires that citizens produce publicly only 
justifiable reasons. In fact, they have to account for others’ readiness to apply the same 
                                            
45 Rawls 2005, xlii, my emphasis. 
46 “When citizens make moral claims in a deliberative democracy, they appeal to reasons or principles that can be 
shared by fellow citizens who are similarly motivated. The moral reasoning is what is in this way mutually 
acceptable. … it cannot reach those who refuse to press their public claims in terms accessible to their fellow 
citizens” (Gutmann and Thompson 1998, 55). In Rawls’s words: “the idea of reciprocity lies between the idea of 
impartiality, which is altruistic (being moved by the general good), and the idea of mutual advantage understood as 
everyone being advantaged with respect to each person’s present or expected future situation as things are. … 
reciprocity is a relation between citizens of a well-ordered society expressed by its public political conception of 
justice” (Rawls 2005, 16-17). 
47 Reidy 2007, 248-249. 
48 “Citizens should appeal to reasons that are based on common sense, logical consistency, strong evidence or 
established methods of science and inquiry […] In other words, in advancing a political justification, a citizen 
provides what, from her own perspective, is the most reasonable claim or argument and what, from the perspective 
of an addressee, may be considered at least reasonable” (Boettcher 2004, 614-615, passim). 
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criterion in the shared space of the public discourse. But besides indicating a standard 
of assessment for the reasons they should put forward in the public space, it does not 
offer an evaluative tool to judge whether those reason will be actually justified. In other 
terms, while the demands of the criterion of reciprocity apply to the intrapersonal level 
by informing the agent about what standard her reasons ought to respect, i.e. mutual 
justifiability, they say nothing on how likely will justification be successful.  
Reasonable citizens are bound to formulate reasons that other citizens (provided 
that they are reasonable as well) would not only be able to understand but also to accept. 
Then, how can the Rawlsian account of reciprocity require justification instead of a less 
demanding justifiability? It seems to me that it is precisely this problem posing the 
question of a more complex device to achieve the demanded standard of justification. 
The concept of reasonableness (thanks to its reference to criterion of reciprocity) does 
the work of accomplishing this task, because it is equipped with the regulative power of 
the conception of justice, that works as a benchmark of justifiability thus enabling 
justification. The theoretical jump reasonableness performs between the understandability 
and the acceptability of reasons couches the formulation of the political liberal notion of 
legitimacy and of public justification. The fact that political liberalism designs the 
conception of justice in a way that embodies reasonableness as its normative ideal enables 
it to ask for actual justification. The gap between mutual justifiability and actual common 
justification is automatically rectified because the conception of justice allows to identify, 
within the set of mutually justifiable (understandable) reasons, those that are candidate 
to be considered reasonable (therefore acceptable) and so produce actual justification. 
In this sense then reasonableness is also the moral ideal of the conception of justice, 
because it defines the moral character and limit of the scope of reasons that may 
reciprocally be endorsed. So, even though reasonableness is not regulated by a 
comprehensive idea of the good, it has to respect a given moral standard, set by the 
conception of justice. As a result, not only should citizens produce sound arguments but 
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arguments that others can recognise as sound and reasonable within the boundaries of the 
shared conception of justice49.  
The result of reasonableness being philosophically founded on the criterion of 
reciprocity and so on this account of justification is the implication of a morally thick 
requirement. In Rawls’s words: “[p]ersons are reasonable in one basic aspect when, 
among equals say, they are ready to propose principles and standards as fair terms of 
cooperation and to abide by them willingly, given the assurance that others will likewise 
do so. Those norms they view as reasonable for everyone to accept and therefore as 
justifiable to them; and they are ready to discuss the fair terms that others propose. … 
What rational agents lack is the particular form of moral sensibility that underlies the 
desire to engage in fair cooperation as such, and to do so on terms that others as equal 
might reasonably be expected to endorse”50. The reasonable thus morally overcomes the 
boundaries of plain rationality because it allows space for a revision of one’s own 
particular interest through the lens of her fellow citizens’ interests51, motives but also 
through the agreed idea of justice that they supposedly share, which task is to inform the 
morality of this mechanism. Thus, the moral attitude demanded by reasonableness not 
only broadly covers the idea that political interaction should to account for others’ 
(fellow citizens’) claims, let them be interests or moral (comprehensive) reasons. Most 
importantly, it regulates the political interaction in a narrower sense: it requires to take 
the morality of the conception of justice as the reference for reciprocally justifiable 
therefore acceptable reasons. So, reasonable citizens should hold others’ claims to be as 
valuable as theirs, insofar as they also do so but above all because such claims are already 
                                            
49 In fact, the formulation of the criterion of reciprocity found in the second introduction to PL is minimally but 
meaningfully different from the one used in The Idea of Public Reason Revisited. While in the introduction the “fair 
terms of social cooperation [are] (defined by principles an ideals)” (Rawls 2005, xlii), in The Idea, “citizens are 
reasonable when, viewing one another as free and equal in a system of social cooperation over generations, they 
are prepared to offer one another fair terms of cooperation according to what they consider the most reasonable conception 
of political justice; and when they agree to act on those terms, even at the cost of their own interests in particular 
situations, provided that other citizens also accept those terms” (Rawls 2005, 446, my emphasis). The close link 
between the notion of reciprocity and the notion of justification is also crucial in the definition of consent and 
public justification, that I will explore later. 
50 Rawls 2005, 49-51, passim. 
51 “If, as Rawls contends, a person’s public behaviour must be reasonable if it is to be legitimately accommodated, 
protected, and facilitated, then maximizing one’s potential to achieve her personal ambitions – that is, acting in a 
‘rational’ manner – will require that she act ‘reasonably’, as such is defined by the public conception of justice. 
Hence, the likelihood of success in realizing one’s personal goals will be a measure of their reasonableness. In 
essence, then, one must act reasonably to act rationally” (Young 2005, 1-2). 
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morally qualified by a common point of view, one that is ex ante theoretically identified 
and expected to be held as the most reasonable one, thanks to a morally defined notion 
of reasonableness. 
 
2.2. Public reason and its demands 
So far I have discussed the design and content of the notion of reasonableness 
trying to emphasise its moral status. I shall now turn to show how this tool finds political 
application, expressed in a set of requirements that political liberalism poses to its 
citizens. Such expression of requirements is systematised in the idea of public reason, 
i.e. the “characteristic of a democratic people: it is the reason of its citizens, of those 
sharing the status of equal citizenship. The subject of their reason is the good of the 
public … in a democratic society public reason is the reason of equal citizens who, as a 
collective body, exercise final political and coercive power over one another in enacting 
laws and in amending their constitution”52. It is thus the type of reasoning is supposed 
to be applied in the public discourse, when defining political matters and when taking 
fundamental political choices. It is here important to note that Rawls introduces a series 
of clarifications about the nature of public reason that are also needed to understand 
what actually public reason is, and its function within the political liberal project.  
First, I shall focus on the function of public reason, that its relevance for political 
agents and the objects of its application. In order to do this, it is useful to look at how 
the idea of public reason, defined by a specific area of application and by a specific 
content, is distinguished from its ideal. The idea of public reason defines the reasons that 
government officials and candidates for public offices have to present when fundamental 
political issues are at stake, so these are the main political actors that have to apply it. 
Political liberalism identifies as “fundamental questions” those concerning the principles 
that give shape to the basic structure of government, political processes and the division 
of powers (legislative, executive and judiciary), and the citizens’ basic rights and liberties 
that every empowered majority is bound to respect53. The content of public reason is 
                                            
52 Rawls 2005, 213-214, passim. 
53 Rawls 2005, 227. A philological note: in The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, Rawls defines the scope of application 
of public reason as the public political forum, that is “the discourse of judges in their decisions, and especially the 
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not intrinsically dependent on the conception of justice as fairness, rather it is defined 
by what Rawls calls a family of reasonable conceptions of justice54. The application of the 
principles embodied in this family of conceptions of justice should take the form of the 
legitimate norms of a democratic society. Furthermore, it requires “citizens’ checking 
that the principles derived from their conceptions of justice satisfy the criterion of 
reciprocity”55. Here lies the tie between public reason and reasonableness: the 
functioning of public reason as a tool to guide the political decision-making process and 
the definition of fundamental political conditions cannot but refer to reciprocity that is 
the core ideal of reasonableness. In fact, the ideal of public reason is “realized, or satisfied, 
whenever judges, legislators, chief executives, and other government officials, as well as 
candidates for public office, act from and follow the idea of public reason and explain 
to other citizens their reasons for supporting fundamental political positions in terms of 
the political conception of justice they regard as the most reasonable. In this way they 
fulfill … their duty of civility to one another and to other citizens”56. So, in the case of 
political liberalism the reference will be justice as fairness. The realisation of the 
corresponding idea of public reason is conceived as a duty, more specifically as a moral 
duty: it has the form of a moral obligation that is supposed to take precedence over the 
moral reasons embodied by particular comprehensive doctrines, when the actors find 
themselves in the public debate. Public reason, being intimately related to 
reasonableness, is the tool that regulates, through this set of obligations, individual 
political behaviour in the processes of justification and selection of reasons, both 
depending on the distinction between reasonable and unreasonable ones57. 
A second important aspect is the supposed practicability of public reason, that is 
the conditions under which political liberalism conceives the actual application of public 
reason. A first step in this analysis is the specification of the sense in which public reason 
                                            
judges of a supreme court; the discourse of government officials, especially chief executives and legislators; and 
finally, the discourse of candidates for public office and their campaign managers, especially in their public oratory, 
party platforms, and political statements” (Rawls 2005, 443). 
54 “It is crucial that public reason is not specified by any one political conception of justice, certainly not by justice 
as fairness alone. Rather, its content – the principles, ideals, and standards that may be appealed to – are those of 
a family of reasonable political conceptions of justice and this family changes over time” (Rawls 2005, l-li). 
55 Rawls 2005, 442. 
56 Rawls 2005, 444. 
57 Boettcher 2012, 3. 
  
 
23 
is to be considered public. In defining public reason, Rawls says that it “is public in three 
ways: as the reason of citizens as such, it is the reason of the public; its subject is the 
good of the public and matters of fundamental justice; and its nature and content is 
public, being given by the ideals and principles expressed by society’s conception of 
political justice, and conducted open to view on that basis”58. According to these lines it 
seems then that it is broadly concerned with the domain of human life that pertain to 
the collective and shared space of politics. 
Things are more complex than this, in fact, the Rawlsian case for the possibility 
of the actual application of public reason is empirical and comes from the presence in 
contemporary societies of what Rawls calls the public political culture. Even in this case, it 
is necessary to distinguish what is captured by the notion of public political culture and 
what is excluded by it. First, public political culture is different from the background culture, 
i.e. the culture (broadly conceived) contextually belonging to a civil society that is 
composed of “diverse agencies and associations with their internal life”59. Parallel to the 
reasons comprised in the background culture (social reasons, formulated by those groups 
and associations), but always separate from the ones of the public political culture, there 
are domestic reasons (those coming from families as small groups)60 and those coming 
from the non-public political culture, i.e. those provided and elaborated in 
communication media. It seems to me that the background culture with all the parallel 
types of reason identified is the place where pluralism is expressed in its factual shape, 
and these groups and the individuals belonging to them are bearers and representatives 
of the various comprehensive doctrines. So, once again, these are not and cannot be the 
references for the political liberal mechanism of justification to work. Public political 
culture coincides with the set of political values and principles that refer to the political 
conception of justice and the political conception of the person61, such political values 
are “very great values and not easily overridden and the ideals they express are not to be 
                                            
58 Rawls 2005, 213. 
59 Rawls 2005, 443. These are “churches and associations of all kinds, and institutions of learning at all levels, 
especially universities and professional schools, scientific and other societies” (Rawls 2005, 443, n. 13). 
60 Rawls 2005, 220, n. 7. 
61 Rawls 2005, 29-34. 
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lightly abandoned”62. When citizens and institutions debate referring to the right 
(embodied in the conception of justice and hosted by the public political culture) while 
setting aside considerations about the good (that constitute instead the background 
culture and the non-public political culture), their discourses are, in the Rawlsian 
outlook, worth the label of “public”.   
If we look at public reason as a gear of the political liberal strategy, it becomes 
then evident that its normative role is expressed in a restriction on the set of reasons that 
have to be offered in the public debate, that in its turn runs parallel to the limits imposed 
by reasonableness on the fact of pluralism. Two important remarks are to be done here: 
first, public reason does not refer only to the so called public forum, but also to the 
larger public debate, representing thus an imperative also for citizens; second, even when 
resting on a wider interpretation of public political culture, it opens the door to non-
public and comprehensive commitments only when they are filtered by reasonableness. 
First, even if Rawls specifies that public reason only applies to institutions rather than 
citizens, there are passages in Political Liberalism and in The Idea of Public Reason Revisited in 
which the idea that public reason should also apply, at least to a certain extent, to citizens 
is introduced. In fact, Rawls considers the fact that if the ideal of public reason is realised, 
that is if the actors in the public forum fulfil their duty of civility, then citizens are 
provided with public reasons for the political choices that are binding for them. 
Moreover, citizens are expected to explain to each other their actions in a way that is 
reasonably acceptable form the point of view of others, thus they have to respect that 
same criterion of reciprocity that founds the moral character of public reason. In fact, 
“ideally citizens are to think of themselves as if they were legislators and ask themselves what 
statutes, supported by what reasons satisfying the criterion of reciprocity, they would 
think it most reasonable to enact. … Thus citizens fulfill their duty of civility … This 
duty, like other political rights and duties, is an intrinsically moral duty”63. So the requirements of 
public reason apply to citizens as well, when they vote and in the debate about the 
political sphere64. Second, in this sense citizens should be able and must indeed 
                                            
62 Rawls 2005, 218. 
63 Rawls 2005, 444-445, my emphasis. 
64 Archard 2001, 211. 
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distinguish the kinds of reason that they are entitled to present in the public debate. The 
selection of such reasons refers to the standard established by reasonableness and so the 
basis for the plurality of reasons cannot be the fact of pluralism, rather reasonable 
pluralism. Citizens can indeed refer to their reasonable comprehensive doctrines when 
debating in the public sphere, but only by respecting the so called proviso: they must 
assure that “in due course proper political reasons – and not reasons given solely by 
comprehensive doctrines – are presented that are sufficient to support whatever the 
comprehensive doctrines introduced are said to support”65. Now, the proviso suggests 
that reasons that should considered eligible to be accepted in the public debate should 
undergo a double refinement: to begin with, they should come from reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines and not from comprehensive doctrines as such, and only then 
they should be revised in order to be expressed in political terms. In this sense, citizens’ 
fundamental moral commitments, i.e. the set of prescriptions dictated by the content of 
comprehensive doctrines, even if the target is already restricted to reasonable ones, have 
to be modified to match the standard set by public reason. The standard of public reason 
requires a translation of reasons into political reasons that refer to the set of values and 
principles defined by the conception of justice and that respect the criterion of 
reciprocity and duty of civility.  
A fitting example of such redefinition of moral commitments in political terms 
that political liberalism considers adequate could be the debate, still topical in many 
contemporary democracies, of same-sex marriage66. It is in fact a case in which there is 
a very evident gap between the demands of public reason and the formulation of public 
claims in political (in Rawlsian sense) terms and the moral demands some comprehensive 
doctrines might ask their representatives to defend. Let us take for example citizens 
identifying themselves as, say, conservative Catholics. This group believes that 
                                            
65 Rawls 2005, 462. 
66 The famous equivalent is Rawls’s footnote about abortion, extensively discussed in literature. In its first 
formulation (in the 1993 version of PL) women’s right to abortion is thought out according to the guidelines of 
public reason by appealing to the political values of “the due respect for human life, the ordered reproduction of 
political society over time, including the family in some form, and finally the equality of women as equal citizens” 
(Rawls 2005, 243, n. 32). The case that follows states that “any reasonable balance of these three values will give a 
woman a duly qualified right to decide whether or not to end her pregnancy during the first trimester. … [A]t this 
early stage of pregnancy the political value of the equality of women is overriding” (Rawls 2005, 243, n. 32). 
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homosexuality is immoral and/or unnatural and that marriage is a sacred institution 
meant to harbour procreation and children care. Public reason, instead, requires to take 
into consideration the value of equality and so to the principle that citizens should be all 
treated equally. Most importantly, equality demands that no restrictions or legal 
regulation are to be imposed on the basis of citizens’ identities or beliefs.  Now, 
according to Rawls, if conservative Catholics are reasonable, they should recognise that 
the value of equality amongst citizens takes priority over the value of sacredness. They 
should renounce to bring their comprehensive claims in their public debate and give up 
with any action or project of boycott against the performance of marriage of same-sex 
couples67. The former is a political values, embodied in the conception of justice and the 
public political culture, justifiable to all reasonable citizens and in fact object of 
overlapping consensus, while the latter is a comprehensive value, belonging to the 
background culture and depending on a set of metaphysical beliefs68. In The Idea of Public 
Reason Revisited, Rawls highlights how a comprehensive doctrine can still be said to 
respect public reason even when it does not provide a sufficiently reasonable ordering 
of values to be the most reasonable one69. The footnote is supposed to show how public 
reason is effective in solving disagreements when those happen to be reasonable ones. 
Citizen respecting public reason should: first, hold a comprehensive doctrine that 
can host the commitments of the conception of justice; second, prioritise the political 
values of the conception of justice over the core moral commitments of their 
comprehensive doctrine making it thus reasonable; third, refer in the public discourse 
only to the public political culture and not to the background culture, thus excluding all 
non-political values and arguments in judging their cases. This way they fulfil their duty 
of civility; fourth, looking, when debating, for the most reasonable set and order of 
values rather than the one that corresponds what they believe to be true or morally 
preferable. By respecting reasonableness, they intrinsically commit to the criterion of 
reciprocity: this is the moral foundation of all their duties as citizen. 
 
                                            
67 Dreben 2002, 327-329. 
68 For a broader discussion on the issue see Nussbaum 2010 and Liveriero 2015. 
69 Rawls 2005, 479, n. 80. 
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2.3. Overlapping consensus and public justification 
In the two previous sections I analysed the tools put in place by political liberalism 
meant to make sure that the conception of justice is implemented and that its principles 
are applied. As said though, the goals of political liberalism go beyond the satisfaction 
of justice requirements and call also for a strategy to achieve stability. Overlapping 
consensus and public justification are the mechanisms thought out to guarantee stability. 
I will now introduce their definition and dynamics, trying to show how the search for 
stability is strictly connected and actually relies on the moral outline of the role of 
reasonableness and public reason. Without the moral commitment to reciprocity and the 
consequent shrinking of the fact of pluralism to reasonable pluralism, the wide 
justification and the steadfast consent political liberalism aims at would not be 
practicable paths anymore. 
The conception of justice is the object of an overlapping consensus among 
various and often clashing comprehensive doctrines. So, overlapping consensus is 
presented as the natural outcome of the reasonable discipline of pluralism, and it 
represents the core of the strategy displayed by political liberalism to manage the 
disagreement deriving from the fact of pluralism. In fact, overlapping consensus answers 
at a time the two-levelled question of political liberalism: it is a form of consent about 
the basic structure of institutions, that respects the requirements of public reason and 
refers to the conception of justice, and it is a steadfast agreement, likely to resist over 
time and so to be stable. It is represented as the area of overlap amongst the various 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines, coinciding with the political values embodied in 
the conception of justice and considered overriding with respect to the comprehensive 
values marking the difference amongst doctrines. Since the conception of justice is only 
compatible with the comprehensive doctrines insofar as these are reasonable, such an 
overlap area would be impossible to identify if the context of consensus were the 
background culture (therefore pluralism in its factual shape). Overlapping consensus 
thus needs to be achieved on the basis of the morally filtered form of pluralism, i.e. 
reasonable pluralism, and it is precisely the moral discipline of reasonableness enabling 
its stability.  
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In fact, citizens are expected to have a steadfast commitment to those 
fundamental political values because issues of justice (i.e. the definition of what is right 
and should found the basic structure of institutions) are always given priority over moral 
issues (i.e. the definitions of what is good that are by nature plural in as much as they stem 
from the various moral standpoints). In political liberalism this idea is expressed as the 
priority of the right over the good. The right, conveyed in the conception of justice, is 
complementary but also sets the limits to the good. The Rawlsian language is especially 
illuminating here, in fact he refers to “ideas of the good” upon which admissibility 
and/or permissibility are predicated70. In other terms, the conception of justice 
(informed by reciprocity and defining reasonableness) decides of the relevant plurality 
that can be allowed in the well-ordered society. Such a capacity to prioritize political 
values is crucial to political liberalism because citizens’ recognition that the political 
conception of justice is the most adequate and the most reasonable one determines their 
compliance with the just institutions it informs and guarantees a stable support to the 
consensus71. Thanks to public reason every comprehensive doctrine is reframed and 
formulated along with the political values of the conception of justice and following 
public political culture. So the political reasons citizens have to support the political 
settings are also genuinely moral because they stem from a moral commitment to 
reasonableness. 
Overlapping consensus “is affirmed on moral grounds, that is, it includes 
conceptions of society and of citizens as persons, as well as principles of justice, and an 
account of the political virtues through which those principles are embodied in human 
character and expressed in public life. An overlapping consensus, therefore, is not merely 
a consensus on accepting certain authorities, or on complying with certain institutional 
arrangements”72, in fact the conception of justice that is its object is not “affected by the 
existing balance of political power between comprehensive doctrines. Nor do its 
                                            
70 “a political conception must draw upon various ideas of the good. … In justice as fairness this restriction [to 
certain ideas of the good] is expressed by the priority of right. In its general form, this priority means that admissible 
ideas of the good must respect the limits of, and serve a role within, the political conception of justice”. (Rawls 1999a, 451, my 
emphasis). 
71 Rawls 2005, 141.  
72 Rawls 2005, 147. 
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principles strike a compromise between the more dominant ones”73. The support to the 
consensus comes from the acceptance, from within the framework of every reasonable 
comprehensive doctrine, of the conception of justice that is presented as freestanding 
from each of them, since it does not imply any epistemological or metaphysical 
commitment. 
Such an ambitious ideal of consent is a powerful device for performing the ideal 
of stability wanted by political liberalism. What citizens should agree upon in overlapping 
consensus (the conception of justice) is at the same time rooted in the standard 
(reasonableness) defining the set of agents that are supposed to agree with each other. 
This creates the perfect conditions to realise consensus. The genesis of the conception 
of justice and the effects of the conception of justice on the political liberal architecture 
take place before the achievement of overlapping consensus. First the conception of 
justice is designed, then it gives the moral guidelines for a discipline of the fact of 
pluralism and of the reason that should be used in the political space. Only when this is 
all given, i.e. once everybody has already agreed on the constraints set by justice74, can the 
search for an agreement begin. Such search will be surely successful, because the 
circumstance of pluralism has already been reduced to the fact of reasonable pluralism 
and its unfortunate effects have been thus neutralised by reasonableness. The values 
object of the agreement, but above all citizens’ commitment to them, are already alleged 
to be overriding with respect to the importance citizens place in moral values. What I 
have before described as a “theoretical jump” from understandability of reasons to 
acceptability of reasons is brought through overlapping consensus to level of actual 
acceptance of those reasons. The idea that stability could come ex post from a balance of 
already existing viewpoints is downplayed as dissatisfactory and insufficient, following 
the model of a modus vivendi75. Also the representative of those reasonable doctrines who 
find themselves in a weak position, when it comes to power, stably consent, because 
their consensus is grounded in moral reasons and not in prudential incentives. In other 
                                            
73 Rawls 2005, 142. 
74 Barry 1995. 
75 The rest of this work is devoted to a discussion of modus vivendi, I will specifically discuss the Rawlsian notion 
of modus vivendi in Chapter 2.  
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terms, they do not have to compromise politically, because comprehensive reasons are 
already morally excluded76.  
So because the allegiance to the agreement is founded in the commitment to the 
conception of justice through reasonable comprehensive doctrines and taking priority 
over them, “those who affirm the various views supporting the political conception [of 
justice] will not withdraw their support of it should the relative strength of their view in 
society increase and eventually become dominant”77. This fundamental commitment to 
the principles of justice, that is also grounded in citizens’ commitment to their 
comprehensive views, enables the kind of stability that political liberalism needs. It is 
thus clear how stability is not the result of fortunate contingencies, rather it is the effect 
of constraints on the set of comprehensive doctrines that the theory (and not a political 
decision) considers worth to take into account. This is the moralistic nature of political 
liberalism. 
The fact that the support of the conception of justice comes from the citizens’ 
deepest convictions is also the basis for social unity, in fact: “political liberalism says that 
as citizens of this society we have achieved the deepest and most reasonable basis of 
social unity available in a modern democracy. … [T]his basis of social unity is the deepest 
because the fundamental ideas of the political conception are endorsed by the reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines, and these doctrines represent what citizens regard as their 
deepest convictions – religious, philosophical, and moral”78. It is the moral basis of 
overlapping consensus that should be regarded as the prime mover of political liberalism 
of stability. The moralistic move of political liberalism, expressed in public reason, 
operates a selection of adequate comprehensive doctrines and within those of the 
reasons that can be brought to public discourse, right reasons.  
In this sense, overlapping consensus works for the stability together with the 
notion of public justification. In replying to the Habermasian question whether the goal 
of overlapping consensus is only stability and what is the role of justification79, Rawls 
                                            
76 Lister 2007. 
77 Rawls 2005, 148. 
78 Rawls 2005, 391-392.  
79 Habermas 1995. 
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sets out the definition of public justification and explains how the search for stability is 
fundamentally connected with the liberal idea of legitimacy80. Rawls considers three 
levels of justification: first, pro tanto justification happens when citizens’ comprehensive 
commitments can override the political values of the conception of justice, despite it 
being complete; second, the level of full justification is realised at the individual or at best 
particular (in groups or associations of bearers of comprehensive doctrines) level, and 
no reasons are given to count political values as prior with respect to non-political ones; 
third, the level political liberalism wishes for, public justification. Public justification is 
realised when all citizens in a society are reasonable and therefore bearers of reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines, and know that their fellow citizens are also reasonable, 
therefore, as they do, respect the requirements of public reason. Because all citizens 
know that the one conception of justice is shared by everybody, the standard of public 
discourse set by public reason is respected and the public culture of society is 
characterised according to its demands81.  
It is precisely because of its reference to the morality of reasonableness that public 
justification is capable of serving the purpose of stability. The publicity of the conception 
of justice provides the moral reasons for citizens to plan their actions but also to foresee 
what they can expect from their fellow citizens, thus avoiding the individual process of 
decision leading to plural solutions and therefore disagreement82. In such circumvention of 
disagreement (albeit reasonable) lies the effectiveness of the political liberal strategy to 
manage the undesirable consequences of pluralism. If on the one hand the double 
requirement of respecting justice while preserving stability is presented as a goal, on the 
other hand the moralistic play of the conception of justice creates a virtuous circle 
between justice and stability: while the discipline set by the principles of justice enables 
stability, the stability given by overlapping consensus and public justification contributes 
to the conservation of the standard of public culture, that is expression of the recognition 
and endorsement of the principles of justice. Thanks to the combination of justice and 
                                            
80 Firstly formulated: “our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a 
constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light 
of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason” (Rawls 2005, 137, my emphasis). 
81 Rawls 2005, 385-387. 
82 Freeman 2007, 6. 
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stability, the idea of liberal legitimacy finds the framework to be acknowledged as a 
practicable solution: the agreed and thus publicly endorsed priority of political values 
enables decision based on public reason to always be legitimised. 
 
3. The limits of political liberalism 
3.1. Classes of objections 
It seems needless to say again that political liberalism and the Rawlsian work more 
broadly gave rise to a huge tradition in political thought as well as to a great number of 
critical reflections around the manifold tools it displays to answer its questions and 
around the very nature of its approach. It would thus be the aim of a much larger work 
to try to categorise the whole corpus of literature on political liberalism, above all literature 
that raises objections against it. Thus, I shall start this section by limiting and defining 
the scope and intentions of my criticisms. So far I have analysed the instruments of 
political liberalism highlighting how the way it fulfils its double task of achieving the 
respect of the principles of justice together with stability depends on its full reliance on 
the cornerstone of its theoretical structure: the moral content of reasonableness and 
public reason. I gave a reading of political liberalism that questioned its capacity to 
answer to the problem of the undesirable consequences of the fact of pluralism. More 
precisely, I highlighted the role reasonableness plays in the political liberal solution. The 
enforcement of a conception of justice is successful because legitimised by a steadfast 
form of consent, is in its turn achieved through the imposition of a discipline on 
pluralism, a limit on the variety of the moral viewpoints that should be taken to account 
in the public justification process. In this sense, I treated the political liberal theory as a 
moralistic strategy.  
Recall that I followed Williams in identifying political liberalism as an instance of 
moralism. A preliminary remark has to be made here: the criticism coming from the 
realist point of view depends on a defence of the priority of politics in the definition of 
political dynamics and issues, a task that should not, according to realists, be taken on 
by morality, as it is the case of political liberalism. This is a first class of objections, those 
made in the name of an alternative normative outlook, and that, to say it in a brief slogan, puts 
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politics first. Criticisms starting with a realist perspective thus display a fundamental 
disagreement with the theoretical approach political liberalism has towards political 
theory as a discipline. For this reason, realist critiques do not capture the internal limits 
of political liberalism. In other terms, they are external critiques. The problem then does 
not lie in the endorsement of a specific kind of morality or in its malfunctioning for the 
purposes of the theory. Such problems political liberalism is already meant to have 
overcome, in fact, the conception of justice is thought out to be freestanding. The 
problem lies within the role of morality, more specifically in its interference with the 
political. The morality of reasonableness positively biases political decision (only 
reasonable agents and doctrines are eligible to participate) in the definition of the 
institutional design of a society.  
My intention, for the moment, has been and is to outline a criticism of political 
liberalism that does not endorse realism because of an already alleged superiority of the 
realist point of view over the moralistic one. In other terms, I do not want to label my 
critique as realist a priori. Rather I would like to identify and evaluate the moralistic 
mechanism of the political liberal strategy in order to cast light on its possible 
shortcomings. I must say at this point, that the purpose of further discussion will be to 
consider whether a realist approach is to be preferable to the Rawlsian one, but I firstly 
need to show how I consider this latter dissatisfactory in the first place and whether such 
dissatisfaction eventually depends on its moralistic profile. An important caveat here: I 
do not intend to put into question the internal coherence of the Rawlsian project. Of 
course political liberalism works in giving a stable political account of justice, but only if 
one endorses the Rawlsian meaning of “political”, i.e. by committing to a notion of 
public reasoning that is moral. For Rawls political values trump moral values, but the 
reasons for this overriding power are moral and not political. Political values are 
supposed to be given priority thanks to reasonableness and ultimately to the criterion of 
reciprocity. What I want to see is whether, as I believe, this substitution of the moral to 
the political is responsible for the political liberal strategy to face the fact of pluralism to 
be dissatisfactory. In other term, I want to see which are the weakness of political 
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liberalism and figure out if it is its moralism that has to be blamed for them. If this will 
be the case, then the realist outlook will have to be preferred. 
In order to do this, I shall start with an introductory observation concerning the 
nature of objections that might be raised and have indeed been raised against political 
liberalism but that do not fall under the realist umbrella. Once again, my intention is not 
to give a full and organised overview of the literature about political liberalism (a huge 
enterprise!). This second class of objections, that are more relevant for my discourse 
now, consist of those raised, so to speak, in the name of facts. Differently from the first 
type, such criticisms do not focus generally on political liberalism as a representative of 
moralism. They more specifically refer to its moralistic treatment of political facts, 
especially with regard to the issue of pluralism. In so doing, political liberalism is treated 
as a representative of ideal theory. The main point is that what I called before the “raw 
material of political liberalism”, i.e. the fact of reasonable pluralism, does not correspond 
to an accurate description of the status quo in contemporary democratic societies. 
Rather, it is a moralised re-description of the political reality, useful to allow a successful 
achievement of consent and justification, thus supposedly showing the adequacy of the 
political liberal strategy.  
 
3.2. In the name of facts: normativity and demandingness 
By tackling the fact-sensitivity of the theory, objections of this second class draw 
attention on two important aspects of political liberalism: firstly, they object to it as a 
representative of ideal theory and so, consequently, it seems to me that they show the 
way to highlight the demandingness of the theory. As I explored before, what Rawls means 
by ideal theory consist of an approach that stresses the specific task of the ideal of the 
basic structure. Nevertheless, the definition of institutions is conceived in political 
liberalism as part of a process of justification and as the object of consent, two 
mechanisms that, as seen, strictly depend on the application of public reason. By 
following all the way down the line of this argument, it becomes more evident how the 
re-description of the fact of pluralism is the way political liberalism respects the need for 
an ideal to be followed to satisfy the preservation of the standard of justice. In this sense, 
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the political liberal strategy needs to rely on an idealised definition of facts, in order for 
the political liberal ideal to be able to actually affect reality. In other terms, the application 
of reasonableness and the idea that reasonable citizens will comply to the demands of 
public reason, make political reality already a little closer to the ideal (the set of 
comprehensive doctrines is reduced to the set of reasonable comprehensive doctrines 
and only reasonable citizens are taken into account). Such little step is crucial for the 
strategy to work. 
On this premises, I now turn to the point of demandingness. The normative power 
of political liberalism is defined by a set of highly demanding moral imperatives, those 
of public reason. Thanks to such imperatives, political liberalism considers a 
quantitatively restricted and qualitatively refined political reality, and can thus imply that 
it is feasible as well as desirable that citizens can keep up with a very high standard of 
political behaviour. The idea that the political liberal theory reconciles desirability and 
feasibility, showing that a desirably fair society can also be stably performed, is 
summarised in the idea of the realistic utopia, that Rawls expresses after PL. The idea is 
that political theory has to be realistic (and not realist)83, that is it has to respect the 
boundaries of what is feasible, given the circumstances, but it has to be as well utopian in 
considering possibly upcoming in the immediate future circumstances, hypothetically 
adequate to fulfil normative requirements that might be too demanding for the present 
conditions84. Only, “there is a question about how the limits of the practicable are 
discerned and what the conditions of our social world in fact are; the problem here is 
that the limits of the possible are not given by the actual, for we can to a greater or lesser 
extent change political and social institutions, and much else”85. The limits and 
boundaries that have to be taken into account are defined through the constructivist 
method: “[w]hat justifies a conception of justice is not its being true to an order 
antecedent to and given to us, but its congruence with our deeper understanding of 
                                            
83 The adjectivisation of the term “realism” might be source of confusion. I use the adjective “realistic” in the most 
intuitive sense, as a synonymous for likely, expected, achievable, in the same sense Rawls uses to qualify the idea 
of the realistic utopia. I use the adjective “realist” as a reference to the methodological perspective of political 
realism, in the sense I explored above. 
84 Pasquali 2016, 50-53. 
85 Rawls 2001, 5. 
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ourselves and our aspirations, and our realization that, given our history and the 
traditions embedded in our public life, it is the most reasonable doctrine for us. … moral 
objectivity is to be understood in terms of a suitably constructed social point of view that all can 
accept”86. The facts of our political world are not to be immediately observed, as it would 
be in a strictly realistic (again, not realist) account, neither it is entirely up to the theorist 
to decide what fact to care about, as it would be in an opposite perspective. Rather, the 
noteworthy relevant political facts are selected through the lenses of ideal people in ideal 
conditions (the original position), i.e. in a political vacuum.  
This is the relationship with facts implied by justice as fairness and therefore by 
political liberalism: the range of facts that theory should take into account is thus given 
by a possible alternative scenario. Such scenario in political liberalism is the one seen 
through the lens of reasonableness and it is one where its demands are already satisfied. 
In this sense what political liberalism calls the fact of reasonable pluralism is an already 
accomplished ideal, because it already presupposes that citizens are capable of applying 
and indeed apply the demands of reciprocity. The problem of so deeply relying on 
idealisation is that the political liberal answer to the fact of pluralism turns out to be 
ineffective, because it is designed to manage pluralism as it should be rather than 
pluralism as it is87. This should not be regarded as a minor problem because the goal of 
political liberalism is to give normative indications for a society to be just and stable. The 
very possibility of stability depends on the right reasons, those that can only grow from 
an idealised soil.  
The evaluation of the effectiveness of the political liberal strategy coincides with 
a possible third source of criticism to political liberalism, the one considering if the trade-
off between feasibility and desirability is actually convincing or if it too heavily depends 
on the ideal of reasonable pluralism, suggesting so a de facto impracticable strategy path in 
answering the question of pluralism as it is. The main problem that comes upon political 
                                            
86 Rawls 1999a, 306-307, my emphasis. 
87 I follow here Onora O’Neill’s distinction between abstraction and idealisation. The problem with assuming that 
citizens will all be able to consistently behave reasonably “is not just that much (too much) that is true of human 
agents is omitted in some accounts of agents, but that much (too much) that is false of human agents is added. 
Descriptions of agents in much post-enlightenment ethical and political theory are often idealized; they are satisfied 
only by hypothetical agents whose cognitive and volitional capacities human beings lack” (O’Neill 1987, 56).  
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liberalism as an ideal theory and from this perspective is that the idea of starting the 
process of justification and the way to consensus “may be imaginable, but it is not 
feasible. It is therefore naïve, and ineffective, to hold existing societies to account on the 
basis of such demanding moral standards. … the less real-world constraints are taken 
into account in the design of a normative political theory (which is meant to apply to the 
real world), the more practically ineffective its principles are likely to be. … the principles 
may be designed to respond to a situation different from the one we are actually facing”88. The weakness 
of the ideal set by reasonableness and public reason is thus defined by a double problem. 
It is descriptively inadequate, because it does not account for political reality as it is (the 
fact of pluralism and the behaviour of non idealised citizens) and since it refines such 
reality it affords a standard that only corresponds to a possibility in non-actual (non-real) 
political circumstances. Referred to the real world, such standard is so demanding that 
it is hardly manageable to be applied and, as a result, practically irrelevant89. It seems to 
me that irrelevance is a direct consequence of descriptive inaccuracy: because the re-
description of individual agency and therefore of the plurality of viewpoints is not loyal 
to real circumstances then the solution might not work. This affects the solidity of the 
political liberal strategy in its turn under a double perspective.  
On the one hand the likelihood of the success of the strategy is put into question: 
in this sense the ideas of reasonable citizens, of a full public justification and of a strong 
overlapping consensus are to be just discarded as unfeasible in our world and so not 
worth being explored or tested, at least as they are presented in political liberalism. This 
raises a feasibility issue. On the other hand, the employment of the strategy has some 
intrinsic high costs. Even if we assume that the selection of relevant facts and the 
reduction of pluralism is feasible, the notions of reasonableness and public reason would 
determine a distance between a set of citizens entitled to fully participate in public life 
of a society (reasonable citizens, bearers of reasonable comprehensive doctrines) and a 
set of citizens that is not involved of the justificatory process and does not participate in 
                                            
88 Valentini 2012, 659, my emphasis. 
89 I owe the notions of descriptive inadequacy and practical irrelevance to John Horton: “[t]here are, I suggest, two 
related but distinguishable broad lines of criticism … First, there is the complaint that the conception of politics 
at work in liberal moralism lacks descriptive adequacy. Secondly there is the objection that it is normatively utopian 
and therefore largely practically irrelevant” (Horton 2010, 433). 
  
 
38 
the overlapping consensus (the unreasonable). The question of the unreasonable raises 
an issue of inclusiveness, especially concerning for the political liberal account of 
legitimacy. This problem affects the desirability of the theory. I now turn to the discussion 
of these objections. 
 
3.3. Feasibility and desirability: a difficult trade-off 
There are manifold interpreters of political liberalism touching upon its ideal 
character and so, more or less explicitly, questioning its practicability. Such objections 
tackle different aspects of the political liberal strategy at different levels, but they all show 
how controversial it is to hold a strategy to be successful if it is hard or difficult to 
implement it because of its distance from reality. In particular, the problem many critics 
have pinpointed is that the demands of reasonableness and public reason are somehow 
unsustainable for actual human beings, because its deontological burdens are simply too 
heavy. Another important aspect such criticisms have in common, I think, is 
methodological individualism, that is they are formulated keeping in mind the viewpoint 
and the moral, cognitive and volitional abilities of actual individuals. Rather than 
evaluating the internal consistency of the theory itself, this type of objection focusses on 
real citizens as the ultimate political actors.  
Reasonable individuals are expected to be able to offer reasons and be ready to 
listen and possibly be persuaded by others’ reasons, at the same time only accounting 
for a specific set of reasons, that is by selecting their interlocutors, and only referring to 
the shared conception of justice, avoiding partial considerations90. The act of behaving 
reasonably requires in the first place an ongoing willingness to cooperate that is a desire 
to produce public reasons91: this capacity is certainly possessed by idealised individuals, 
who always prioritise the right over the good, but it can hardly be expected from actual 
individuals, whose preferences may swing. If real individual behaviour is taken into 
consideration92, one initial point is that there can be some practical difficulties in 
                                            
90 Moore 1996, 171. 
91 Brower 1994, 9-10. 
92 Notice that these critics typically advocate for different solutions, let them be a stronger or looser form of public 
reason or the idea that public reason is all the way down a useless tool. There is no space to discuss this here, the 
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choosing the right reasons and also in re-formulating some originally non-public reasons 
in a form that is respectful of the demands of public reason. The inquiry citizens have 
to make before expressing their reasons might be perceived as too demanding (even only 
in terms of time) compared to the effect it might trigger, besides the one of strengthening 
public reason93.  
A further point concerns considerations about would be the costs of prioritise 
right reasons (being reasonable) for the individual. The questions actual citizens are likely 
to ask themselves are those about the moral costs of setting aside their core 
comprehensive commitments, but also those about the consequences of this choice. 
One question concerns the relationship between reasonableness and truth: being the 
shared conception of justice acceptable from all reasonable standpoints it has to be 
neutral towards what comprehensive doctrines hold to be true. As a result, the plural, 
possibly incompatible, truth claims embodied in comprehensive doctrines are equally 
uninfluential94. Thus, citizens may ask themselves why truth or moral commitment 
should never trump the demands of public reason. An illuminating example are religious 
citizens: the idea that they should set aside what they hold to be a matter of truth for the 
sake of public reason is for them especially demanding, given that they believe such truth 
to have a divine origin. On the one hand it has been argued that public reason should be 
made more inclusive with respect to reasons95, or that political liberalism should host a 
variety of public reasons, more fitting with the fact of pluralism96, or that comprehensive 
reasons should be allowed and brought forward in the public sphere because this would 
be the best way to encourage the achievement of agreement through mutual 
understanding97 and so justification. Such positions are limited to the highlighting of 
                                            
concern is about the hold of the political liberal strategy as a whole and not just the specific features of public 
reason. 
93 See Nussbaum 2011, 15. 
94 The conceptual relationship between reasonableness and truth has been extensively explored by Habermas, also 
in light of his own works on public discourse. “On Rawls’s conception, metaphysical doctrines and religious world-
interpretations admit of truth and falsity. … the truth claims of all reasonable worldviews have equal weight, where 
those worldviews count as reasonable which compete with one another in a reflexive attitude” (Habermas 1995, 
124-125). 
95 Bonotti 2010. 
96 Bohman 1995. 
97 See Weithman 2002 and Nussbaum 2011. 
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intuitive difficulties individuals may face in weighting their most important moral 
commitments against public reasons.  
A stronger challenge on this point has been formulated by Micah Lott, who 
analysed in depth how the prioritisation of public reason over comprehensive ones may 
put citizens on the position of undermining their own moral accountability for the sake 
of public reasons98. The scenarios he analyses are those in which a truth possessed by 
citizens happens to be extremely relevant from a political point of view, but because of 
its being an epistemic or moral truth (or at least so it is held by the citizens in question) it 
cannot be translated into public reason. The very fact that citizens perceive the 
information they have and think of it as a truth, or at least the best they can achieve in 
terms of truth, puts them in the condition of (if they are good Rawlsians) betray their 
beliefs and losing their moral accountability and producing no political effect also. 
Citizens, may find themselves deciding between the demands of the duty of civility and 
the duty to honour other fundamental rights or duties that cannot contingently being 
brought to public attention in a reasonable way. It is here important to notice that what 
counts to the purpose of the argument are the moral perceptions of citizens and how 
they will probably (but indeed likely) affect their behaviour, regardless of their correctness: 
“[i]nsofar as a person perceives some duties to be of more importance than others, it 
seems foolish to predict that she will choose to abandon a more important duty for a 
lesser one if the two come into conflict. Likewise, I don’t see how we can morally fault 
people for choosing what they perceive to be a higher duty of over a lesser duty if the 
two come into conflict”99. 
This shows how even under the best intention to behave reasonably, it is highly 
unlikely that non idealised citizens will always and perfectly behave according to public 
reason. The objections I collected here insist on the complications of the feasibility of 
political liberalism as a whole because it cannot be expected from actual citizens that 
they fully comply with such elevated demands. Political liberalism is looked at as an over-
demanding theory, which initial expectations are flawed by inaccuracy. 
                                            
98 Lott 2006. 
99 Lott 2006, 82. 
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3.4. Political liberal legitimacy and its process 
I now turn to a further question concerning desirability, i.e. the demands of liberal 
legitimacy. The notion of legitimacy embodied in political liberalism is strictly connected 
with the idea of reasonableness and public reason and in fact Rawls refers in the 
introduction to PL to the criterion of reciprocity as its basis: “[p]olitical conceptions to 
be reasonable must justify only constitutions that satisfy this principle [of reciprocity]. 
This gives what may be called the liberal principle of legitimacy as it applies to the 
legitimacy of constitutions and statutes enacted under them”100. The full utterance of the 
Rawlsian notion of legitimacy is that “our exercise of political power is fully proper only 
when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens 
as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and 
ideals acceptable to their common human reason. This is the liberal principle of 
legitimacy”101. Now, at first glance it seems that this latter formulation of the principle 
of legitimacy102 is wide in the scope, since it addresses all citizens and refers to the 
capacity of reasoning they have in common as humans. It embodies the idea that if the 
constitutive structure of a society can be endorsed by all these citizens in light of such 
broadly shared capacities then it is legitimate, provided that this endorsement happens 
reasonably. Such endorsement depends on the ability of citizens to justify the principles 
and ideals that are meant to be binding for them (because they define political power). 
The principle of legitimacy is presented by Rawls as dependant on the criterion of 
reciprocity, but, David Archard notices, the reverse is also valid, i.e. the criterion of 
reciprocity can be derived by the ideal of legitimacy: “[a]ny would-be exercise of political 
power is legitimate only if those who would exercise it provide those who would be 
subject to it with reasons the latter will accept”103. This formulation makes it clearer that 
those who should be entitled to exercise political power need to be reasonable in the 
first place. 
                                            
100 Rawls 2005, xliv. 
101 Rawls 2005, 137. 
102 It is the second in the order that I presented them but it is important to bear in mind that this is not the 
chronological order they have been written. While the main body of the book is from 1993, the introduction I have 
just quoted is from 1995. 
103 Archard 2001, 212. 
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The idea that legitimacy, and so the legitimate use of coercive power, depends on 
the justification from all citizens is supported by various liberal thinkers. Already before 
the publication of PL, Larmore discussed the idea of political liberalism in a way that is 
very sympathetic with the Rawlsian one, providing a case for justification grounded on 
the notions of rational dialogue and equal respect, calling for mutuality of justification 
and neutrality: “[i]f our aim is to devise principles of political association and if we are 
resolved to respect each other as persons in this effort, then the principles to established 
must be the ones justifiable to everyone whom they are to bind. If, in this attempt at 
justification, we meet with reasonable disagreement, then we should fall back on 
common ground and determine what principles can be derived on that basis. Acceptable 
political principles must thus conform to the cardinal principle of neutrality toward 
controversial views about the good life”104. Similarly, Waldron identified a core tenet of 
contemporary liberalism with the idea of justification to every citizens subject to political 
power: “[t]he thesis that I want to say is fundamentally liberal is this: a social and political 
order is illegitimate unless it is rooted in the consent of all those who have to live under 
it”105.  
Notice that such an account of legitimacy implies a twofold mechanism. On the 
one hand, the fundamental principles defining the shape and modes of political coercive 
power have to be justified to all citizens. This should happen in political liberalism via 
public justification and overlapping consensus, in fact the three levels of justification 
require citizens to justify firstly in foro interno and then publicly, by endorsing the 
prioritisation of the political values of the conception of justice and by relying on them 
to justify their position to others. Such values, and so the reasons they produce, are 
already shared, because they are the object of overlapping consensus106. On the other 
hand, the very process of justification has to happen reasonably so the legitimation process 
does not concern all citizens, but only the reasonable ones. The fact that legitimacy is so 
                                            
104 Larmore 1990, 351. 
105 Waldron 1987, 140. 
106 “public justification by political society … works in tandem with the other three ideas: those of a reasonable 
overlapping consensus, stability for the right reasons, and legitimacy. … [T]he express contents of these [reasonable 
comprehensive] doctrines have no normative role in public justification; citizens do not look into the content of 
others’ doctrines … Rather, they take into account and give some weight to only the fact – the existence – of the 
reasonable overlapping consensus itself” (Rawls 2005, 387). 
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dependent on justification and works parallel with the achievement of consensus creates 
a gap within the notion of liberal legitimacy itself: while only reasonable people 
participate to the legitimation process, legitimacy requires that all the ones supposed to live 
under (be coerced by) the principles object of the legitimation/justification are in the 
position of justifying them. 
 
3.5. Non-ideal people and unreasonableness: the costs of political liberalism 
It is this specific relationship between justification and legitimacy triggering 
criticisms about the exclusivist attitude political liberalism has towards the unreasonable. 
What I want to highlight here is the idea that the roots of the relationship between 
legitimacy and justification can be traced back to the notion of reasonableness. In order 
to do so, I shall clarify the conclusion I have just reached. The liberal principle of 
legitimacy defines what political coercive power should count as legitimate in political 
liberalism, by referring, I hope I have shown, to the notion of justification. In so doing 
it gives a criterion to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate use of such power. The type 
of justification required by political liberalism is public justification, a notion I already 
explored, that requires a process of selection of reasons (right reasons) and of agreement 
on those reasons in its turn depending on reasonableness. In this sense, the process of 
justification informs the process of legitimation, because it is by making the basic 
structure and the principles justifiable that theory can claim them to be legitimate. The 
success of the justificatory process and the achievement of overlapping consensus are 
the result of the willingness of reasonable citizens to restrict the pool of the reasons to 
right reasons and, simultaneously, of the reduction of pluralism to reasonable pluralism. 
So, if justification is limited to the set of reasonable citizens, then also legitimacy is 
dependent on the same limits. 
The question of legitimacy, because of this intrinsic connection with justification, 
shapes the position of political liberalism with respect to unreasonable people. The fact 
that legitimacy is subject to the limits of reasonableness tells at the same time something 
about the political liberal attitude to non idealised unreasonable citizens and something 
about the notion of reasonableness itself. Rawls is only explicit about unreasonableness 
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in a footnote, where it refers I think only to a subset of unreasonable comprehensive 
doctrines, those that are openly illiberal: “[t]hat there are doctrines that reject one or 
more democratic freedoms is itself a permanent fact of life, or seems so. This gives us 
the practical task of containing them – like war or disease – so that they do not overturn 
political justice”107. The idea of containing unreasonable doctrines could be prudentially 
justified on the basis that in the long run it protects the fundamental tenets of liberal 
justice, because it protects stability by preventing the unreasonable to gain too much 
power. Nevertheless, the main purpose of containment is moral, since it is supposed to 
protect that special kind of moralised stability identified by right reasons108. In this sense, 
the aim of containment is again one of selecting the appropriate (consistent with justice 
and reasonableness) reasons, doctrines and ultimately citizens.  
The question Rawls is tackling here is the difference between the facts of 
pluralism and of reasonable pluralism, claiming that the parties in the original position 
would select the same principles of justice, regardless of their accounting for the former 
or the latter form of pluralism and this is because “[t]he parties must always guarantee 
the basic rights and liberties of those for whom they are trustees”109. Of course, 
reasonableness does not interfere with the work of parties in the original position. If 
anything, it is the original position being at the very basis of the idea of reasonableness. 
Parties are able to produce principles of justice which implementation requires 
reasonableness because they are situated in what I previously called a political vacuum. 
Clearly, this is the point of thinking out a hypothetical impartial point of view. However, 
the result is that even if the parties’ trustees are all citizens, their word only counts and/or 
apply to reasonable ones. In defending the Rawlsian position, Jonathan Quong argued 
that the identification of such gap comes from a misreading or misunderstanding of 
Rawls. He argues that “[t]he principles of justice derived in the original position gain 
their moral force from the way the original position is constructed. In other words, if 
the original position is a genuinely fair and impartial moral perspective, then the 
principles of justice derived within it are going to hold for everyone, and not just those 
                                            
107 Rawls 2005, 64, n. 19. 
108 Quong 2004, 323-325. 
109 Rawls 2005, 64. 
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citizens who happen to endorse their premises”110. Nevertheless, this is only sufficient 
to argue that there is no sound reason in political liberalism to deny the unreasonable 
the basic liberal rights and freedoms, and does not account for the difference between 
reasonable and unreasonable marked by the legitimation process. So even if the 
principles of justice are originally thought out for all citizens, they de facto say something 
only to reasonable ones.  
The reason is that reasonableness is applied in a self-referential way. It gives the 
starting for public justification and overlapping consensus, i.e. reasonable pluralism, 
because if the justificatory stage took pluralism as it is in account then it would be 
impossible to achieve stability for the right reasons, but is also informs the process. In 
other terms, political liberalism aims at being justified only to a set of people whose 
political characteristics (reasonableness) are defined and defended from within political 
liberalism itself111. It is because of this that critics argued that political liberalism is only 
concerned to be legitimate for the reasonable. Such circularity has been discussed in 
manifold ways, and Estlund, one advocate of this position, described reasonableness as 
an “insular” concept112. He observed that the principle by which only those 
comprehensive doctrines that are reasonable, that is acceptable to reasonable people, 
can be part of the justification implies another assumption, more precisely, a normative 
assumption. It is the requirement that every reasonable citizen shall recognise the power 
(or the right) to reject a comprehensive doctrine in the justification/legitimation process 
only to other reasonable citizens, which means on the basis of the lack of capacity of the 
doctrine in question to respect the standards of reasonableness113. It is in this sense that 
the audience of the conception of justice is limited and so it is its authority, in fact if it 
was the unreasonable claiming a rejection of the conception of justice, this would not 
affect its legitimacy, rather it would just be a further prove of their unreasonableness. 
The role of reasonableness is not one of testing the outcomes of justification, which 
                                            
110 Quong 2004, 316. 
111 This view has been called the “internal conception” in Quong 2011. 
112 Estlund 1998. 
113 “Insularity Requirement: Each member of C [reasonable citizens] must recongize the rejection rights of all and 
only the members of C. (An individual has rejection rights over a doctrine’s admissibility into political justification. 
And … only members of C have rejection rights[)]” (Estlund 1998, 259). 
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would be testing if what results from the process is a good candidate for shaping political 
power, neither it depends on justification, which would mean considering reasonable 
what citizens have justified and so legitimised. It is not an ex post threshold test114. Its 
role is instead constitutive of justification and so legitimacy ultimately depends on 
reasonableness115. 
As anticipated the interference of reasonableness on legitimacy does not come 
without a cost. The exclusion of the unreasonable from the legitimation pool, in 
Friedman’s words, has impact not only on the status of the unreasonable, but also on 
the implications of political liberalism. Being excluded from the legitimation pool, 
unreasonable citizens’ position with respect to the basic structure of institutions is 
irrelevant for the legitimacy of those same institutions. Whether citizens falling within 
the set of the unreasonable are able or unable to justify the institutional settings under 
which they live has no relevance. The use of coercive power over them is seen from their 
point of view as illegitimate because unjustified, nevertheless “their rejection [of the 
conception of justice informing coercive institutions] appears to carry no theoretical 
weight”116, that is it does not affect the strategic structure of political liberalism, in fact 
“given the enormous diversity among human viewpoints, the exclusion of the 
unreasonable people from the legitimation pool makes the search for legitimacy more 
manageable than it otherwise would be. This consideration, however, is a practical one 
only. It is not a principled reason for excluding anyone. Rawls, by contrast, elevates the 
exclusion of the unreasonable into a matter of principle in his quest for political 
legitimacy”117. 
Now, it seems to me that the matter of exclusion of the unreasonable highlights 
two weaknesses of political liberalism. Firstly, as explored, it seems that the political 
conception is not meant to speak to the unreasonable. The principles of justice do apply 
to all citizens, but only some of them receive their message. In this sense, their practical 
relevance is jeopardised by the limits of their effectiveness. In fact, only those who grasp 
                                            
114 The expression “threshold test of reasonableness” is from Macedo 1990. 
115 Besch 2013, 35-37. 
116 Friedman 2003, 163. 
117 Friedman 2003, 164. 
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their importance, the reasonable, take part to the construction of the political foundation 
of their society and legitimate the political power of institution, thus leaving the rest, the 
unreasonable, under illegitimate (even though only from their point of view) coercion. 
This last point is an undesirable consequence of political liberalism, because it damages 
stability, which achievement does not account for a part of society that it is expected to 
contain. 
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Chapter 2 
Managing pluralism: portraits of modus vivendi 
  
1. The black mirror of political liberalism? The question of Rawlsian modus 
vivendi 
1.1. The management of pluralism: a premise on alternative strategies 
I devoted the first chapter to the dissection into atomic components of the 
Rawlsian political liberal theory, presenting it as a strategy. I treated the fundamental 
normative assumptions and commitments of political liberalism as the pillars and 
cornerstones of the political liberal architecture. Such normative tools are those needed 
to manage the undesirable consequences of the fact of pluralism by containing it. I 
accounted for how in Rawlsian philosophy the application of the prescriptions of 
political liberalism are meant to build a type of contemporary liberal democratic society 
(labelled well-ordered society) that is capable of legitimately enforcing a conception of 
justice and, as a consequence, successfully performing stability. I analysed how the 
theoretical design of political liberalism, by underlining how the mechanisms it puts in 
place are aimed at the management of the undesirable consequences of pluralism (hence 
the qualification political liberalism as a strategy). I analysed political liberalism through 
the question of how satisfactory its strategy is, and I concluded by endorsing some of 
the mainstream criticisms in literature. In the process, I identified three main weaknesses: 
idealism, moralism, and a feature that I called demandingness (or, when I used it more 
critically, over-demandingness). Idealism and moralism are methodological terms of art 
and accepted categories in literature that I used to analyse political liberalism and that I 
am going to use to discuss modus vivendi. Unlike these, demandingness should be 
regarded as a concept aimed at grasping a peculiarity of political liberalism, that is the 
quality and, using a metaphor, the volume of demands that political liberalism puts on 
individuals.  
First, I discussed how political liberalism falls under the label of idealism. I 
especially insisted on the gap between the fact of pluralism and what Rawls calls the fact 
 50 
of reasonable pluralism. The definition of this gap is dependent on two aspects: one is 
the difference in broadness of the range of comprehensive doctrines tout court and the 
subset of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, the other is the difference between 
unreasonable and reasonable citizens, marked by the individuals’ readiness to comply 
with the demands of public reason and, ultimately, those of justice. The political liberal 
idealism consists of the refinement of the fact of pluralism in these two senses, and my 
dissatisfaction with it depends on its fact-sensitivity being levelled according to the 
objectives of its normative programme (justice and stability) rather than according to 
descriptive accuracy.  
Second, I reviewed what I called the tools of political liberalism according to their 
purpose within the theory and their implications for citizens, concluding that political 
liberalism ends up demanding more than it realistically could. I focused especially on the 
requirements of reasonableness and public reason, arguing that their over-
demandingness sets a normative standard that can only be approached by individuals 
with uncommon moral capacity. I considered such over-demandingness as the result of 
the idealist take: because the starting point of political liberalism is a “polished” version 
of pluralism (that I called the raw material of political liberalism), citizens are expected 
to give exceptional performance in the public sphere. Their steady compliance to the 
idea of justice enables in its turn the success of two highly demanding devices of stability: 
public justification and overlapping consensus.  
Third, I discussed political liberalism as an example of moralism. I argued, along 
with Williams1, that the means political liberalism puts in place to achieve justice and 
stability (i.e. the ideals of reasonableness and public reason) represent the prioritisation 
of a particular morality over political dynamics. I observed how the political liberal 
strategy cannot do away with moralism, because the discipline imposed on the fact of 
pluralism ultimately refers to the morality specified by the notion of justice, 
philosophically and not politically identified. I need here to reiterate an important point 
about the critique of moralism. The purpose of the previous chapter was to do is to 
show how the moralistic nature of political liberalism is not only strictly necessary for its 
goals, but also deeply connected with its ideal approach. On this premise, I concluded 
regarding moralism as a dissatisfactory aspect of political liberalism because I considered 
                                            
1 Williams 2005. 
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its strategic costs in terms of desirability and practicability. In this sense, the over-
demandingness of public reason and overlapping consensus seems to be avoidable for 
the purpose of containing the undesirable consequences of pluralism. Thus, I did not 
conclude that political theory should reject a moralistic approach and endorse a realist 
one on the basis that realism is a theoretical desideratum. Rather, I limited my observations 
to the price political liberalism had to pay for its moralism. I surmised that moralism is 
the reason for the undesirable exclusion of the unreasonable and, via its ideal 
connotation, for the impracticability of its goals. 
Having identified what are the reasons why political liberalism does not 
convincingly perform in facing the fact of pluralism, one must look for an alternative 
strategy to manage ineradicable disagreement. One alternative solution that is the focus 
of a renewed attention of current debates is modus vivendi. Rawls treated modus vivendi 
as an alternative scenario to political liberalism, conceptualising it as a non-normative 
solution, as well as a deeply undesirable one. In this sense, he does not elaborate on it as 
a suitable alterative, let alone one that measures up to political liberalism, as his outlook 
on modus vivendi is kept in check by the stipulations of ideal theory. I look instead at 
modus vivendi as a political strategy that has the potential to respond to the fact of 
pluralism. From a starting point of what has previously been considered and I consider 
a misrepresentation of modus vivendi, i.e. the Rawlsian one, I try to set out its essential 
features (what does define what modus vivendi is), to assess its strengths and weaknesses 
as I did for political liberalism, and finally to ponder its normative relevance. 
 
1.2. The Rawlsian definition of modus vivendi 
“Modus vivendi” are the Latin words used to express a status quo in international 
relations, denoting a treaty securing the perfect balance of powers among states or 
nations, i.e. a situation in which none of the parties has an interest in undertaking an act 
which may lead to the loss of equilibrium and consequently to conflict. Most 
importantly, modus vivendi is grounded on the idea that two conditions are met at the 
same time: that States are ready to act at the expense of others and that it is part of the 
common knowledge that an alteration of the status quo (let it be the violation of a treaty 
or of a less formalised agreement) would be disadvantageous for all parties. The example 
Rawls employs to illustrate the dynamics of modus vivendi is the acceptance of the 
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principle of toleration by Catholics and Protestants in the sixteenth century: 
appeasement through toleration was reached only because the costs of an exhausting war 
drained both sides to the point of outweighing the duty (inherent to their morals) of 
“uphold[ing] the true religion and to repress the spread of heresy and false doctrine”2. 
For the two parties, giving up hostilities and endorsing the principle of toleration was 
the only accessible way to conclude a highly draining situation and to secure a long-
lasting peace3. 
Rawls appropriates the expression to draw a parallel between the scenario it 
describes in international relations and a certain situation in domestic politics. Modus 
vivendi is in fact intended as the situation in which a society is only supported by an 
agreement resulting from the bargain among groups’ or individuals’ powers or interests. 
Because this use of the notion of modus vivendi is due to Rawls and because the phrase 
originally became part of contemporary political theoretical language as a Rawlsian 
reference, I will call this theoretical perspective (and the political scenario it describes) 
“Rawlsian modus vivendi” (hereinafter RMV). In line with how modus vivendi is 
conceived in international relations, RMV is founded on self- or group interests, it is the 
result of social and political bargain, and it is subject to the fluctuation of circumstances. 
The original twist of RMV is the perspective from within a given society: RMV does not 
describe the interaction among distinct political unities, rather it portrays the political 
relationships of individuals living under the same set of institutions whose social unity is 
the result of a balance and is, especially compared to the standard of political liberalism, 
only apparent4. As it happened after religious wars in the Modern era, the tolerant 
acceptance of living close to one’s opponent is not the object of an overlapping 
consensus, rather it depends on considerations of political convenience. 
Before unfolding the dynamics of RMV, it is worth reflecting more on its 
definition. Rawls’s introduction of RMV is brief and designed to enrich the scrutiny of 
overlapping consensus and of its place within political liberalism. The very notion of 
RMV is framed by political liberal categories and it is thus conceptualised in an evaluative 
                                            
2 Rawls 2005, 148. 
3 “resting on the conflicting authorities of Church or Bible, there was no resolution between them, as their 
competing transcendent elements do not admit of compromise. Their mortal combat can be moderated only by 
circumstance and exhaustion, or by equal liberty of conscience and freedom of thought. Circumstance and 
exhaustion lead to a modus vivendi”(Rawls 2005, xxxviii-xxxix). On this point, see also Rawls 1999, 433. 
4 Mills 2000, 194-197. 
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perspective, as the stereotyped absence of what is most dear to political liberalism: justice 
and stability. In order to unravel the elements that define RMV, I have to look at what 
is the role it plays in the political liberal project and how it is thought out with respect to 
political liberal normative standards. RMV is only considered as a stage on the way to 
overlapping consensus. Society is expected to overcome it to become a well-ordered 
society and to reach the kind of stability and compliance to the principles of justice that 
define political liberalism. Overlapping consensus is achieved via the stage Rawls calls 
constitutional consensus, that is on an ideally chronological line between RMV and the 
realistic utopia of political liberalism. Constitutional consensus is the situation in which 
liberal principles of justice are embodied in a constitution and the political procedures 
of democracy are shaped according to their content. A certain form of pubic reason is 
already present at this stage and citizens are expected to apply what Rawls calls “the 
cooperative virtues of political life: the virtue of reasonableness and a sense of fairness, 
a spirit of compromise and a readiness to meet others halfway, all of which are connected 
with the willingness to cooperate with others on political terms that everyone can 
publicly accept”5. The society characterised by constitutional consensus is a democratic 
one (the freedoms of political speech and association, the right to vote and “whatever 
else is required for the electoral and legislative procedures of democracy”6 are there) and 
citizens’ attitude towards their own comprehensive views protects the principles of 
justice from being systematically overridden by comprehensive claims (that are not 
necessarily shared by all).  
Comprehensive doctrines are loose and make it possible for citizens to appreciate 
the good of political principles per se. Notice that this is no more than a possibility: in a 
constitutional consensus the principles of justice do not inform the basic structure of 
institutions, nor the kind of public reason that is at use when political decisions are taken. 
Citizens are not ready yet to rethink their position in case it shows to be incompatible 
with the political principles. In fact, the form of reasoning expected from citizens simply 
refers to common sense and uncontroversial scientific evidence. Under these conditions 
though, it happens that they appreciate the common values that keep their polity 
together: “at the first stage of constitutional consensus the liberal principles of justice, 
                                            
5 Rawls 2005, 163. 
6 Rawls 2005, 159. 
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initially accepted reluctantly as a modus vivendi and adopted into a constitution, tend to 
shift citizens’ comprehensive doctrines so that they at least accept the principles of a 
liberal constitution. These principles guarantee certain basic political rights and liberties 
and establish democratic procedures for moderating political rivalry, and for determining 
issues of social policy”7. When the cooperative virtues of political life are expressed at 
their best, enabling compliance to the principles of justice that implies their overruling 
the content of comprehensive doctrines, then the final stage of political liberalism is 
realised. Constitutional consensus is needed as an intermediate level on the way to 
overlapping consensus because the deep and wide allegiance to principles of justice that 
political liberalism requires depends not only on the compatibility of the various moral 
standpoints with those principles, but also on the capacity and will of citizens to prioritise 
those values over the non-political ones embodied in the respective comprehensive 
doctrines. Allegiance to constitutional consensus, instead, is based on the endorsement 
of those political values on the ground of long-term interests, attitudes shaped by custom 
and a will to adapt to what is contextually considered a normal behaviour. 
 
1.3. RMV in the shadow of political liberalism  
RMV can only be unpacked through the lens of the desiderata of political 
liberalism. Its definition grants a franchise to political liberalism by actualising the 
absence of all the structures and mechanisms that constitute the political liberal theory. 
In this sense RMV is the black mirror of political liberalism. In fact, although presented 
as the first of three steps it seems to me that RMV formulation is conceived in a deeply 
different way with respect to the following stages and that the step to the constitutional 
consensus requires a fundamental change. As seen, one of the tenets of overlapping 
consensus, that is fundamental for political liberalism, is tied to the achievement of 
conditions for citizens to accept the fundamental principles of justice informing the basic 
structure of political institutions in the form of public justification. Now, while at the 
stages of constitutional consensus and overlapping consensus citizens understand the 
value of the principles of justice and endorse them (for reasons that can be but do not 
have to be moral), they do not do so in RMV.  Recall that the requirement of public 
justification is also at the basis of the political liberal notion of legitimacy: for the use of 
                                            
7 Rawls 2005, 163. 
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political power to be legitimate, the basic structure of institutions has to be justifiable to 
every reasonable citizen subject to its rule8. Moreover, in achieving public justification, 
political liberalism rules out what Rawls calls the fact of oppression, that is the scenario in 
which a conception of justice or good informing political institutions cannot be publicly 
justified and has to be maintained through the use of State power. When a political 
choice is made or a policy implemented, those citizens who cannot accept and/or justify 
that choice or policy from their moral standpoint (i.e., when it does not account for or 
explicitly clashes with their beliefs and values) are in a condition of oppression, because 
the political decision will be imposed on them9. RMV does not envisage a notion of 
justifiability, let alone the possibility of actual justification in the sense political liberalism 
does, nor does it embody the idea that citizens’ agreement to live under modus vivendi 
institutions should rest on an explicit endorsement.  
The qualitative gap between RMV and other liberal forms of consent and 
legitimacy seems to me mainly dependant on the fact that RMV says very little about the 
modes of pacific coexistence amongst individuals who profoundly disagree with each 
other. As a matter of fact, all that RMV says is that such coexistence is pacific because 
lead by reciprocal toleration, intended as the giving up of actual conflict. RMV can come 
into existence and be maintained insofar as the costs of breaking a given balance of 
powers, interests, goals and starting a conflict (of any kind) are higher than those of the 
upkeep of the status quo. This is true of RMV regardless of what status quo. These 
considerations highlight at least two important aspects of RMV. First, that consent is 
not qualified, which means that the reasons individuals have for complying with RMV 
do not need to match any moral or epistemic standard: there are no good or right reasons 
in RMV. All that matters is that some kind of incentive (again regardless of if being just 
prudential or also moral) to carry on tolerating each other presence and not to upset the 
balance is there. Second, RMV is indifferent to the relative distribution of power or to 
whether institutions reflect the substantive content of a doctrine, insofar as the scenario 
happens to be balanced. However, this means that, from a political liberal perspective, 
RMV does not exclude the possibility of oppression (in Rawlsian sense).  
                                            
8 Rawls 2005, 137. 
9 “a continuing shared understanding on one comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine can be 
maintained only by the oppressive use of state power. … The same holds, I believe, for any reasonable 
comprehensive philosophical and moral doctrine … A society united on a reasonable [doctrine] would likewise 
require the sanctions of state power to remain so. Call this ‘the fact of oppression’” (Rawls 2005, 37). 
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1.4. Consensus and (in)stability in RMV 
In the previous section I argued that toleration is an essential feature of RMV 
because it is conceptualised as the adequate way of achieving the settlement of 
disagreement. The recourse to toleration as only viable option depends on the absence 
in RMV of a strong consensus of any kind. Not only RMV does not rely on a consent 
of the type of overlapping consensus, that represents the reconciliation of pluralism in 
the form of a moralised principled agreement about what is right, but neither does it 
need an agreement around a notion of the good. In contrast with such forms of consent, 
all that RMV needs is the acknowledgement that coexistence can only peacefully work 
with the giving up of conflict and needs toleration. The agreement underpinning RMV 
does not depend on the endorsement of a notion of the just or the good, neither it 
implies any theory about individuals’ moral commitment to a political agreement or to 
the use of a certain form or public reasoning nor one about social cohesion. It is thus 
evident why Rawls qualifies the agreement on RMV in contrast to overlapping consensus 
in the famous sentence: “[t]he substantive question concerns the significant features of 
such a consensus [overlapping consensus] and how these features affect social concord 
and the moral quality of public life. … an overlapping consensus is not a mere modus vivendi”10. 
Toleration in RMV is not endorsed as a shared political value, as instead are 
principles of justice in political liberalism, rather it is instrumentally endorsed and 
individuals’ compliance to it comes from prudential reasons and not from moral ones. 
The lack of moral support for maintaining RMV leaves the door open to a renegotiation 
of the most fundamental political settlements every time circumstances change, i.e. every 
time contingencies modify the balance of powers and interests among individuals or 
push them to revise their goals. Their allegiance to RMV can be read as a weak consent 
that expresses itself in activities aimed at maintaining order but not in an endorsement 
of the political settlements per se. RMV is a matter of convergence around a status quo 
which is considered the most adequate on prudential grounds (without corresponding 
to any moralistically given standard of justice), and it has to be maintained without 
explicit (and/or morally grounded) approval from the parties involved in it. RMV lacks 
what has been defined by Jean Hampton an “endorsement consent”. I borrow here her 
words to better specify how the kind of consent typical of RMV “may not express a 
                                            
10 Rawls 2005, 146-147, my emphasis. 
 57 
person's approval of her regime. To accommodate the notion of approval, we need a 
meatier idea of consent that expresses not merely acquiescence in a political regime but 
also explicit approval of and support for it. A regime that endorsement consent gets 
from its subjects not just activity that maintains it but also activity that conveys their 
endorsement and approval of it. A regime that attains the realisation of endorsement 
consent from most of its citizens will do more than simply survive: The considerable 
support from its subjects will make it vibrant and long- lived, capable of withstanding 
attacks from without and within. Beyond a kind of attitude toward the state, 
endorsement consent is a decision to support it because of one's determination that it is 
a good thing to support. By giving this form of consent, the subject conveys her respect 
for the state, her loyalty to it, her identification with it, and her trust in it”11. Because 
compliance is so conceived, individuals living under RMV institutions do not support 
the existence of such institutions because they are perceived as a good in themselves. 
Institutions maintaining a status quo are no more than the expression of a will not to 
start (or fall back into) conflictual circumstances. 
The weak agreement underpinning RMV is the result of individuals’ limited 
agency in the public space, conceived as a happenstance only necessary to play the game 
to secure or at best maximise their particular (individual or related to specific group 
identified by a common comprehensive doctrine) benefit. Parties in RMV are not subject 
to any moral or cognitive demand à la public reason (let it be of a highly ideal stance as 
in political liberalism or otherwise conceptualised). As representatives of comprehensive 
doctrines, they do not need to revise their position to make it fit to a moral standard that 
is external to the doctrine itself, neither they have to accommodate the demands of a 
commitment of political sort (referring to fundamentally shared political values or a 
historically established agreement). As a result, they are not expected to attribute any 
special value to social cooperation that go beyond the preservation of their fundamental 
interest in peace and order. On the contrary, they will continue to stick to the agreement 
if and only if the continuation of cooperation pays off better than desertion of 
cooperation. In this sense, the political approach of RMV is deeply Hobbesian. 
                                            
11 Hampton 1997, 96. 
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Toleration is a liberal principle but it is only understood as a suitable alternative to 
disorder and discord12. 
This represents a problem from the Rawlsian point of view because the absence 
of moral or morally connoted reasons coincides with the impossibility of reaching the 
solid stability a society should secure. More than this, not only is RMV incapable of 
achieving stability for the right reasons (in Rawlsian terms), but it is to be considered 
equally unstable outside the Rawlsian framework because it inherently depends on 
circumstances: that precarious equilibrium among powers, interests and goals can at 
anytime collapse or, in a best case scenario, shift. Such a modification would then require 
a more or less deep and broad re-negotiation of the fundamental terms of political life 
(rather than a deep and broad consensus around them13). In a RMV framework, then, 
“stability is contingent on circumstances remaining such as not to upset the fortunate 
convergence of interests”14, because citizens do not endorse the shared framework in a 
moral sense, they simply see it as a viable option in order not to lose the minimal 
conditions for social life. The problem with RMV lies in the direct consequence of such 
a lack of endorsement: individuals who agree to be citizens in a RMV are not just ready 
to stop sticking to the agreement as soon as they (or their respective group) comes to 
power, but they are also ready to live under a more or less intrusive degree of coercion  
when they happen to be part of a minority or a disempowered group. 
In this sense, RMV seeks for peace and order not as ideals or values that politics 
has the task to realise, but rather as minimal conditions for political life. For this reason, 
the benefit of one’s possibility to fulfil a particular goal or to gain power might in 
principle outweigh the costs of a shared peaceful social and political environment. This 
is the intrinsic instability of RMV. 
 
1.5. Is RMV a realistic settlement? 
RMV is a model of cooperation that, as said, refers to the modus vivendi 
descriptive notion typical of international relations, in which context political actors are 
States. Since RMV represents an application of this mechanism to one society, political 
                                            
12 So far I have referred a lot to the toleration as the object of RMV consent without further detailing it. In the 
second part of this chapter I will reflect more in deep on what notion of toleration modus vivendi theory calls for.  
13 Rawls 2005, 164-167. 
14 Rawls 2005, 147. 
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units are defined by individuals or groups15 living under the same set of institutions and 
within the limits of one political body. So, in order to define the merits and flaws of 
RMV the account of the individual (citizen of that political body) it embodies needs to 
be analysed. In discussing consensus and instability in RMV, I have clarified the quality 
of the motives and reasons guiding single behaviour in the political realm of RMV. In 
this section I tackle RMV’s account of the individual, claiming that RMV shares, in this 
respect, the same distance from accuracy that affects political liberalism. 
RMV relies on an account of the individuals as participants to an aseptic game 
for the balance of power while needing at the same time a tolerant attitude towards their 
opponents. Rawls seems to assume that citizens in RMV have their own conception of 
the good and therefore a more or less complete moral view (in his own terms, they 
embrace a more or less fully comprehensive doctrine). Nothing suggests that they are 
somehow prevented from endorsing one. In RMV citizens’ moral capacity is only 
applied to their private sphere or at least in their particular perspective but not in the 
public sphere. In fact, the agreement underpinning RMV is maintained only thanks to 
citizens’ prudential considerations based on their own interests, let them be the 
preservation of relative power or the survival of the most powerful groups or 
individuals16. Because RMV relies on toleration as the means to preserve minimal 
conditions of cooperation, it fails to account for those moral standpoints that may imply 
forms of commitment and moral imperatives, typical of fundamentalist religious attitude 
or fanaticism, to convert those labelled as sinners or evildoers to the right side. More 
precisely, any moral standpoint which imperatives cannot be fulfilled within the specific 
limits of a tolerant framework (namely those stemming from the mutual recognition of 
the fundamental liberties) does not fall within the limits of RMV. Should a group or 
individual break the boundaries of toleration, RMV would have no institutional 
resources to cease or contain the imbalance. 
If, on the one hand, fundamentalists and fanatics are excluded by the picture of 
RMV, it also does not account for individuals actively engaging in building and 
                                            
15 By groups I am referring here to associations or sets of individuals held together by homogeneity of moral and 
cognitive beliefs and ideas, in other terms of bearers of the same comprehensive doctrine. Even though the term 
“community” might be fitting for the purpose, I avoided it in order not to imply any reference to the 
communitarian theory. 
16 “We simply suppose that historical circumstances have so turned out that for the time being at least, the balance 
of forces keeps all sides supporting the current arrangements, which happen to be just to each of them” (Rawls 
2005, xl-xli). 
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maintaining an agreement (as citizens of a well ordered society instead do), and it does 
not formulate any normative requirement in this regard either. But because individuals 
are still seen as bearers of moral commitments, it relies on a dualist, artificial imagining 
of the agent in the political context. In fact, RMV assumes that citizens’ morality is 
sharply split: in the private realm they are supposed to apply moral reasoning as based 
on their respective comprehensive doctrines, while all principled (morally substantial) 
aspirations vanish as soon as they step in the public realm, thus leaving space for self-
interested prudential considerations oriented by the principle of a rational choice rather 
than a moral one. In other terms, citizens of a RMV lack any sense of belonging to the 
political society, and loyalty to the institutions that govern their life together. The 
absence of any kind of will to maintain the cooperation (even a minimal one) 
independently from self-preservation calculus, brings in the picture an idea of citizens 
that is immune to any form of participation in political life. On one extreme, political 
liberalism delegates the definition of modes and fashions of such participation to the 
normative demandingness of public reason. On the other, RMV radicalises the absence 
from the public sphere of any preference that goes beyond the preservation of relative 
balance (via the protection of self-interest). If citizens in the Rawlsian well-ordered 
society were to only formulate their public claims in a reasonable way freestanding from 
their more private beliefs (they ought to do so), citizens in RMV are supposed not to have 
claims to be made public. Not only they do so out of lack of public morality (specified 
by a greater or lesser level of public reason or sense of belonging to a polity) but they 
are also expected not to have any reason (moral or prudential) to give public expression 
to what they maintain to be their position. 
Not only does RMV reject the model of an evolving society that develops towards 
a more idealised and stable situation; rather, the utter absence of principled morality in 
public life makes RMV the archetype of this same absence. RMV ends up with 
instrumentally tolerant and instrumentally liberal citizens. I am not claiming here that 
this would be a problem per se. In criticising political liberalism I follow Onora O’Neill 
objection to idealisation (that she defines as the practice of adding too much to the 
cognitive abilities and will of human beings as political agents). I identified idealism, and 
the lack of descriptive accuracy it carries, as a shortcoming of political liberalism. It 
seems to me that RMV is affected by a similar weakness. The design of the citizen 
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trespasses the abstraction line, by overlooking too much of how humans actually behave 
in the political space17: not only does it exclude the ordered expression of moral 
commitment political liberalism wishes for, but also any unrefined, and often indicated 
as irrational, expression of passion and partisanship. However, the reduction of political 
behaviour to a series or collection of rational choices does not affect RMV theory only 
in terms of excessive abstraction. The expectations RMV puts on individuals might seem 
low because of the minimisation, if not annihilation, of the expression of morality in the 
public sphere. As a result, citizens’ epistemic performance is expected to go way beyond 
what is the common standard. If expecting strict compliance to principles of justice is 
clearly idealistic, nonetheless it seems problematic to assume that citizens are able to 
collect perfect information and to reach a detached view of their participation in society 
in order to strategically act on the grounds of power balances and particular (ascribable 
to individuals, groups or communities) interests. The way Rawls designs political 
behaviour is so far from a rigorous description that, although commonly labelled as 
realist, it ends up being unrealistic.  
RMV’s distance from reality makes it a political paradigm that has little to say to 
contemporary democracies about the management of pluralism, but this does not have 
to be true of modus vivendi theory tout court. If modus vivendi has to fulfil this task, it 
should be aware of, and be clear about, the fact that individuals cannot be supposed to 
always act justly in a moral sense, neither to have a strong commitment to prioritise the 
life of the political society over their individual interests or even their moral aspirations. 
In other terms, it should not entail unrealistically high expectations from political actors. 
If on the one hand, it should not assume the behaviour they may display to be perfectly 
oriented by a set of moral principles always prioritised over self-interest, on the other 
hand taking modus vivendi seriously means not to assume that individuals would not 
behave emotionally, expressively and to some extent irrationally in their social space.  
 
1.6. Modus vivendi: an independent political project 
I used the previous section to set out the core features of RMV and to analyse 
what I see as its merits and above all its shortcomings. For modus vivendi theory to be 
a valuable candidate in solving the management of the undesirable consequences of 
                                            
17 O’Neill 1987. 
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pluralism, it has to overcome what I considered to be the weaknesses of political 
liberalism, mainly the refinement of the scope and depth of pluralism, and at the same 
time be able to secure minimal political conditions of peace and order. I presented RMV 
as the black mirror of political liberalism, firstly following the way Rawls introduces and 
interprets the notion of modus vivendi as a model for the representation of the 
management of pluralism in domestic politics. The Rawlsian outlook on modus vivendi 
serves the purposes of political liberalism and thus shows several concerns on the 
inability of the RMV model to fulfil what from a political liberal perspective are the main 
goals of theorising, i.e. designing a way to assure stability while realising justice. RMV is 
unequipped to achieve the standard political liberalism sets for justification, consent and 
public discourse (through reasonableness and public reason), but at the same time it 
represents the origin of a path to that standard. In order to move way from RMV a 
significant shift in individuals’ attitude towards the public space is required. They 
essentially have to turn from amoral player in a shared space into morally engaged 
citizens who cherish their institutions and political space as their highest value. RMV 
serves political liberalism as a useful counter-image to maintain the myth of desirability 
and attainability of stable consensus and public justification. 
I then identified what are the main shortcomings of RMV. A first relevant 
weakness (already emphasised by Rawls) is its substantial instability. More specifically, I 
analysed how the agreement underpinning RMV is no more than a happenstance, 
dependant on a thin conceptualisation of toleration. The reduction of the attainment of 
consent and the fulfilment of toleration to a fortunate coincidence (balance of powers, 
goals, interest) combined with a purely instrumental attitude makes RMV entirely subject 
to changing circumstances. In this sense, while political liberalism secures stability at the 
price of curbing pluralism, RMV preserves pluralism at the price of jeopardising stability. 
Now, even if the main goal of a modus vivendi agreement is at least the preservation of 
peace and order, it cannot afford the kind of instability of RMV because it would 
constitute the abandonment of  to the minimal condition of order. This is the outcome 
of the utter lack of any reasons for supporting whatsoever RMV arrangements. Not only 
RMV does away with philosophically defined right reasons, but it sweeps away the 
political questions of why people should stick to modus vivendi institution and how they 
should do so. 
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A second problem I analysed lies in the picture of the political agent implied by 
RMV, a radically dualistic one, resting on a clear-cut distinction between the citizens’ 
private and public behaviour. The reduction of the public space to an arena of self-
interested calculus segregates the expression of citizens’ beliefs from the public 
discourse, de facto resulting in the absence of any public discourse that may contemplate 
the discussion of moral, religious or philosophical opinions and beliefs, but also one that 
includes the expression of feelings, partisanship, ideology. So, once again, RMV is 
positioned at the very opposite pole of political liberalism. In fact, while political 
liberalism demands reasonableness by suppressing any other form of political behaviour 
(by attributing political agents an unrealistic moral capacity), RMV relies on pure and 
perfectly performed rationality by overlooking crucial aspects and distorting the 
complexity of political interaction. 
It seems to me that the major differences between RMV and political liberalism 
underline how they cannot be thought as stages that come in succession, but they rather 
reflect two distinct political projects. The fact of pluralism as it is calls for a political 
response, that is a strategy to alternatively contain, discipline, regulate, or more minimally 
manage pluralism. While in the Rawlsian project the management of pluralism is directed 
at a settlement of disagreement through the reconciliation of viewpoints, RMV abstains from 
governing the interaction amongst such viewpoints. Its purpose, as modus vivendi 
theory, is a pacification of  the political circumstances that leaves the spectrum and depth of 
pluralism untouched. This fundamental gap between RMV and political liberalism 
remains overlooked in the Rawlsian work.  
This evaluation of RMV leads to the conclusion that it cannot be a satisfactory 
alternative to political liberalism. However, this does not necessarily suggest that modus 
vivendi tout court cannot be one. In this sense the analysis of costs and benefits, vices and 
virtues of RMV cannot be exhaustive of modus vivendi as a distinct political project. 
Several reflections about how to conceive modus vivendi have emerged in the debate 
following Rawls’s original conception and its definition and dynamic are the object of a 
lively contemporary debate. I will discuss the current literature on modus vivendi in the 
next section. 
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2. Taking modus vivendi seriously: normative perspectives 
2.1. The non-ideal vocation of modus vivendi 
In concluding my critique of RMV I highlighted how the most fundamental 
difference between the Rawlsian vision of modus vivendi and the political liberal outlook 
to politics is grounded in the nature of the normative projects that the two theories 
engage in. On this basis, I identified political liberalism and RMV as responding to 
antipodal urges of political theory: the achievement of justice and stability, only 
performed through the discipline of pluralism, and the protection of pluralism in its 
factual form. In this sense, despite considering RMV a dissatisfactory response to the 
fact of pluralism, political theory shall take interest in the fact that it indicates one way to 
tackle the undesirable consequences of pluralism, that is the search for a genuinely 
political solution to a political question (pluralism) rather than a theory-driven rephrasing 
of the original question itself (political liberalism avoids answering the question of 
pluralism to answer instead the question posed by reasonable pluralism). The potential 
of modus vivendi, left undeveloped by RMV, consist in bringing the focus back on the 
search for a political answer rather than a moral (and so moralistic) one. 
Now, another merit of RMV is to bring the attention back to the question of 
actual pluralism but the answer it provides is still not decently fulfilling the purpose of 
the management of pluralism, or at least cannot be considered a significant competitor 
to political liberalism. As seen, RMV is designed to be entirely functional to the 
specification of political liberalism, but most importantly it is a picture of a possible 
political scenario in the absence of political liberalism or its forerunning steps. In this 
sense RMV is a fundamentally descriptive project that does not aim at indicating what 
ought to be done (what individuals ought to do and what institutions ought to do) to 
maintain modus vivendi conditions. RMV just happens and does not have to be 
maintained (hence the Rawlsian appeal to overcome it), in fact it is not endorsed. Large 
part of my dissatisfaction with RMV lies in its substantial lack of accuracy, that is it fails 
in fulfilling its own descriptive task, by relying on high abstraction. I have highlighted 
how this weakness of RMV results in its intrinsic inability to be regarded as a valuable 
response to pluralism. But most importantly, the essentially descriptive character of 
RVM does not convey the full potential of modus vivendi theory. If the task of political 
theory (or at least one of them) is to find a political answer to the question of pluralism 
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as it is, this does not mean that its answer is doomed to be an account of politics and 
political mechanisms as they are. On the contrary, the answer modus vivendi gives to 
pluralism can and should take the shape of a normative one if it aims at being an 
appropriate alternative to political liberalism.  
In fact, modus vivendi theorists see such potential and advocate for modus 
vivendi to be a normative political project. This literature constitutes a strand of normative 
political theory that reflected and reflects on how modus vivendi should conceptualise 
the dynamics of consensus, legitimation, institutional stability, individual compliance in 
order (and to my purpose now most importantly) to conduct the research for terms to 
face the fact of pluralism. But because reflection around modus vivendi is nested in the 
debate around liberalism and proceeds from an intellectual impulse to establish a 
distance from political liberalism, I take it to be fastened (at least in the long term) to the 
major objective of outperforming the Rawlsian project in the management of pluralism 
in contemporary societies. For these reasons, modus vivendi cannot do away with 
normativity, but it has to overcome the obstacles that political liberalism faces. 
As such, much of the modus vivendi debate features a reaction to ideal theory, 
especially in the respect of its being a hardly feasible and an essentially exclusive solution: 
“The idea of modus vivendi has been, in recent years, revived by theorists that scorn the 
rigidity and all too idealistic aspirations of contemporary liberal theory and would like to 
see it replaced by a more realistic approach to politics”18. Alongside the aversion to ideal 
theory, and the pronounced commitment to non-ideal theory that comes with it19, 
modus vivendi theorists often resort to the semantic sphere of compromise and 
negotiation to structure the dynamics typical of modus vivendi, in order to highlight its 
pragmatic, contingent and inclusive character: “At the centre of the idea of a modus 
vivendi are notions such as prudence, judgement, negotiation, compromise, bargaining 
and such like. These are notions that can certainly be explicated in general terms but by 
their very nature are resistant to any attempt to set out precise criteria for their proper 
                                            
18 Wenner 2017, 1, forthcoming. 
19 See also (Sala 2013), (Wendt 2013), (Westphal 2017, forthcoming).  As it happens in the quotation, many refer to 
non-ideal approach in considering the term as a synonym with realism. I analysed in my first chapter how the two 
concepts have to be kept separate and how they do point at two different aspect of theories. Yet, they both belong 
to a style of doing political theory that corresponds the ambition of bringing the focus of political theory back to 
its political dimension, to say it in a slogan. I will try to explain, in the last part of this work, how these two variables 
of non-ideal and realist theory are to be applied to modus vivendi and whether modus vivendi theory has something 
to say about the meaning and status of such categories. See Valentini 2012 and Sleat 2014. 
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application. They can be instantiated in many different ways; and, although weakly 
normative, how they are to be interpreted will largely depend upon circumstances and 
context”20.  
The idea that modus vivendi institutions and its normativity should not envisage 
a space for shared public reasons but rather a shared space (the one amongst opponents) 
for public discourse is tied to the argument that stresses the effectiveness of modus 
vivendi solutions: "Precisely not making an issue one of fundamental principle may lower 
the political temperature and make it more amenable to an effective modus vivendi. […] it 
is more important that the outcomes be seen on all sides as rough and ready 
compromise, a trade-off of interests and opinions, in which all the parties have been 
given something and each has made concessions”21. If, as I have shown, the architecture 
of political liberalism durably ensures stability at the price of the idealisation of pluralism 
and of political institutions and agents, modus vivendi theory shall target the same goal 
(the design of a successfully stable political solution) for a lesser cost. In fact, modus 
vivendi debate goes in the direction of reconsidering the normativity of non-ideal theory 
as even more performing than the Rawlsian solution from the point of view of relevance 
in actual political matters and debates: “[o]nce political theorists probe possibilities of 
political cooperation on the basis of the idea that a shared understanding of political 
justice is not available (at least not to a degree that is reliable enough to ground a general 
argument), modus vivendi solutions lose their appearance as deficient political 
outcomes”22.  
The almost unanimous recourse to the notion of compromise in modus vivendi 
literature strikes me as the normative core of modus vivendi, as the conceptual kernel 
where the need of non-ideal theory to rely on political facts rather than ideal meets the 
call for the formulation of a proposal that suggests how politics should be. As such, it 
seems to me worth being understood as part of the programme of modus vivendi theory, 
rather than just a consistent part of its narrative. The proposal I will investigate in my 
final chapter nestles in this branch of the literature: I will first examine the dynamics of 
                                            
20 Horton 2006, 163.  
21 Horton 2003, 20. See also the continuation of Wenner’s sentence: “if a certain normative standard is simply not 
achievable, it might lead to disaffection with the facts of political life and thus either to apathy or (as the claim 
goes) an excessive zeal in fighting for alleged absolute rights that are not open to negotiation. This, then, might 
result in an ever more entrenched and uncompromising political landscape, something both liberals and modus 
vivendi theorists should seek to avoid” (Wenner 2017, 1, forthcoming). 
22 Westphal 2017, 4, forthcoming. 
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compromise in order to afterwards apply them to modus vivendi. But first, I shall look 
into what for the current debate is essential to the definition of modus vivendi. 
 
2.2. Citizens of a modus vivendi 
A large part of my criticism of both political liberalism and RMV focusses on the 
account of the individual (person, citizen) that the moral demands of the former and the 
epistemic expectations of the latter embody. I claimed that the understanding of citizens 
of the well-ordered society is flawed by idealisation, whilst the one of individuals in RMV 
is the result of an unrealistically abstract misrepresentation. What I called the non-ideal 
vocation of modus vivendi calls instead for an account of political agents true to reality23 
enough to avoid both extremes. A specification is needed here: of course, a thorough 
account of citizens’ behaviour as moral and political agents (and so their modes of 
participation in the public sphere) can only be contextual and as such the description 
cannot be singular nor definitive. Surely modus vivendi theory will have to rely on a 
certain amount of generalisation but bearing in mind that its task is normative, a refined, 
extensive but above all descriptive sociological reconstruction of contemporary societies 
falls outside the scope of it (if not of normative political theory in general). But because 
modus vivendi theory aspires at being non-ideal, such descriptive moment, however 
limited, has to be built in. In other words, there has to be at least a grasp of a common 
intuition or an immediately acceptable understanding about how people effectively are. 
For instance, they are neither perfectly reasonable nor aseptically rational, neither saints 
nor egotists. The search for a good balance in accounting for how political agents are 
does not depend just on finding a middle path between a more optimistic and a more 
pessimistic drive. Individuals in a modus vivendi are to be socially embedded individuals 
entangled in relationships of manifold sorts (depending on moral commitment, but also 
sense of membership and identity, loyalty, affection and last but not least power) whose 
judgements and reasoning can easily be and often are affected by bias tainted with ill-
founded preconceptions (let them be more or less in good faith). in John Horton’s 
words: “a mass of poorly informed people with a very limited interest in politics and 
                                            
23 I will use the term “realistic” as a predicate for descriptive accuracy and, as such, as a synonym for “non-ideal”. 
I will use instead the adjective “realist” as a reference to political realism, as the opposite of “moralist”. 
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with diverse and complex motivations, including not a few prejudices of one sort or 
another”24.  
One important aspect of modus vivendi is that it has to deal with real agents, 
whose political behaviour is driven by epistemic and moral beliefs that cannot always 
overlap but neither dovetail, but also by passion, willingness to express themselves in 
the public space and sometimes feelings of partisanship. Once again, counterbalancing 
the idealism of political liberalism helps in finding the focus for a theory of modus 
vivendi. In a 2013 article, Roberta Sala identified, under the label of “non-reasonable”, 
a set of citizens who were left overlooked in the Rawlsian project. The notion of non-
reasonableness is representatives of those people in contemporary democratic societies 
who do not comply with the over-demanding standard of Rawlsian reasonableness and 
yet do not threaten liberal institutions and do not fit in extreme (or extremist) 
comprehensive doctrines or viewpoints. In Sala’s words: “There may well be persons 
who will never end up adopting public reason and its requirements to defend their 
positions in the political domain. However, this does not mean or imply that they are 
unreasonable in Rawls’s strict sense: that is, that they are also ready to impose their 
beliefs on others”25. A theory that does not want to be fully idealist or utopian or, on the 
contrary, one that does deprive politics of some of its most essential features, has to take 
into account that actual people are most likely to correspond to such a picture: “the 
problem of how to deal with the ‘non-reasonable’ is not a mere accidental matter, but is 
a crucial fact of politics with which our theories should concern themselves”26.  
I do not want to suggest here that modus vivendi theory should be reduced to a 
response to the non-reasonable (and neither is this Sala’s goal). One main reason is that 
such a move would draw a line between sets of people that theory should and should 
not take into account, falling into the same pattern of exclusion that impinges the 
unreasonable in political liberalism. Another reason is that there is more to modus 
vivendi: if it is to be a satisfactory normative alternative to political liberalism, it has to 
be conceived as a mode of political interaction able to face the fact of pluralism and the 
type of disagreements that occur amongst real people, virtually including any category 
of viewpoint, which means by overcoming categorisation at all.  
                                            
24 Horton 2010, 434. 
25 Sala 2013, 7. 
26 Sala 2013, 11, my emphasis. 
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The notion of non-reasonableness helps to define the call of modus vivendi, as 
an inclusive and context-sensitive political framework. In fact, “the non-reasonable’ can 
be thought to share something like a project of cooperation with other citizens, although 
they do that on other grounds than those belonging to a liberal political culture (for 
instance, as they value social cooperation as a means to accomplish peacefully their 
preaching mission). In other words, they are ready to endorse liberal institutions in so 
far as they guarantee them the conditions for pursuing their mission. Their engagement 
in society is therefore a kind of modus vivendi”27. The citizens of a modus vivendi are then 
by definition not subject to the moral requirements of a cooperation model that aims 
for the attainment of a set of shared and prioritised values. Instead, the theoretical 
embracing of people as they are is meant to lead to a model that takes into consideration, 
even without offering a full account of it, the multidimensional character typical of the 
political interaction of moral agents. In this sense, a first and fundamental tenet of modus 
vivendi as a non-ideal normative project is that the aforementioned kind of consensus 
presupposing an endorsement cannot be the model of convergence. Modus vivendi is 
characterised in first instance as a response to the political need for peace and order and 
as such it has to embody a prudential element. 
 
2.3. A “modus vivendi liberalism”: why not? 
This section is entirely dedicated to the discussion of David McCabe’s Modus 
Vivendi Liberalism28. The reason of this cameo is that his work is an attempt to revalue 
modus vivendi theory by working on the kind of morality the agreement to live in a 
modus vivendi may imply. I report McCabe’s attempt to develop a version of modus 
vivendi different from the Rawlsian one, but arguing that it ultimately results in a deflated 
version of political liberalism, because it presupposes a morally principled consent 
around a set of values and principles. My main goal is to use McCabe’s modus vivendi 
liberalism to deepen the understanding of what is the consensus needed for a theory of 
modus vivendi. 
McCabe’s starting point is that modus vivendi cannot set theoretical limits on the 
scope of toleration, that is to say it cannot draw the line between tolerable and intolerable 
                                            
27 Sala 2013, 12. 
28McCabe 2010. 
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claims (or comprehensive doctrine) or on acceptable and unacceptable moral conduct. 
One goal of modus vivendi liberalism is to overcome the approach political liberalism 
has towards the fact of pluralism and to preserve pluralism as it is. For this reason, the 
boundaries of the agreement on toleration have to contingently vary according to the 
actual balance amongst the requirements of consenting parties. So far, McCabe’s account 
is consistent with my original intent and the intuitions about modus vivendi grasped by 
literature: actual conditions of cooperation are contextually decided and the 
consequences of pluralism are not managed by the imposition of limits on it.  
The distinctive trait of modus vivendi liberalism is the introduction of an 
underlying moral commitment for the support of modus vivendi institutions. In fact, 
modus vivendi liberalism endorses a thin morality, thought out as a form of minimal 
moral universalism, i.e. a set of fundamental assumptions about was is likely to be 
universally endorsed and that can therefore be considered as an integral part of every 
moral standpoint and all ways of life. McCabe distinguishes values between thick and 
thin ones and observes that thin morality is likely to be widely endorsed and therefore 
can be considered as an integral part of every moral standpoint and all ways of life: “That 
liberal democracy is the only legitimate form of government, that capital punishment is 
cruel, that political institutions should be resolutely neutral regarding religions – these 
are relatively thick ideas, endorsed by some viewpoints but rejected by others. That rulers 
ought in some way to be accountable to the ruled, that punishment should be 
appropriate to the crime, that no person should be forced to worship in a manner they 
reject – these are thin moral values that any morally decent person must endorse. While people can 
reasonably differ over the content of thick morality, they cannot plausibly deny the 
requirements of thin morality”29. Now, minimal universalism is essential to modus 
vivendi liberalism, because in McCabe’s project, the redefinition of modus vivendi 
depends on abandoning the rejection of moral ideals, typical instead of RMV, for the 
“presumption that the interests of all persons matter equally”30.  
If modus vivendi is supported on the basis of thin morality, this would not 
represent an imposition of a specific moral framework. In fact, the relative weight of 
thick values is not once and for all decided and their implementation leaves room for 
                                            
29 McCabe 2010, 138, my emphasis. 
30 McCabe 2010, 138. 
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different possible policy designs. This flexible character of thin morality answers, 
according to McCabe, the question risen by value pluralism: since no value is a priori 
overriding (with the exception of minimal thin ones), the relationship between the modus 
vivendi liberalism framework and the particular moral demands (e.g. coming from 
religions or traditions in cultural minorities) is contingently adjusted. In McCabe’s 
perspective, the availability of thin morality, so thought out, is the solution to the 
problems that Rawlsian modus vivendi shows. On the one hand, the thin core of values 
plays an active role in the political reasoning of citizens and their individual moral 
connotation coherently avoids that rupture between their moral private and a-moral 
public attitude, presupposed by the RMV. On the other hand, the plasticity of thin 
morality is supposed to respect the contingent and precarious character of modus 
vivendi: the set of values embodied by thin morality, their rank and their implementation 
in terms of policies is subject to the circumstances and available for negotiation. 
It seems to me that thin morality plays in the economy of modus vivendi 
liberalism the same role that the principles of justice play in Rawls’s political liberalism. 
Agreement around toleration, endorsed per se as a value, generates stability because 
toleration is ex ante supposed to be a fundamental good from all standpoints. If there is 
an already shared morality, even minimal, then a minimal overlap amongst point of view 
is already there. Such presupposed overlap amongst the viewpoints together with the 
presumption of such commitment being already embedded in contemporary societies 
configures modus vivendi as a weakened version of political liberalism. Of course, 
modus vivendi liberalism defies the political liberal problem I defined as over-
demandingness, but it does so by deflating the same theoretical structure. Rather than 
relying on reasonableness, it draws the line of acceptable pluralism on a form of moral 
decency rather than just referring to the basic political interests that people have in 
common: peace and order.  
In so doing, modus vivendi liberalism ends up resembling the stage of 
constitutional consensus in so far as the prudential nature of the agreement underpinning 
modus vivendi institutions goes missing. In this sense, modus vivendi liberalism is 
answering a question asked by a form pluralism that is already moderately converging 
on some core principles and loses the inclusive capacity to potentially control the full 
scope of pluralism. An important distinction has to be drawn in order to show how it is 
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theoretically relevant to give up with a presupposed consensus. A look at contemporary 
democratic societies will show that the de facto political preconditions of peace and order 
are relatively secured and even those moral viewpoints that might at a first glance be 
considered unreasonable, actually comply with the institutional structures in place and 
in fact corresponding the model of non-reasonableness rather than unreasonableness. 
Now, should modus vivendi theory refer to (and in so doing only be relevant for) the 
present context? Modus vivendi liberalism rightly acknowledges this, but incorporates 
this aspect of the status quo amongst the premises of its case, thus turning it into a de 
iure condition. For this reason, modus vivendi liberalism falls into the same moralistic 
paradigm that affects political liberalism: it endorses a redefinition of pluralism that is 
backed by a theoretically anointed and not politically decided morality. 
 
2.4. The place of toleration in modus vivendi  
The project of modus vivendi stems from the idea that there cannot be an original 
moral commitment to a certain set of institutions or form of cooperation (let it be the 
most just, or most efficient, or any ideal type of coexistence). Modus vivendi is the 
minimal reply to the need for peace and order that is intrinsic to politics and that can 
only be achieved through mutual toleration. This is the idea of toleration serving modus 
vivendi. If on the one side toleration can be conceptualised as the pursuit of an ideal 
form of life as in Locke and Kant, on the other side it corresponds to the most efficient 
outcome of the search for terms of peaceful coexistence. I support the view that it is in 
this latter and thinner sense that it has to be regarded as an essential aspect of modus 
vivendi: toleration is the best strategy to achieve a decent level of order. I shall begin by 
ruling out thicker ideals of toleration as adequate for the purposes of modus vivendi. 
John Gray touches upon the multileveled nature of toleration and its relationship 
with value-pluralism at several points, identifying two ways of thinking of it: “In the 
form that we have inherited it, liberal toleration is an ideal of rational consensus. As heirs 
to that project, we need an ideal based not on a rational consensus on the best way of 
life, nor on reasonable disagreement about it, but instead on the truth that human will 
always have reasons to live differently. Modus vivendi is such an ideal”31. The first 
                                            
31 Gray 2002, 5. 
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definition of toleration comes from the Modern era and points at an agreement among 
individuals, due to them possessing the attribute of rationality, on what is the best way to 
live, thus implying that it would be irrational not to live like toleration indicates. Gray 
refuses such notion as the cornerstone of a project that is structurally incompatible with 
value-pluralism. In fact, he argues that “[l]iberal toleration was not a project of coexistence 
among different forms of life, mutually acknowledge to be legitimate and worthwhile. It was 
one of restraint in relation to beliefs and practices confidently judged to be false or 
wrong. … toleration expressed a common form of ethical life. It made moral 
disagreement possible for those within it while those who stood outside it were 
consigned to unintelligibility”32. In this sense, the exclusivist character of liberal 
toleration is conceptually close to the one of reasonableness or of a liberal vision that 
priorities a specific conception of good (to use a Rawlsian terminology). For these 
resons, Gray argues, liberal toleration as inspired by classical liberalism is the root of 
contemporary liberalism: it evolved into the notion of neutrality or into a perfectionist 
point of view. 
The second definition, that Gray instead endorses, is fully built upon the doctrine 
of value pluralism. Toleration is the response to the idea that to flourish in manifold 
incompatible ways that reflect just as many sets and ordering of values is part of what 
human nature consist in. Once again it is important to keep in mind the distinction 
between the fact of pluralism and the doctrine of value pluralism. The fact of pluralism, 
says the phrase itself, is an empirical fact: one can observe that contemporary societies 
are plural, i.e. they host different incompatible viewpoints. The doctrine of value 
pluralism, says the phrase again, is a doctrine about the metaphysical status of such 
viewpoints. Although I made this distinction clear (I already stressed that my case against 
political liberalism does not rely upon an endorsement of value-pluralism and so I will 
do in my case for modus vivendi), Gray looks at the interplay between the doctrine of 
value-pluralism and the fact of pluralism by reducing the former to the latter: “[n]ow, as 
in some times in the ancient world, value-pluralism is not much so an ethical theory as 
an established social fact”33. It is undeniable that Gray’s argument for an alternative to 
outlook on liberalism steadily rests on a commitment to the truth of value-pluralism. His 
                                            
32 Gray 2000a, 324, my emphasis. 
33 Gray 2000a, 325. 
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vision of modus vivendi as an ideal that is “the natural successor of liberal toleration”34 
comes from this place. Modus vivendi is seen then: “an alternative agenda for 
contemporary moral and political philosophy”35.  
The first of Gray’s notions of toleration is as said the historical product of the 
Modern era and has been formulated as a response to a set of contingencies of deep 
disagreement, or better, discord and conflict. It has thus the merit of being a political 
answer to facts, but it relies on a theoretically given unique ideal of the best way of life 
and on a broad consensus about it. But modus vivendi represents an institutional set that 
embodies toleration as its method for a peaceful and ordered coexistence within its limits 
of incompatible claims. As much as public reason worked as a tool for political 
liberalism, toleration is the tool of modus vivendi for the management of pluralism.  
In order to be an efficient mean in maintaining the political conditions of peace 
and order, and thus preserve the fact of pluralism, modus vivendi toleration has to 
realistically reflect the circumstances of disagreement that pluralism generates. Horton 
defended a minimal notion of toleration (that he called “traditional toleration”) as 
adequate for the purposes of modus vivendi politics also on the basis of its 
representation of actual political circumstances. “[Traditional toleration] is the willing 
putting up with the beliefs, actions and practices of others, by a person or group that 
disapproves them, and who would otherwise be inclined to prohibit or suppress them, 
if they had the power to do so. Toleration in this sense is a deliberate exercise of self-
restraint, a willed refusal to interfere coercively with what is regarded as the objectionable 
behaviour of others. […] [It] has the merit of including within a political accommodation 
that incorporates a measure of toleration, the antagonistic nature of many conflicts 
between divergent values and ways of life. It also allows some play for the inequalities 
of power that are typically airbrushed out of ideal political theory, whether this be 
conceived in terms of liberal impartiality or discursive democracy or an ideal speech 
situation, although it is not reducible to a mere balance of power or a mechanical 
calculation of interests. It acknowledges that the complex interweaving of interests, 
ideals and power, of self-interest, prudence and morality, is an ineliminable feature of 
any plausible understanding of political life, and that any adequate theorisation of politics 
                                            
34 Gray 2000a, 329. 
35 Gray 2000a, 326. 
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needs to take this complexity into account. Inevitably, on this view, the precise form that 
toleration takes in any actual political accommodation will be in large part a function of 
context and circumstance”36. It seems to me that this long quotation highlights a subtle 
but crucial difference from the second of Gray’s formulation of toleration. If toleration 
embodies the idea that the different claims constituting pluralism are not only 
incompatible but can potentially be expressed in the form of a competition in the public 
sphere, then it is a thinner and therefore less theoretically compelling concept to serve 
modus vivendi theory. Rather than making an assumption about the truth of value-
pluralism or about moral disagreement being an essential trait of human nature, Horton’s 
toleration only looks at the bare fact that political disagreement is an observable trait of 
contemporary societies and that pluralism seems for the present time impossible to 
overcome.  
If committed to this idea of toleration, modus vivendi can leave unaltered the fact 
of pluralism, but it also accounts for the potential (often actual) imbalances of power, 
the unresolved disagreements that come with it together while at the same time 
embracing an accurate picture of individuals’ behaviour. In fact, toleration acknowledges 
the position that citizens hold with respect to one another’s opinions and moral 
standpoints: “What is tolerated is in some respect rejected as improper, lacking value or 
undesirable: the tolerant person or group is to some degree characteristically opposed or 
antagonistic, and sometimes actively hostile, to what is tolerated”37. Citizens are and 
know that they are at one time tolerant and tolerated political agents. Reasonable citizens 
with a high sense of social and political unity and sufficient competence to conduct the 
public debate in a rational and organised way are far from the realistic picture of 
contemporary societies which modus vivendi wants to mirror. Toleration is endorsed in 
a fashion that entails no more than the acknowledgement that it is the most powerful 
mean to maintain a decent level of peaceful coexistence and as a good strategy to go 
along with fellow citizens in a situation of enduring disagreement. 
 
 
                                            
36 Horton 2011, 296. 
37 Horton 2011, 290. See also Nicholson 1985 and Susan Mendus: “the problem of toleration arises in 
circumstances of diversity … toleration is required where the nature of diversity is such as to give rise to 
disapproval, dislike, or disgust”(Mendus 1989, 8). 
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3. Provisional conclusions 
The goal of this chapter has been a critical analysis of the available literature on 
modus vivendi, starting from the Rawlsian outlook on it. I have started by highlighting 
how the dismissive position of political liberalism towards modus vivendi is dependent 
on the fact that the latter has been only conceptualised in relation to the former. The 
result, RMV, is a political proposal that is insufficient under several points of view. 
Contrary to political liberalism RMV is deeply unstable, but similarly to political 
liberalism it is inaccurate in accounting for political reality. As a result, despite being free 
from any moral demand, RMV places the burdens of epistemic demands on individuals. 
In so doing, RMV fails in its alleged aspiration to be a descriptive theory.  
The second part of this chapter is devoted to the identification of what should 
be the essential characteristics of modus vivendi theory once it is perceived and thought 
out as a normative political project. The state of art of research on the theory of modus 
vivendi is characterised by a rich variety of contributions focussing time after time on 
the potential stability of modus vivendi, on what institutions should be typical of modus 
vivendi, on how is political interaction conceptualised in modus vivendi, above all what 
type of theory should modus vivendi be. There is wide agreement around the idea that 
modus vivendi should be a representative of non-ideal theory, but even more 
importantly the strive is visible to emancipate modus vivendi from political liberalism.  
The idea I want to pursue is to answer the question of what modus vivendi is, by 
looking at it as an independent theoretical project and not anymore as a response to 
political liberalism. In order to do this, I had to examine what are considered the 
fundamental tenets of modus vivendi theory. My goal, starting from these points, is to 
formulate a theory of modus vivendi that be resistant to the objection I formulated 
against political liberalism, by at the same time maintaining the ambition to answer my 
initial question about the management of pluralism. What I am looking for is a theory 
of modus vivendi that be non-ideal, realist, but that most importantly possess the ability 
to preserve the fact of pluralism (pluralism as it is) without allowing the undesirable 
consequences of it to take over on peaceful and liberal conditions that are necessary for 
a pluralistic society to exist. Such modus vivendi should be able to conform to the 
political dynamics typical of real, and non idealised, citizens, that is complying to their 
potential unreasonableness (in Rawlsian sense), but also to their ability to cooperate for 
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the keep up of peace and security. The outcome, should be a theory able to balance the 
demands of desirability, by guaranteeing satisfactory political conditions, and feasibility, 
by relying of the actual moral potential of people. Being so thought out, this form of 
normative modus vivendi should turn out to be fitted and relevant for the present 
political practices. 
The most important findings of this analysis of literature on modus vivendi go 
beyond an initial commitment to non-ideal theory. First, I hope to have sufficiently 
underlined how modus vivendi should look at peace and order as fundamental means, 
rather than ends, that create the political space. In this sense, the ancestry of modus vivendi 
is Hobbesian: peace and order are maintained as the necessary conditions for citizens to 
pursue their divergent plans of life. But because modus vivendi is also thought out within 
the debate on liberalism, peace and order are also the conditions for citizens to express 
in that political space their difference, ultimately potentially condensed in competitive 
political agendas. Second, and consequentially, the permanent effort for the preservation 
of order and peace, i.e. a refrain from resorting to violent means to pursue one’s ends, 
has to be seen in modus vivendi as an unexpressed agreement to do so. The form of 
consent fitting the purpose of modus vivendi is of a prudential nature, free from a 
commitment to any form of morality, even a minimalist one as in McCabe’s proposal. 
Nevertheless, modus vivendi theory should not exclude that moral or expressive reasons 
to comply to institutions could be real: a reduction of the complexity of the political life 
of contemporary societies to mere instrumentality would represent a withdraw into 
RMV. Such is the contextual character of modus vivendi. 
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Chapter 3  
Compromise modus vivendi 
The goal of this final chapter is to introduce my own proposal of modus vivendi 
theory. As I have previously suggested, I intend to use the concept of compromise and 
its structure as the privileged starting point to look into the definition of modus vivendi. 
The proposal I am about to outline represents the pars construens of this work, aimed at 
being a valuable alternative to both political liberalism and RMV. Because it refers to the 
dynamics and structures of the concept of compromise, but it is also built upon what 
scholars consider the fundamental characteristics of modus vivendi, I will label it 
“compromise modus vivendi”, hereinafter CMV. The aspiration of CMV is to contribute 
filling the gap between the political liberal solution and the one depicted by RMV, by 
relying on the findings of the debate around modus vivendi1. 
In order to be considered a valuable option, first, CMV should be able to resist 
the objections that I have raised against political liberalism and RMV. So, on the one 
hand, it has to be committed to non-ideal theory (alongside the implication of the 
available literature on modus vivendi). On the other hand, it should be a representative 
of normative political realism, thus avoiding the moralistic obstacles of the Rawlsian 
theory. This is to say that CMV should be sensitive to the reality of contemporary 
democratic societies and also make sure that politics (and not theory) is the place where 
the political community has to find the shape and substance of its foundations. Second, 
CMV should be able to pass the test of desirability and feasibility, under the scrutiny of 
which both political liberalism and RMV have proven to be dissatisfactory solutions: the 
former by falling short of practical relevance while resting on a mechanism of exclusion 
(of the unreasonable), the latter by being a highly undesirable cynical distortion of 
political coexistence, overlooking the complexity of its dynamics. Third, and possibly 
most importantly, what CMV should be is a worthy answer to question raised by the fact 
                                            
1 In this sense, the use of the label “CMV” should not give the reader the impression that I believe my proposal to 
be groundbreaking in the field of modus vivendi theory. My aim is, much more modestly, to figure out what 
constitutes the idea of compromise and how it can be used to define modus vivendi, rather than tackling modus 
vivendi in the first place and then incorporating the language of compromise. The wording “CMV” has the 
convenient aim of enhancing clarity.  
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of pluralism and its potentially unwanted consequences. CMV should aim at the 
preservation of pluralism as it is, in harmony with peace, order and stability. 
 
1. Faces of compromise 
1.1. Compromise and modus vivendi 
This section is directed at clarifying what is meant by compromise and how it 
should be applied to modus vivendi (in order to obtain the CMV model). Literature on 
compromise is often committed to design a taxonomy of compromises thus conducting 
an analytical work about how to define compromises. Amongst others, the debate draws 
a distinction between compromises of principles and compromises of interests, moral 
compromises and political ones. My goal here is not to question the theoretical 
robustness of these distinctions, rather it is to find what could be the most informative 
idea of compromise for modus vivendi. 
The notion of compromise entails the idea that the compromising agents have 
moral aspirations, i.e. they also reason and act, alongside with their beliefs and possibly 
feelings, in compliance to principles that may also have moral character. Compromise 
shares the structure of trade-off, negotiation, and bargain but it specifically reflects the 
idea that moral motives are involved. Notions such as trade-off and bargain only denote 
the willingness of involved parties, who have competing or not fully compatible goals, 
to meet halfway or to reach an equilibrium point amongst their relative aims, that be at 
least partially satisfactory in terms of costs and benefits but that does not involve any 
moral loss. This definition of compromise is not of course definitive, nor it is necessarily 
shared, but it grasps the general minimal intuition about what a compromise is, and most 
importantly it shows how working on it can be relevant for the study of modus vivendi2. 
In fact, the underlying idea of modus vivendi theory, and more broadly of non-ideal 
political theory, is to be able to mirror the complexity of social interaction in pluralistic 
societies (the entanglement of moral viewpoints, but also goals, interests and expression 
                                            
2 An example of broad and intuitive largely acceptable definition of compromise in literature could be Philippe 
Van Parijs’s one: “I shall here adopt a broad and value-neutral definition which is in line with the common usage 
of the French noun ‘compromis’ and the English noun ‘compromise’: a compromise is an agreement that involves mutual 
concessions” (Van Parijs 2012, 467). Another is provided by Fabian Wendt: “[c]ompromises, in my view, have two 
defining characteristics. First, they are agreements between two or more parties, occurring against the background 
of a conflict. … What is distinctive about compromises is that all parties regard some other arrangement (not the 
one agreed upon) as the optimal solution – this constitutes the background of conflict. … The second defining 
characteristic of compromises is that the parties to a compromise make mutual concessions” (Wendt 2013, 577). 
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of feelings) while offering a paradigm of political cooperation that stays true to such 
complexity by at the same time guaranteeing the fundamental conditions to preserve the 
intact political space.  
In this sense, RMV represents a bargain whilst, on the contrary, modus vivendi 
should conceive the fundamental agreement on terms of coexistence as a practicable 
compromise among parties, hence CMV. Thus, CMV should be sensitive to the variety 
of moral commitments held by individuals and groups while, at the same time, 
encompassing the fact that the political space hosts considerations of relative interests 
and powers. Let me stress once again that CMV, as a modus vivendi, aims at being a 
model of cooperation and as such it is a normative theory, seeking to define terms of 
political interaction that do not strive for being the most just, rather the most adequate 
for the mutable context of contemporary liberal democracies. 
 
1.2. Interests and principles 
One analysis of the notion of compromise comes from Theodore Benditt’s 
distinction between compromise of interests and compromise of principles. His idea of 
compromise implies some considerations about the structure of it and about the 
disposition of the parties. First, in a compromise none of the parties ends up capitulating, 
meaning that one side do not get to fully win over the other and there is no surrender to 
one of the two or more positions originally held. Those who take part to a compromise, 
all have to make steps further towards an agreed solution. Second, compromise is to be 
distinguished from appeasement because parties do not end up converging on one of 
the two or more originally held positions. In this sense, compromise must entail the idea 
that an in-between solution is the outcome of a compromising process. The idea of 
“meeting halfway” is necessary to the constitution of compromise but still not sufficient. 
In fact, according to Benditt, if parties are involved in a mere bargain, they will find a 
solution to the distance between their interests by meeting halfway, but in this case their 
relationship will be limited to mutual inducement, while there will be not recognition of 
the opponent as a moral peer3.  
What Benditt labels a “compromise of interests” is reduced to a resource-
allocation model and the reciprocate acknowledgement of moral peerhood among 
                                            
3 Benditt 1979, 26-27. 
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compromising parties is essential because the parties’ claims are to be regarded as equally 
legitimate4. In fact, “if the opponent’s interests are different in kind from one’s own, 
compromise is possible only if one recognizes a plurality of interests or some principle 
of tolerance”5. It seems to me that the message conveyed here leaves room for a 
minimalist interpretation, i.e. that the parties should be aware that interests are plural 
and that they can and indeed might be competing and that such plurality should be taken 
into account6. Now, this shows how it makes sense to apply the pattern of compromise 
to modus vivendi: it embodies the idea that competing interests can coexists insofar as 
there is some form of toleration or mutual recognition. For the moment, suffice to 
observe that the task of CMV theory would be to unfold for what reasons and how 
stably this paradigm can be performed in politics.  
What, on Benditt’s account, distinguishes the compromise of principles from the 
one of interests is a reliance on democratic procedures which outcome will embody a 
paradox: the implementation of the choice resulting from democratic deliberation is to 
be considered, even if is the result of a compromise, just, because it is democratically 
legitimated. Now, I take this to be a too bold conclusion for CMV (but also for modus 
vivendi more broadly). The definition of a just political outcome and more 
fundamentally of a standard of justice should not part of the project of CMV (again, nor 
of modus vivendi in general). Moreover, the outlook on the result of a compromise 
cannot be expected to be considered by the parties as the standard of justice. If the 
process of compromise leads them to reciprocal acknowledgement as well as to the 
search of a midway solution, it makes more sense to expect parties to predicate justice 
of their originally held positions rather than of the results of the compromise. 
Another relevant taxonomy of compromise is the one designed by Chiara Lepora, 
according to whom a compromise is defined by a mutual sacrifice of one or a set of 
principles for the sake of another or another set of principles, whilst a sacrifice of 
                                            
4 I will enquire more in detail in the notion of moral peerhood in the last section of this chapter. 
5 Benditt 1979, 31. 
6 Notice that, in his work, Benditt does not found his argument just on pluralism, rather on value pluralism. I have 
already explained how I intend to position my argument with respect to the distinction between the two. However, 
the case for competing interests and principle also works without endorsing the truth of value pluralism, but most 
importantly it reflects the dynamics of actual pluralism. Notice, anyway, that here my use of Benditt’s reflections is 
limited to how they can be relevant for CMV.  
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material interests for other interests is just labelled as “choice”7. Lepora’s taxonomy of 
compromise envisages three different scenarios: substitution, intersection and 
conjunction8. “Substitution compromise” takes place whenever two actors, call them i1 
and i2, hold entirely different sets of principles, i1 believes {a, b, c} and i2 believes {d, e, 
f}, but they both backpedal to {x} that is acceptable but at the same time entails a 
renounce to the first stance from both sides. It seems to me that the democratic solution 
proposed by Benditt might be assimilated to the substitution kind of compromise: the 
agreement on {x} shows that {x} takes priority over both originally held sent of 
principles, so however {x} is defined it possesses a characteristic (for instance 
procedurally defined justice, as in Benditt) that makes it acceptable from all standpoints. 
Notice that substitution compromise may well represent a compromise of interests: {x} 
may be a halfway solution among competing non-moral aims9. However, even by 
accepting this interpretation of substitution compromise, the language of justice can be 
avoided. If {x} is meant to represent the democratically reached decision, all that is said 
about it is that it has to be implemented and it will have authority, not that justice has 
been achieved or that it has to be approximated. In the second kind of compromise, 
“intersection compromise”, i1 believes {a, b, c} and i2 believes {c, d, e}, therefore they 
will converge on {c}. It seems to me that intersection is a case of plain convergence and 
cannot really be thought as a compromise: parties are already agreeing and do not need 
any further adjustment to the original situation10.  
An important consideration is to be done here: substitution compromise and 
intersection compromise seem to be adequate models when circumstances correspond 
to the Rawlsian ideal of reasonable pluralism and not in a situation of actual pluralism. 
The idea that parties find a solution that overrides their initial standpoints is fitting with 
the idea of the revision of comprehensive doctrines in a more reasonable direction (in 
the case of substitution) and with the idea of an overlapping consensus (in the case of 
intersection). In these cases, it does not seem fully adequate to use the notion of 
                                            
7 Lepora 2012, 5-6. It seems to me that the exclusion of trade-offs among principles from the category of 
compromise is a mere matter of labels. The taxonomy traced by Lepora is applicable to conflicts of principles as 
well as to those of interests.  
8 Lepora 2012, 7-12. 
9 The interpretation I am giving is excluded from the beginning by Lepora, because in her language compromise 
can only be among principles. As I said, I do not hold this distinction to be valid for the purpose of my argument. 
10 For this reason, Benditt rightly uses the term “appeasement” for this pattern. 
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compromise, but this is a mere question of definition. What is important is that neither 
the substitution pattern nor the intersection one address in depth the fact of pluralism. 
In the substitution case, there is no indication about the (in)compatibility of the two sets 
of claims, and in fact the two parties are able to agree on a solution that is alien to both. 
In the case of intersection the background of compromise is a partially pluralistic 
scenario since an agreement is already at hand. 
Finally, “conjunction compromise” is the scenario in which i1 holds {a, b, c} 
while i2 holds {¬a, ¬b, ¬c}, there is no intersection and no room for a further principle 
able to accommodate both demands, because they are deeply irreconcilable. This is the 
most interesting and relevant case especially because pluralism is well reflected in the 
incompatibility of claims and beliefs. The solution to the conjunction scenario may 
indeed take the form of all possible conjunctions of affirmative and negative claims (that 
would be {¬a, b, c}, {a, ¬b, c}, {a, b, ¬c}, {a, ¬b, ¬c}, {¬a, ¬b, c}, {¬a, b, ¬c}). In 
all cases both parties are lead to what from their starting point is considered wrongdoing 
and to partial, although mutual, sacrifice. This is the form of compromise that mostly 
requires the application of toleration, because it discloses the idea that, from one’s 
principled standpoint, some moral loss takes place. The partial sacrifice that the parties 
face is inherent to compromise: the only way to avoid the loss would be not to take part 
to the compromise. It seems to me that this is an aspect of compromise that is pertinent 
to modus vivendi, since it shows how if the fact of pluralism is taken seriously and not 
restricted to a circumstance that already embodies agreement (as in the intersection 
pattern). In circumstances of real pluralism the decision agreed upon will always carry a 
measure of loss from the different standpoints, a loss that is due to the very presence of 
others, sharing the same political space. This is the reason why modus vivendi requires 
a form of toleration that, unlike classical toleration (discussed in Chapter 2), does 
acknowledge the absence of a final common solution, unlike what is suggested in the 
substitution pattern. The kind of compromise that CMV should take into consideration 
is one that involves principles and follows the pattern of conjunction. 
 
1.3. Principled standpoints and prudential reasons  
Another important aspect of what defines compromise that is especially relevant 
for modus vivendi concerns the quality of the reasons why agents take part or should 
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take part to a compromise. By looking into this debate (especially in the disagreement 
between Simon May and Daniel Weinstock) I show in what ways the instrumentality that 
I have predicated upon modus vivendi can be (at least partially) drawn from the semantic 
sphere of compromise. The goal here, is not to rule out principled or morally inspired 
reasons, rather to show that they are not necessary to prove that there is a sufficiently 
substantive reason to enter a modus vivendi in the form of a compromise11. This section 
should prepare the path to the understanding of what kind of agreement should support 
CMV. 
One prominent position in the debate about the definition of compromise 
dynamics is May’s thesis that agents are only ready to compromise their moral positions 
for prudential reasons12. In fact, he argues that “[p]olitical compromise occurs when a 
political agent invokes the fact of disagreement as a reason to accept an alternative that 
she perceives to be worse on its own merits than her initial position. Although prudential 
compromises can arise between political agents motivated purely by their self-interest 
… moral compromise … occurs when disagreement is invoked as a reason to accept a 
political position otherwise perceived to be morally inferior”13. The idea underlying 
political compromise is that parties perceive their originally held position as better than 
the others’ ones as well as better than the midway solution that the compromise 
represents. This is consistent with the thin notion of toleration I argued to be adequate 
for modus vivendi. Under circumstances of pluralism, like the ones depicted by Lepora’s 
conjunction compromise, one cannot expect that citizens consider their opponents’ 
position as equally valuable as their own. Neither it would make sense to determine that 
a modification to one’s position triggered by the necessity to find a conjunct decision 
should be, from that particular point of view, equally good or even better. Such a 
                                            
11 A final specification that needs to be done preliminary to the debate on principled and prudential reasons has to 
do with the similarity and difference between moral compromises and political compromises. Once again the 
organisation of the taxonomy is a question of labelling. Suffice to say that some identify compromises made for 
prudential reasons with political ones, and principled compromises with moral ones. I will not discuss the details 
of this distinction here. I follow Antonella Besussi’s identification of moral compromise as one dependant “on a 
strategy that underneath a pact of pacification leaves intact disagreement admitting its impossible extinction” 
(Besussi 2016, unpublished manuscript). Such definition seems to me especially explanatory of how I could, for 
the sake of the argument for CMV, overlook the difference (if there is any) between moral compromise to political 
compromise. Recall that my original question is to look for a satisfactory strategy to manage the undesirable 
consequences of pluralism. In this sense, CMV should be a strategy that is able to preserve pluralism in its factual 
shape by reaching political conditions that do not jeopardise peace and order. The idea that citizens in a society 
hold different moral positions and compromise in order to reach a political decision, de facto reduces political 
compromise to a subspecies of moral compromise. 
12 “moral compromise in political life is only ever warranted for pragmatic reasons” (May 2005, 317). 
13 May 2005, 318. 
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scenario would represent a correction and not a compromise14, a situation that can surely 
occur in circumstances of pluralism, but that falls outside the pattern of compromise. 
Compromise implies mutual loss and even if it can potentially lead to an improvement, 
such assessment will come from a view from nowhere, certainly not form the parties 
involved, that have to make concessions15.  
What instead May considers the correct pattern is pragmatic compromise, that is 
one promoted by the extrinsic condition of disagreement (in political settings, pluralism) 
and which reason to be carried on is an important goal, as peace and order can be for a 
political society. In this sense, compromise is carried out for prudential reasons. When 
applied to modus vivendi, citizens must have reasons to accept that not all of their moral 
beliefs will always be fully mirrored in legally binding policies or comprehensively and 
exclusively taken into consideration in the institutional process of designing and 
implementing such policies. Their alternative options would be to resort to conflict (in 
more or less violent forms) or to exit from the political community16. The decision to 
continue their life under the umbrella of the same institutions implicate a pragmatic 
compromise, instrumentally directed at the preservation of their possibility to pursue 
their goals in a peaceful and at least decently ordered environment17. What citizens share 
is not a moralised commitment to realise justice or a supererogatory duty to preserve 
their political society for reasons dependent on their sense of belonging to a community. 
In other terms, they do not share a responsibility18 to care for the public good: first, it is 
a fact that not all people are easily ready look at their political community as an overriding 
                                            
14 May 2005, 319. 
15 The difference in perspective is, I think, crucial for the understanding of what compromise and more specifically 
CMV demands of citizens. The idea that from an individual viewpoint compromise will always represent a loss is 
challenged by Van Parijs’s idea of “good compromise”. According to him, one of the conditions that make a 
compromise good is that “it must make both parties better off than under the status quo, not just better off than 
in the absence of compromise” (Van Parijs 2012, 479). First, the burden of the assessment of the compromise 
should not and cannot be on the involved parties, as it would ipso facto imply a correction of the originally held 
position. Hence the change of perspective: only an external viewer (and possibly only afterwards) can judge the 
goodness of a compromise. Second, as I will explain more at length in the following sections, CMV does not 
exclude that the outcome of compromise can turn into an established and widely accepted solution, but this cannot 
be a fundamental condition for it. 
16 See Van Parijs 2012, 467-468. 
17 An important remark is needed at this point: unless CMV is thought out within the boundaries of contemporary 
liberal democracies, it cannot guarantee that all parties of the compromise, i.e. all citizens, will be able to pursue 
their specific plans of life in a society in which they might happen to be a minority. To find the solution to this 
potential impasse CMV has to hold onto what I called the non-ideal vocation of modus vivendi. The specific shape 
of institutions of CMV is politically (thus contextually) decided and theory has no place in determining it. 
Otherwise, CMV would be a form of moralism and as such hardly preferable to political liberalism. As a theory 
relevant for the present conditions in contemporary democracies, CMV is already constrained by the framework 
of liberalism. 
18 See May 2011. 
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good or value (and non-ideal theory cannot imply it); second, CMV should not, as a 
theory, aprioristically impose such a demand concerning what citizens should hold to be 
good (because this would be inconsistent with pluralism). 
In order to finalise my case for pragmatic compromise, I shall now address 
Weinstock’s four counterarguments to the possibility of compromising on the basis of 
a principle rather than for prudential reasons. Weinstock’s first case relies on the idea 
that citizens should think of each others as epistemic peers and be confident that the 
outcome of the compromise could be “a position that integrates a broad range of 
relevant considerations [and] better captures the stakes involved in a policy decision”19. 
The second case refers to the gap between democratic institutions and democratic ideals: 
because democratic institutions are imperfect, the goal of compromise is to realise higher 
democratic ideals (rather than, as I argued, rely on the democratic standard as a 
constraint for the outcome)20. Once again, the immediate answer to these first objections 
comes from the place of non-ideal theory. As much as it is desirable that citizens 
conceive public discourse as a forum to perfect their moral viewpoints and to perpetuate 
the realisation of democratic ideals, it is visible how they instead do not equally distribute 
skepticism on their and others’ views and are often not alien to depicting each others as 
misinformed or ill-faithed. Moreover, the demands raised by such conditions are 
supposed to trump any consideration of what is good involved by the plural moral 
standpoints of citizens. Thus, not only the complexity of political interplay is overlooked 
but pluralism is tamed in principle. While CMV is thought out within democratic liberal 
settings it does not require that once and for all citizens should commit to put an effort 
in the enhancement of democratic ideal. 
Weinstock’s third case appeals to the supposed duty citizens might have to each 
other as members of the same polity. I have already ruled out this objection, following 
May in stating that citizen should not be held responsible for the preservation of the 
political community. They have an interest in it being peaceful and stable, and they might 
develop a sense of responsibility, but this should be no more than a possibility. The 
fourth case concerns the consequentialist justification of compromise: “[c]ompromises 
made for reasons of ‘principled consequentialism’ have this structure. They are 
                                            
19 Weinstock 2013, 546. 
20 Weinstock 2013, 550.  
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principled, in that they are done for the sake of the advancement of a moral value or set 
of values. But they are also consequentialist, and thus partially prudentially based, 
because they account for the circumstances of the real world in order to determine the 
extent of the compromise that is required in order to optimize the realization of a value 
given circumstances”21. Certainly, one could argue about the nature of consequentialism, 
and I believe indeed that it is possible to build a consequentialist argument meant to 
promote a value or a principle. However, I do not believe that this would make the 
argument prudential, neither that accounting for circumstances corroborates the 
supposed prudential nature of the argument. Of course, this is a large debate that falls 
outside the scope of this work. But it seems to me that Weinstock overloads the nature 
of compromise by demanding that it is addressed at promoting a value or principle, after 
all an end, rather than, more modestly, a mean. Again, I have to clarify the relevance for 
CMV: the fundamental reason to compromise is to promote peace and order, but this 
does not necessarily mean, that peace and order are overriding political values. In fact, they 
are conceptualised in CMV as mean, instruments to allow the fact of pluralism to remain 
untouched. 
In conclusion, I have shown how the pattern of compromise that CMV should 
challenge is one (labelled as conjunction) that embraces the possibility of disagreement 
to be, at least temporarily, insurmountable. I have insisted that the reason to enter the 
mechanism of compromise in such circumstances is prudential and so CMV would take 
the form of a pragmatic compromise.  
 
2. CMV, consent and stability 
At this point I have analysed how and in what sense CMV combines aspects that 
have been typically ascribed to modus vivendi and to compromise. I have shown how 
CMV is committed to non-ideal theory, as it endorses a type of compromise that does 
not involve any idealistic expectation on the compromising parties, i.e. the citizens of 
CMV. In this section, I intend to focus on the desirability and practicability of CMV. In 
order to be a plausible and also satisfactory solution, CMV should provide reasons to be 
endorsed and maintained as well as guaranteeing a decent level of stability. The initial 
intention of CMV is to be a strategy to face the fact of pluralism. In order to do this, it 
                                            
21 Weinstock 2013, 553-554. 
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has to prove to be a viable pattern of cooperation that leaves pluralism untouched while 
providing peace. After all, “[t]he aim of modus vivendi cannot be to still the conflict of 
values. It is to reconcile individuals and ways of life honouring conflicting values to a life 
in common. We do not need common values in order to live together in peace”22. 
 
2.1. Between a balance of power and overlapping consensus: reasons for a modus vivendi agreement 
I have insisted already on the idea that compromise highlights how peace and 
order should be conceived as having instrumental value, and how the commitment to 
modus vivendi institutions is brought about first and foremost by prudential 
considerations. I have argued that such prudential motives are essential to modus vivendi 
and that, for this reasons, it entails a thin notion of toleration. All such consideration are 
meant to contribute to the design of CMV but they leave open the question about the 
stability of it. More specifically, such question asks how stable could potentially be the 
agreed solution of compromise represented by CMV, i.e. its institutional settings. In 
order to grasp the kind of stability CMV is capable of providing, I firstly have to reflect 
on the kind of consensus that can potentially arise around CMV. 
CMV is a consensual form of political arrangement, but, unlike political 
liberalism, it does not aim at an agreement around principles supposed to be the most 
just or most justifiable ones. Since the consent underpinning CMV does not need to 
make a selection of reasons, moralistically considered more or less adequate, CMV does 
not define ex ante what should be the fundamental set of principles or rules to be agreed 
upon. The shape that the framework of coexistence takes is contextual and politically 
decided, embodying toleration as the necessary means of peace. Such an agreement does 
not depend on the capacity of political institutions to reflect a specific conception of 
justice, rather on their “ability to reconcile, thought not perennially eradicate, conflict, 
and in doing so provide a means for the peaceful coexistence of people with different 
and conflicting moral, political, and religious views”23. CMV is not aimed at overcoming 
disagreement, only the conflict. Citizens in a CMV do not set aside their beliefs for the 
sake of consensus, they only set aside the struggle for the sake of peace24. The one 
                                            
22 Gray 2002, 5-6. 
23 Sleat 2011, 482-483. 
24 “compromise has nothing to do with the abandonment or the mere denial of conflictuality, but rather concerns 
a change in the form(s) of conflictuality. It is not ‘‘peace’’ in the Kantian sense of a suppression of any cause of 
future conflict” Arnsperger and Picavet 2004, 168. 
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instrumental reason that motivates the search for peace is that everybody (or at least the 
vast majority) has an interest in peace. It does not matter what viewpoint (or 
comprehensive doctrine) citizens come from, that is to say it does not matter what they 
take to be an important good or a fundamental principle in life, peace (the order, stability 
and security that come together with it) is the precondition for them to try to realise that 
good or satisfy that principle25. Moreover, “peace has a specific instrumental value 
because it is a precondition for economic growth and wealth creation, something 
(almost) all people arguably want”26. In this sense, peace is the one fundamental reason 
that justifies citizens to take part to CMV: they share an interest in peace because the 
fulfilment of their moral aspirations, expressed in their ways of life and plans of life, 
requires an adequately ordered political room. This does not exclude that they may 
eventually develop attachment to their political institutions but nevertheless, the starting 
point for its endorsement is of a prudential kind. Although the conflict (or potential 
conflict) is among principles (values, views of the world, forms of life) the agreement 
maintain CMV stems form a “partial coincidence on interests [because] [a]t minimum, 
both parties have an interest in terminating their conflict, because, presumably, 
remaining in conflict leaves them both worse off than one or the other possible 
settlement”27. 
In this sense, peace is a first-order prudential reasons to support CMV. However, 
if CMV limited its account of agreement to this, it would not be a model of cooperation 
too distant from RMV. Certainly the justification for sticking to the pact stemming from 
compromise (i.e., to modus vivendi institutions) is fundamentally instrumental. This 
focus on instrumentality leaves room for two other types of commitment to CMV 
institutions that cannot be exclude in principle. First, it is possible, and indeed likely, that 
other considerations of moral character might contribute to the maintaining of the 
agreement. CMV should be reticent about the reasons for the acceptance of its 
institutions. Contrary to political liberalism, that only elevates as acceptable the right 
reasons, and contrary to RMV that is entirely founded on a lucky conjuncture, CMV 
should not impose limits on what counts as a reason to comply to institutions. A similar 
limitation would immediately mean that the fact of pluralism is tailored onto the 
                                            
25 Horton 2010, 438. 
26 Wendt 2016, 9. 
27 Golding 1979, 13. 
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requirements of theory. When it comes to the selection of reasons, CMV has simply no 
requirement. Support to CMV can be animated by a variety of reasons as broad as the 
fact of pluralism is28. Reasons that produce the acceptance and compliance to CMV are 
multiple and can be incompatible. It is in any case difficult to precisely identify what 
motives trigger political agents to perform an action. CMV is indifferent to the nature 
of such reasons, they are only normatively relevant if they contribute to the stability of 
institutions29. Moreover, such reasons can be in reciprocal conflict as the backbone of 
the support to CMV is in any case prudential and oriented to the upkeep of peaceful 
political conditions.  
Second, it is possible that conditions of stability might encourage a sense of 
loyalty and obligation to the political community. Like the previous kind of commitment 
this is also entirely contingent and relies on the intuitive idea that long-term cooperation 
and coexistence might result in a form of attachment. However, this kind of mechanism 
is also fundamentally grounded in the necessity of peace as a precondition. As Sala 
expresses it: “[a]fter the reasons or motives they [the citizens] may have to comply with 
laws, the practice of cohabitation work undoubtedly to cement a peaceful community of 
citizens, be they committed for the ‘right reasons’ or not. … The special place of the 
goods of peace and safety does not mean that they are for everyone the supreme goods. 
That is, it is not necessary to conceive peace and safety as our final ends – or ideals – to 
feel committed to seeking them”30. 
CMV does not correspond to the negative idea promoted by the famous Rawlsian 
expression “a mere modus vivendi”31. The agreement on the institutional settings of 
CMV does not depends on a theoretically defined set of principles or reasons, rather it 
embraces the political circumstance of pluralism leaving it unaltered. The absence of 
whatsoever philosophical definition of consent enables CMV to avoid moralism and 
thus to qualify as an example of political realism. Unlike RMV, CMV is not narrowed to 
a specific set of circumstances, neither it embodies an intrinsic defence of a status quo. 
                                            
28 “I think that we can keep silent on the kind of reasons for accepting a compromise. It might, and often will be, 
prudential reasons, based on self-interest, that lead people to accept some particular compromise, but it might also 
be moral reasons” (Wendt 2013, 578). 
29 For these remarks I am indebted to Katharine Schweitzer, for the discussion on her outlook on modus vivendi 
at the conference “Modus Vivendi” held at the Centre for Advanced Study in Bioethics, Westphälische Wilhelms-
Universität Münster on 8-10 July 2015. 
30 Sala 2015, 178. 
31 Rawls 2005, 147. 
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On the contrary, it preserve the normativity of compromise by allowing the political 
mechanisms of pluralism to unfold.  
 
2.2. Stability in CMV: the problem of robustness  
I now turn to a defence of CMV as a strategy able to perform stability. I point 
out that CMV offers a satisfactory account of stability which has the advantage of not 
resting on the imposition of any limits on pluralism. For this reason, I argue that CMV 
should be considered preferable to both RMV, because it is condemned to instability, 
and to political liberalism, because it moralistically governs pluralism. CMV takes into 
consideration the preservation of conditions for a peaceful coexistence, therefore a 
certain level of order and stability is to be guaranteed. However, compared with the 
notion of stability embodied by political liberalism, the one implied by CMV should be 
radically different. The aim of CMV is not a strong and moralised stability for the right 
reasons, as in political liberalism, rather stability is related to the need for a decent level 
of order and conditions of cooperation. This indeed contrasts political liberalism in at 
least two senses, which I will call the robustness of stability and its content.  
In the political liberal framework, the notion of stability is politically grounded in 
the ideal of an ongoing agreement that is supposed to last over time, not needing any 
adjustment or redefinition, deriving from what are thought as the ordinary political 
circumstances of the well-ordered society. The allegiance to the principles of justice is 
the cornerstone of such robustness, while their absence leads, according to Rawls, to the 
annihilation of any relevant reason to comply and therefore to profound instability, as 
in RMV. The kind of stability CMV aims at corresponds instead to minimal conditions 
of order, sufficient to set the terms of political society to exist over time. This does not 
necessarily mean that the fundamental institutional structure must be continuously 
renegotiated (a possibility that is instead coherent with RMV) or that it is desirable to do 
so. In fact, although CMV should not be conceived as a definitive achievement, it can 
be embodied in institutions (first and foremost in a constitution). One substantial feature 
of CMV is the assumption that they may or may not last over time, depending on 
contingencies and above all in how contingencies affect the acceptance of the 
compromise they represent by involved parties (i.e. citizens)32. CMV should reject, or at 
                                            
32 Horton 2010, 440-441. 
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least give up with, a robust concept of stability because CMV is coherent with the idea 
that politics and not morals is the proper means required to deal with contingencies that 
are by nature unpredictable.  
That is why the less ambitious notion of stability of CMV accounts better than 
the political liberal one for the flexibility that political life itself requires33, without being 
completely deflated as in RMV. In fact, the citizens’ availability to compromise, and 
therefore to CMV, secures citizens’ commitment to the preservation of order. At this 
point, it is important to make two remarks. First, a reiteration: the commitment to order 
is instrumental and therefore it is not trumping other values that may be morally 
connoted and embodied in particular points of view. Pluralism is thus preserved in its 
factual shape by CMV. Second, the allegiance to CMV does not necessarily equate with 
an unconditional preservation of the status quo, rather the conditions for the citizens to 
comply or refuse to support CMV are to be contingently defined. 
 
2.3. Light stability 
The second sense in which CMV is different from political liberalism and RMV 
is the content of stability. Political liberalism aims at stability for the right reasons, where 
the rightness of such reasons is assessed in accordance with principles of justice (while 
by contrast RMV is associated with a complete lack of stability). That is why it is 
appropriate in political liberalism to speak of a kind of “content” of stability: reasons 
leading to stability are not conceived as historical or contextual causes stimulating 
political mechanisms, rather they are the effects of a precise set of conditions 
hypothetically occurring as the result of citizens’ widespread moral commitment to 
principles of justice. In CMV the general requirements of order and peaceful coexistence 
do not need a set of principles of the sort political liberalism proposes and stability does 
not need to be founded on a strong consensus. At the same time, stability in CMV is not 
completely empty of moral content. In CMV, citizens are not required to rethink their 
moral allegiances and beliefs to make them fit into the agreement. Citizens are aware of 
living in conditions of deep pluralism and clashes amongst values and principles 
constitute a relatively enduring characteristic of their coexistence: CMV does not aim at 
altering this condition. On the contrary, CMV relies on the idea that from an individual 
                                            
33 Horton 2006, 161-164. 
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point of view, having certain protection of the fundamental liberties (as in happens to 
be the case in contemporary liberal democracies) shall be a sufficient reason to support 
the institutional set which citizens have compromised upon. Individuals are better off 
with the possibility of nurturing their plans of life even if they do not correspond to the 
majority’s ones (while being aware that they might eventually become majoritarian) 
rather then with the certitude of oppression or chaos. Moreover, citizens know it is a 
genuine compromise (of sanguine kind, involving mutual sacrifice and acceptance of 
terms of negotiation) underpinning the CMV. Not only they should be able to tolerate 
living in the same political space with individuals and groups holding moral beliefs that 
can be incompatible with theirs, but also they would have to face the fact that such 
clashing moral claims can be represented in the public debate and therefore they must 
be ready to negotiation, in the sense I explored above. 
So, CMV accounts for a notion of light stability: there’s no principled ground and 
no political settlements or policies must be expected to perform in the long run and in 
a widely justifiable way. I think that light stability shows how CMV is preferable to both 
political liberalism and RMV. On the one hand, there is no morally decided principle 
that informs the reasons to support CMV. This means that citizens are not compelled 
to look for the right reasons Rawls wants, i.e. those conforming to principles of justice 
that are given from outside politics. Citizens of CMV can, paraphrasing Rawls, support 
the institutions for good reasons, i.e. those that are embodied in their moral point of view. 
In such a scenario there is no need anymore to regulate pluralism or to limit its spectrum. 
The plurality of claims may or may not flourish without being subject to any boundaries. 
On this ground, CMV is able to resist the objection I raised against RMV that I called 
“radical dualism”, despite being a form of modus vivendi. On the other hand, CMV does 
not renounce any form of stability as RMV does. Citizens of a CMV are moved by the 
availability of negotiation to create stable conditions to let their ways of life free to 
unfold. Their willingness to compromise coincides with their willingness to cooperate 
and such awareness triggers the support to the compromise expressed by CMV, in a way 
that is more stable than a contingent (fortunate) convergence of interests. Briefly said, it 
seems to me that while political liberalism is able to guarantee stability at the price of 
pluralism and RMV instead preserves pluralism at the price of stability, CMV’s light 
stability is able to account for the fact of pluralism without endangering order.  
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Some final reflections should be done about the notion of light stability and how 
it does not distinguish among the types of reasons in support of CMV. Such question 
concerns the relationship between the stability of CMV and its justifiability: should a 
justifiable order be in place for CMV to be stable? It seems to me that light stability 
depends also on the capacity of CMV to be justified to citizens and on the thickness of 
the consensus that can be built on CMV institution without affecting pluralism. This 
begs the question about the distinction between actual consensus and hypothetical 
consensus and also the one about the conceptual relationship between consensus and 
legitimacy. Now, the problem is that the search for a common shared core of beliefs and 
interests has always lead in the liberal tradition to an hypothetical account of consensus34, 
that is unquestionably less satisfactory than actual consensus. Hypothetical consensus 
needs to be validated or at least corroborated by an empirical claim confirming that there 
is evidence for considering such consensus at least in principle possible. This is the 
reason why Rawls appeals to the public political culture35. One way of avoiding the 
recourse to hypothetical consensus is to accept that no state or political arrangement will 
ever be fully justified. But one of the points of CMV is exactly to deflate the 
demandingness of political liberal legitimacy requirements (strictly dependant on public 
justification) and showing thus that the fact of pluralism can be really taken into serious 
consideration when no strong (and moralised) consensus is expected to be in place. The 
consensus form of CMV is, as said, contingent.  
Hypothetical acceptability of political settlements is thus substituted by actual 
acceptance that can be grounded on various reasons36, in fact compromise does not 
require to give up fundamental moral commitments and therefore the consensus on 
CMV is compatible with heterogeneity of reasons. In other term, CMV is accepted as a 
second best and compliance to it does not depend on a full agreement on its fundamental 
arrangement. This is possible because the institutional structure of CMV is not presented 
as the most just or the once-and-forever decided to be best one and so negotiation and 
adjustment to circumstances may make it change. Such acceptance is the basis for light 
stability of CMV, since there is no set of right reasons making stability robust as the 
                                            
34 Horton 2012, 132-137. 
35 Rawls 2005, 13-14, 462-466. 
36 “A modus vivendi is a practical accommodation that can be built around any number of factors and be accepted 
for a variety of reasons by those who are parties to it” (Horton 2010, 440). 
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political liberal one, but it also accounts for its contingency, that does not depend on 
consensus around just principles, being consensus at best broad and not necessarily 
universal (because actual rather than hypothetical). Thus CMV reconciles the need for 
consent with the realist ambition of avoiding a principled moralised base for it. 
 
3. CMV: demands 
As said, it is possible that citizens take in high value the fundamental liberal 
principles grounding their communal living, besides them being instrumentally 
endorsed. Nevertheless, citizens are expected to acknowledge that their allegiance to 
CMV normatively calls for a specific individual attitude, one that makes the compromise 
effective and stable. They should thus be aware that the survival of their moral 
standpoint in the public debate should not be taken for granted and therefore they 
should be ready to see their moral commitments being considered negotiable and 
possibly being openly put into question. Ultimately, citizens should be ready to accept 
that their moral adversaries have the real possibility of reaching a position of power and 
that for this reason some policies will not be entirely justifiable to them in the way that 
might be expected, and is indeed required, in political liberalism.  
I began this work by criticising political liberalism for its being ideal and 
moralistic, especially blaming the notion for reasonableness. I claimed that the morality 
of reasonableness is over-demanding and that its scope being defined within the principles 
of justice makes it a moralistic ideal, thus undermining the authenticity of the political 
character of the Rawlsian theory for the sake of the highness of its moral standard. I 
explored the mechanisms of RMV, concluding that it lacks whatsoever normativity, and 
that for this reason it does not unravel the full potential of modus vivendi. Such 
endeavour has been endorsed by modus vivendi theorists, who all agree in committing 
modus vivendi to non-ideal theory and also look for a way of developing it as an 
independent theoretical field. I conceived CMV as tied in this tradition, relying on the 
literature on compromise in order to test its stableness in terms of desirability and 
practicability. In order to do so, I specified what ideas of consent and stability should be 
tied to CMV. Now I shall turn to the normative capability of CMV and reflect on 
whether the morality of compromise is compatible with the purpose of modus vivendi 
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and resistant to the objection of moralism. I articulate my point by pinpointing three 
broad demands, i.e. the duties that CMV requires its citiznes. 
 
3.1. Impossible dreams 
The first demand of CMV regards the way citizens in liberal societies relate to 
their own moral standpoint, that is their disposition to live under institutions that might 
not fully realise or express what they hold to be just, good or true. CMV mirrors an idea 
of compromise that, in Avishai Margalit’s terminology, is of the “sanguine kind” as 
opposed to the “anemic kind”. While the anemic compromise is well described by the 
idea of bargain, or trade-off (which are closer to the model of RMV), the sanguine 
compromise implies a special attitude of the parties: the understanding of the point of 
view of the opponent, the readiness to mutual concessions and mutual sacrifice, the 
absence of coercive force and most important the psychological attitude of not 
considering one’s own position as a dream to be realised37. Treating particular positions 
as dreams is the obstacle to the availability to negotiate a common frame of coexistence. 
Compromise embodies the idea, consistent with pluralism, that the way we rank good 
and values is contingent and that no good or value will be once and for all established to 
be overriding. So compromise itself is the best we can achieve because reality will always 
fall short of our ideal (our irrevocable dream). A compromise is the best achievable 
agreement, although it is in principle a second best: reality will always fall short of our 
ideal, whatever this ideal is. It is important to a politics of CMV, that people disagree 
without taking debated issues as a matter of life and death and with awareness that their 
“principle[s], prudence and self-interest, means and ends, reason and emotion, are 
typically bound together in politics in a potentially inexhaustible variety of complex, 
confusing and unpredictable ways, always partly dependent on circumstance and 
context”38. 
Such a renounce represents a loss, inherent with the idea of a halfway solution. 
Every party (every citizen or group of citizens representatives of a moral viewpoint) 
partially loses because they will not be sure that their standpoint will be the majoritarian 
one, but also because they are compelled by the agreement to live together with fellow 
                                            
37 Margalit 2010. 
38 Horton 2010, 442. 
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citizens whose views they do not share but just tolerate (and perhaps dispraise)39. 
However, they are at the same time better off with a sure but partial loss, rather than 
with running the risk, through exit or conflict, of also losing the liberty of expressing 
their ways of life40. The disposition to give up with non-negotiability is the condition to 
achieve minimal agreement on the terms of coexistence. When compromising, i.e., when 
accepting CMV, citizens face the open possibility of belonging to a social minority or 
majority, i.e. to find themselves in an empowered or disempowered political position 
whilst certainly maintaining the liberty of leading the way of life they prefer. The 
compromising option secures stability and peace and thus keeps the possibility open for 
change. An alternative option for citizens would be to refuse to compromise (because 
of the sacredness or inviolability of their moral principles), thus choosing to run the risk 
of losing those conditions of order and security that guarantee them the ability to live 
according to their ideal. This loss they would be able to avoid only by constantly 
maintaining a position of power that may anyway be conditioned by manifold, but most 
importantly unpredictable, circumstances, let them be political or extra-political. It seems 
to me that the compromising option will always be preferable to the risk, because it 
enables citizens to preserve both their fundamental liberties and the possibility of gaining 
a position of power. The conquest and hold of power cannot be more than a possibility 
and, more than that, a temporary one. 
 
3.2. Provisional answers and peerhood 
A second duty of citizens of CMV consist of their readiness not to expect that 
political decisions will always be perfect solutions or impeccably mirror what they 
maintain to be justice or truth. From such duty derives a special requirement about the 
outlook on their fellow citizens as peers. I need to add at this point a provisory remark 
about the general idea of peerhood I am using. In reporting Benditt’s and Weinstock’s 
points of view on compromise, I referred to both epistemic and moral peerhood. CMV 
remains agnostic with respect to the debate about the structure and solution of epistemic 
and moral disagreement41. The purposes of CMV are genuinely political. So, the idea I 
                                            
39 “a concession does not consist of agreeing to receive less than one has an interest in obtaining, but rather in 
agreeing that one will receive less than what one regards as one’s entitlement”(Van Parijs 2012, 470). 
40 Martin 1948, 121. 
41 For an overview of such debate see Kelly 2005, Christensen 2007, Elga 2007 and Simpson 2013. 
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want to convey by the notion of “peerhood” is that political agents (citizens) are, from 
the perspective of CMV institutions, equally entitled to put forward their beliefs about 
the true, the good, the just. The way in which this minimalist, but above all political, 
connotation of peerhood affects individuals consist of their taking part to the same 
process (compromise), without an aprioristically determined judgement on the potential 
moral or epistemic imbalance among them. That is to say that no epistemic or moral, 
more or less authoritative, consideration can affect their entitlement to be a party in the 
compromise. Their duty is limited to the acknowledgement of such condition of 
peerhood. 
Compromise acquires a positive connotation only insofar as the focus of the 
political decision is on the finding of an adjustment that be satisfying from all standpoints 
and that be able to show a common way to act. Compromise is instead thought as a 
betrayal of one’s principles when the focus of the negotiating parties is on the 
irreconcilable nature of standpoints and on the interests of finding the unique correct solution 
to the conflicts of views, leading to the only right choice42. Parties, should accept that 
the deliberation will possibly not reach a unique, definitive, rationally achieved truth 
about the best (or, as in political liberalism, most just) decision. In contrast with the 
aspiration to represent disagreement as an ordered and reasoned debate leading to truth, 
compromise is meant to give a solution about the best course of action to take under a 
variable set of circumstances. In this sense, the preservation of peaceful coexistence 
takes priority over the realisation or political expression of (what is considered to be) 
truth. Of course, nothing prevents the quest for truth to be pursued, but when political 
decisions have to be taken, agents should be able to cooperate, and this requires a special 
outlook on their fellow citizens. 
Just as compromise entails peerhood amongst parties, agents involved in CMV 
should see themselves as equally legitimated in promoting their position. This has to be 
acknowledged in order to allow for a decision to be taken. It is important to highlight 
how this mutual recognition takes place although from the particular standpoints the 
others’ positions are not considered as equally valuable43. Parties should then display an 
open mind-set towards the plurality of claims that are part of the compromise. Amy 
                                            
42 See Fumurescu 2013. 
43 See Rintala 1969. 
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Gutmann and Dennis Thompson defined this mind-set as principled prudence and 
mutual respect as opposed to principled tenacity (if and agents looks for the unique right 
solution and thinks that she possesses it, she will not be available to negotiate it) and 
mutual mistrust (an agent does not consider my opponents’ opinion potentially as 
valuable as hers, therefore she focusses on their being wrong rather than their being as 
entitled as her to participate)44.  
Such availability to negotiation is far less demanding than the moral effort 
individuals are required to do in order to achieve consensus in a moralistic sense. In 
CMV they are not compelled to rethink their position in order to elevate pluralism to a 
disciplined and ex ante regulated form. In other terms, unlike reasonableness, CMV does 
not require that they revise their beliefs in order to overcome pluralism. On the contrary, 
it is sufficient that they give up the aspiration to impose at all costs their vision of the 
world and that they are ready to accept that other visions of the world (that they might 
consider wrong or false) gat to substantiate political decisions. In this sense, CMV 
realistically abstains from imposing a specific and highly demanding form of public 
reason, while maintaining normative power. 
 
3.3. Circumstances, variables, contingency 
Finally, CMV demands that citizens, as compromising agents, adjust their 
flexibility according to what present circumstances can allow. This duty calls them to 
broaden the potential possibilities conceded by their moral points of view and, 
consequently, implies the acknowledgement that this will not impinge on their quality as 
moral agents. Citizens of a CMV are aware of the possibility not seeing their deep moral 
convictions realised, but their compromise does not represent a betrayal or neglect of 
their morality: they are not giving up their moral commitment, they are only giving up 
resort to violent means to promote it in the public sphere. The higher goal of peace is 
the condition to keep the possibility open of having or not having to compromise again, 
and ultimately the possibility of promoting one’s moral view. A present compromise 
opens possibilities for the future, rather than cutting them off for the sake of ideal 
integrity45.  
                                            
44 Gutmann and Thompson 2010, 1130-1137. 
45 The resistance to negotiate some opinions that might be see as to valuable to be compromised (pointing at the 
negative connotation of the term “compromise”) might be motivated by a problem of preservation of integrity. 
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Agents should compromise because they take the circumstances of politics into 
account: “[f]actual uncertainty, moral complexity, the need to maintain a continuing 
cooperative relationship, the need for a more or less immediate decision of action and 
scarcity of resources constitute the circumstances of compromise”46. CMV is thus the 
best response given the circumstances because the agreement on reciprocal toleration 
leads to enduring peace and order, which are the fundamental purposes of the political47. 
Parties’ attitudes to negotiation are defined by their capability of taking the full context 
into consideration, that is to acknowledge their equal status as citizens (and not for an 
equal evaluation of their opinions). In fact, “[w]hen an issue is in dispute there is more 
to be considered than the issue itself – for example, the importance of peace, the 
presumption against settling matters by force, the intrinsic good of participating in a 
process in which each side must hear the other side out and try to see matters from the 
other’s point of view, the extent to which the matter does admit reasonable differences 
in opinion, the significance of a settlement in which each party feels assured of the 
other’s respect for its own seriousness and sincerity in the matter”48. 
CMV does not consist in the prioritisation of political values over moral ones, 
rather it is the realistic acknowledgement that an appeased context is the instrumental 
condition for the (various) ways of life to possibly coexist. In CMV citizens do not have 
to commit to some higher principles and revise their deep beliefs for the sake of a 
moralised consensus as in political liberalism, neither they are supposed to rely on mere 
balances of powers as in RMV. Their adherence to CMV, indeed, stems on the one hand 
from prudential considerations related to the actual possibilities of pursuing their plans 
of life and, on the other hand, it implies a commitment to keep the clashes among values 
                                            
Compromise theorists have reflected on the issue, highlighting how compromise can be a solution that preserves 
integrity. “As a largely formal notion, integrity is compatible with base as well as with lofty values and principles. 
… The notion of a pure or perfect integrity is at best a utopian ideal and at worst a recipe for fanaticism. … The 
resulting agreement, peace and good will, we hope, will ultimately be more conducive to preserving the overall 
pattern of our lives than continued conflict and acrimony. … Given a sufficiently complex characterization of the 
larger network of our values and principles, then, integrity – understood as wholeness as well as simple consistency 
and set in the context of an entire life – will occasionally require moral compromise”(Benjamin 1990, 73-74). “The 
involvement [compromission] is an immoral mixture of plans and principles of reference. There is no confusion 
in compromise [compromis] as in involvement. In compromise, everybody keeps her place, nobody is deprived of 
her justification order. … Compromise … is precisely the art of combining different levels of reference without 
confusing them” (Ricœur 1991, my translation). 
46 Benjamin 1990, 32. 
47 “Compromise between two equally tolerant and dynamic persons or groups is not doomed to point down and 
down to death through acceptance of the intolerable; it can point up and up toward infinite progress through 
mutual accommodation” (Smith 1942, 10-11). 
48 Kuflik 1979, 51. 
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be expressed in a civilized way, avoiding the disagreement to degenerate in conflict. 
Individuals accept to enter the compromise out of their necessity and urgency to find a 
solution to live together, aware that they are accepting a solution that might be, from 
their particular point of view, morally inferior to the one they would achieve without 
assuming a reciprocally accommodating disposition49. They are ready to accept a morally 
suboptimal outcome because their compromising is about political circumstances and 
not moral beliefs and convictions: compromise enables them to look at politics as a 
sphere of life where negotiation is not outlawed50. 
 
4. Conclusions 
I began this work with the intention to propose a version of liberalism that be 
also respectful of pluralism. Pluralism, the always evolving multifaceted variety of 
viewpoints about how life should be conducted (morally, culturally religiously, 
aesthetically) is a prominent character of contemporary societies. The disagreement it 
carries represents an ongoing challenge for politics: political decisions have to be taken 
that cannot always wait for the disagreement to be overcome or appeased. The question 
prompting my research was the search for a political strategy to cope with the unwanted 
consequences of disagreement without repressing the development and possible 
flourishing of pluralism. The answer must be a normative theory capable of addressing 
contemporary liberal democracies. I believe this theory is modus vivendi. 
I conceived CMV after observing how the narrative of negotiation and 
compromise is a constant in modus vivendi literature and after the revival and renewed 
debate around realist political theory. The resort to the ideas of compromise and the 
focus on the capacity to take the circumstance of the world into account when theorising 
is a substantial element in the history of political thought. Modus vivendi offers a new 
paradigm to conceptualise this attention typical of realist political theory. Liberal theory 
has been for long time dominated and is still indebted to Rawls’s work and to the ideal 
contractual model of political liberalism. Modus vivendi can be an alternative. Thus, for 
CMV to be a valuable alternative to the Rawlsian paradigm, it had to be conceived in a 
way that made it resistant to the most relevant objections raised against political 
                                            
49 Besussi 2012, 259-261. 
50 Margalit 2010. 
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liberalism. In order to accomplish this ambition, I looked into political liberalism, RMV, 
the literature on modus vivendi and the literature on compromise, identifying time after 
time, the desiderata that CMV should try to embody and the weaknesses that CMV should 
avoid. The framework in which I elaborated CMV is one of a non-ideal, non moralist 
and normative but moderately demanding theory.  
The concept of compromise represented the bedrock of this construction, while 
the pluralism typical of contemporary liberal democracies its background. Compromise 
accounts for the fact that individuals are bearers of different, often incompatible, moral 
aspiration but it also requires that they are ready to make concessions to each others. 
Citizens in a pluralistic society can tolerate each other, but that kind toleration would 
realistically imply a sceptical look towards points of view that do not correspond to 
theirs. Compromise is the concept that captures the action of finding an agreement 
(however provisional or long-lasting it can be) that encompasses the original distance, 
without presuming to represent a perfect overcoming of it. So, political decisions and 
the design of policies, but most importantly the very structure of the institutions, reflect 
the mutual concessions and the respective aspiration in the form of a conjunct decision. 
Such conjunct agreement is the best result politics can achieve when an overlap of (or 
within) points of view is impossible, that is when pluralism is taken seriously. In this 
sense compromise is the first “ingredient” of CMV: CMV does not optimistically rely 
on the intersection of moral aspirations (as in overlapping consensus), it rather 
contemplates the possibility that such intersection simply does not happen and that an 
effort has to be done in order to make a political decision. This capacity of CMV to take 
into consideration the actual dynamics of political agents, while normatively indicating 
the requirements of the compromising attitude, I consider being a prove of its non-ideal 
character. 
The second element of CMV is of course modus vivendi. While compromise tells 
about the disposition of agents to support CMV, modus vivendi informs, on the one 
hand, about the reasons they have to do so, and, on the other hand, about the reasons 
to support and maintain it in a decently stable way. I insisted in Chapter 2 on the idea 
that modus vivendi should not be a weakened version of political liberalism and I 
reflected on the role of the prudentiality of reasons in defining the very nature of modus 
vivendi. CMV (and its modus vivendi institutions) is accepted as second-best with 
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respect to the people’s originally held moral positions (what I called their dreams), but, 
as said, the conjunctly reached agreement is the best that could be politically achieved. 
This agreement does not have to take place for a specific type of reasons (as, for instance, 
the right reasons). On the contrary, the scope of good reasons to accept and support 
modus vivendi as the result of a compromise is as broad as pluralism is. The lack of 
definition of reasons causes stability of CMV to be light. This concept I called “light 
stability” corresponds to the idea that political decisions (even those about the 
fundamental structure of institutions) can be made without the political society to 
degenerate into chaos or conflict. There are good reasons not to overthrow institutions, 
even when they significantly change. When modifications such as constitutional reforms, 
reforms affecting governmental institutions, adjustments of electoral law, major changes 
in established institutions (such as marriage), citizens have a variety of good reasons to 
stick to their institutions. Citizens might indeed prioritise democratic political values and 
choose to support an unwanted decision because of their moral belief in the highest 
importance of democracy, but they might also comply to modus vivendi for reasons 
stemming from their particular moral point of view. 
Most importantly CMV abstains from categorising the multitude of plural reasons 
by at the same time proving one prudential reason that is sufficient to motivate 
compliance: the preservation of peace and order. It is this reason encouraging citizens 
to abstain from truly destabilising actions (for them, exiting from the society they live in, 
for the political society, conflict or revolution). The plural reasons to which CMV is open, 
mark its respect of pluralism as it is. The prudential reason by which there is an incentive 
to comply to CMV is the sign of its realist character. CMV is a normative realist theory 
as it highlights the distance between the role of political theory and the role of politics. 
Political philosophy can and should theorise about how political agents are and what is 
the just solution to their disagreement. However, in a realist framework, what the 
solution should be is to be left to politics to determine. CMV, without renouncing to 
normative relevance, brings back the focus of the political decision in context. 
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